

EAST EUROPE

Monthly Review of East European Affairs

What is Doing -
HUNGARY WITH HEARD AFTER

Wars and Wars in Poland -
HUNGARY 1918

The Party and the Nation -
HUNGARY FOR HUNGARY

A Note on Soviet Statistics
Soviet Contacts Abroad
Through Yugoslav Eyes
A Soviet Sample
Polish Federal Letter
On Hungarian History

NOVEMBER 1940

12 CENTS

Vol. 9—No. 11

V
O
L
9
1



Free Europe Committee, Inc.

OFFICERS

JOSEPH C. GREW
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
JOHN C. HUGHES
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
ERNEST A. GROSS
CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
ARCHIBALD S. ALEXANDER
PRESIDENT
BERNARD YARROW
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
THOMAS H. BROWN, JR.
ROBERT W. MINTON
C. RODNEY SMITH
VICE PRESIDENTS
THEODORE C. AUGUSTINE
SECRETARY AND TREASURER

MEMBERS

Clarence L. Adcock
Archibald S. Alexander*
Raymond Pace Alexander
A. A. Berle, Jr.*
Francis Biddle
Robert Woods Bliss
Robert F. Bradford
Harry A. Bullis
James B. Carey
Lucius D. Clay
William L. Clayton
Clark M. Clifford
Winthrop Murray Crane 3rd.*
Willis D. Crittenger*
Eli Whitney Debevoise*
Frank R. Denton
Frederic R. Dolbeare*
Mark F. Ethridge
James A. Farley
Julius Fleischmann
Joseph C. Grew*
Ernest A. Gross*
Charles R. Hook
Palmer Hoyt
John C. Hughes*
C. D. Jackson*
Henry R. Luce
Web Maddox
H. B. Miller*
Samuel E. Morison
W. B. Murphy*
Earl Newsom*
Irving S. Olds
Frederick Osborn
Whitney H. Shepardson*
George N. Shuster*
John A. Sibley
Spyros Skouras
Charles M. Spofford
Theodore C. Streibert*
Charles P. Taft
H. Gregory Thomas*
John C. Traphagen
Levering Tyson
DeWitt Wallace
W. W. Waymack
Walter H. Wheeler, Jr.
Charles E. Wilson
Mrs. Quincy Wright
Darryl Zanuck

* Board of Directors

EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

CONTENTS

THE MONTH IN REVIEW	1
HUNGARY FOUR YEARS AFTER	3
BATTLE FOR BELIEF	8
A NOTE ON SOME SOVIET STATISTICS— by Elizabeth Marbury	16
THE STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE	19
THROUGH YUGOSLAV EYES	20
"THE SUNLIT WAY"—by S. G. Strumilin	25
HE AND SHE	26
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS	34
TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS: POLISH PASTORAL LETTER	50
BACKGROUND OF REVOLUTION—by William E. Griffith	54

EAST EUROPE is a monthly review of political, economic, social and intellectual trends and events in the Soviet orbit. Information contained in this magazine is based on a thorough analysis by specialists from East European countries of all major Communist publications as well as the monitoring of Communist broadcasts.

Editorial Director: GEORGE LIEBER

Editor:

ALFRED GROSSMAN

Managing Editor:

FRANCIS PIERCE

Art Editor:

GEORGE GOODSTADT

Associate Editors:

OVIDIU ARDELEANU

JAMES CHACE

LUCY EDWARDS

IVANKO GABENSKY

SANDOR KISS

PAVEL KORBEL

JERZY PTAKOWSKI

MAXINE STEINMAN

GEORGE VICKERS

Circulation: BARBARA VEDDER

EAST EUROPE is published monthly, publication copyright 1960 by the Free Europe Committee, Inc., 2 Park Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. Material contained herein may be quoted up to 50 words without permission, provided acknowledgement is made to this publication. For longer reprints specific permission must be requested from the editor. Subscriptions are \$3.00 per year. All subscriptions and communications should be sent to the above address. Distribution by B. De Boer, 102 Beverly Road, Bloomfield, N. J.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

AFTER THE BALL

AND SO THE CAPTAINS and the kings, the Premiers and First Secretaries departed, and New York sat down hard, its eyes still round with the spectacle of the lord of half the universe pounding his shoe on his desk. It had been a period when every day succeeded in bringing forth its shock and surprise, but, perhaps mercifully, the actors from Eastern Europe played out their roles much as expected. Each lurch and thrust of the Khrushchevian line was dutifully followed, each assault on the common sense of the world obediently echoed. Perhaps Kadar of Hungary was a touch more servile in his defense of the destruction of the 1956 Revolt than might have been expected, perhaps Shehu of Albania was treated a shade more off-handedly by Khrushchev than might have been foreseen, but in general the puissant First Party Secretaries of Eastern Europe played a very dim role in the drama.

And it was no great surprise that somehow, without making any noise or fuss about it, Poland's Gomulka managed subtly to individuate himself from the rest. He followed his master with the pack; nevertheless, as master and other men did not, he sometimes paused to deliver such un-ideological, if desperate, good sense as: "We have quarreled in the past and we shall go on quarreling, but if we want to quarrel we must above all be alive to do it. The dead do not quarrel. And this is the heart of the matter. We are all in the same boat, and if it sinks we all sink with it." With which, surely, the world can agree. And which, amidst the rattle of rockets and discord of deterrents, bears saying.



SCANDAL

IF AGREEMENT AND HARMONY was the bloc's watchword abroad, at home there was a small but astonishing rupture: Poland requested that Albania withdraw its ambassador, charging that the offending diplomat had made sneering remarks about the quality and quantity of Polish "Socialism" and had mistreated a Polish servant. This sort of thing simply does not come out in the open between Communist bloc countries; whatever the reality, the mask of fraternal solidarity is always kept in place. Yet, unthinkable, it has occurred.

However trivial, although unique, this particular touch of scandal highlights the increasing alienation of Albania from the rest of the Soviet bloc. It is as yet more a question of tone than anything else: criticism of the Yugoslav "revisionists" is not unknown in the rest of the bloc (although increasingly rare) but only the Albanians continue to emit the note of shrillest Stalinist virulence. The rest of the bloc speak politely of Communist China, while making their oblique criticism of the current Chinese stand on the acceptability of atomic war, but Albania seems carried away by pro-Chinese fervor and explicitly praises the "correct" Chinese ideological stance. It was significant of this difference that at the recent Chinese National Day celebrations the only important East European Communist official present in Peiping was an Albanian Deputy Premier.

However spectacular the ideological defection of an East European country in a Soviet-Chinese disagreement, the roots of the matter must be sought in the Albanian Party's attitude toward Yugoslavia. This is a tangled skein, involving the Yugoslav tutelage of the young wartime Albanian Party, and subsequent Albanian subservience

until the 1948 break, as well as the question of the sizeable Albanian minority in the Yugoslav Kosovo. Now, as Albania sees an increasing friendliness in relations between Tito and the rest of the bloc, as Yugoslav "revisionism" changes from a major sin to a minor peccadillo with the rise of Chinese "dogmatism" as the prime ideological error, the Albanians seem to be increasingly panicky, thrashing out wildly at the Yugoslavs, hinting that everybody is straying from the proper path except Peiping and Tirana. It is a curious spectacle.

"DIRTY MANEUVERS"

THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE READILY recognized this odd Albanian-Chinese alliance and indeed stated, with justified exaggeration, that "perhaps the Chinese and Albanian leaders meet and toast each other so frequently" just because it gives them an opportunity to vilify in concert the Yugoslav leaders. Strikingly, it was only the propaganda organs of Albania and China that attacked Marshal Tito's actions at the General Assembly session, and the terms of attack were quite typical: "The effort of the Yugoslav revisionists," said the Albanian Party paper, "to create a 'third bloc' was an ignoble, dirty maneuver carried out only for the purpose of getting more dollars and, no doubt, millions of dollars will be paid to the Yugoslav flunkies for their valuable services."

Albania's is a very small voice, but when one's ears are long accustomed to a multi-throated monotone the least variation rings loud. It is certain that Moscow's ears are very much aware of these odd noises. It is possible to speculate that as Moscow becomes increasingly annoyed by the dogmatic and intransigent buzzing of the Albanian wasp it will in reaction become more tolerant to the kind of non-dogmatic flexibility represented by Gomulka.

KHRUSHCHEV AND MAO

THERE IS NO REASON WHATEVER to believe that the confrontation of blocs in New York has caused the Soviet Union and China to draw closer together against mutual enemies. Indeed, in his first major speech upon returning home, Khrushchev took great care to defend his trip to the UN against what seemed clearly to be Chinese criticism. After a reiteration of his demands for the reorganization of the UN—but omitting his threat to leave the organization if these demands were not met—the Soviet Premier carefully and at length went over the grounds of his disagreement with the Chinese Party. "We are," he said, "against fatalism, against inactivity on the questions of war and peace. We should not underrate and especially we should not overrate the potential of those imperialist forces which stand for the preparation of war. . . . The liquidation of the capitalist system is the crucial question for the development of society but only adventurers can believe that this change in social systems can be accomplished by unleashing wars between States. Social revolutions are not for export. They cannot be carried out by bayonets or by rockets."

THE LEAP

INDEED, THE MENTION OF "social revolutions" in this context suggests a link between tiny Albania and hulking China which does much to explain their odd current partnership. Both of them are in the painful primary stage of "social revolution" in which a traditional family-centered agricultural society is being brutally wrenched into the industrial world. Both of them are attempting the "great leap forward," with its incredible dislocation of life at all levels. Such an attempt is only possible under a tirade of propaganda and threat; always there must be the enemy, the malevolent imperialist, the wily revisionist, so that any failure can be laid to enemy machination, any hesitation can be denounced as "objectively" working for the enemy.

It should be remembered that Bulgaria, after Albania the most backward country of Europe, was until recently second only to Albania in anti-"revisionist" uproar. Now even Bulgaria has fallen relatively silent. Albania and China, heedless of outside influence, cry on.

Hungary

Four Years After

"There is now only one kind of suppression in our country: our State suppresses the attempts of former exploiters to bring about a restoration. There is no terror in our land. True, we have defended our regime against the enemy who launched an attack on it. But the last time there was terror in Hungary was from October 23 to November 4, 1956. That was a white terror. We defeated that terror, and since then there has been democracy again in the Hungarian People's Republic."

JANOS KADAR, Radio Budapest, April 3, 1960

IF WORDS ARE sometimes significant precisely because of their meaninglessness, then the above statement by Hungary's Communist chief (speaking, appropriately, in honor of the nation's 15th anniversary of "liberation") is full of import. What it amounts to is a confession that in the four years since the Hungarian Revolt, the Party and the people have remained light years apart. Certainly, Kadar could not have expected any sane citizen to digest such rubbish—however much he may subscribe to the theory that a lie repeated often enough obtains status as truth; and in offering it for public consumption to a country which only recently has been subdued by Soviet tanks, punished for its hopes, and repressed in almost every significant way, he must have been aware that his home audience would be impervious to anything he might say.

Held in contempt by the people it holds in thrall, the Hungarian Communist Party, as reconstituted after the 1956 Revolt, is a Party whose very existence was predicated on the sacrifice of all but the sheerest pretence of ideological influence. Shattered by the popular uprising, it has now been rebuilt to include 400,000 members (the pre-Revolt total was 900,000), possibly a notable achievement numerically, but hardly an indication of its theoretical appeal. The majority of recruits are described by numerous reports as careerists and opportunists—people motivated by cynicism or fear. And it is on this majority committed to the mechanism of power—and not the remaining "re-

visionists" or "dogmatists" in Party ranks—that Kadar is relying to carry out his "middle-of-the-road" course.

How middle-of-the-road Kadar's policy actually is, of course, remains open to question. Officially, while denouncing the "revisionist danger," he has rejected the abuses of the Rakosi era and increased the area of personal freedom denied by the former Stalinist leadership. But for his concessions—among which can be included the less obtrusive presence of the secret police in the post-Revolt period, and an estimated 15-20 percent rise in the living standard—he has reaped little praise.

Kadar has attempted to avoid excesses of Communist militancy—the Party daily, for instance, recently rebuked members of the Communist youth League, KISZ, for out-of-hand opposition to what previously would have been decried officially as "Western vices." "There is nothing wrong with entertainment, dancing, and fashionable clothes," the article asserted. "What is objectionable is lack of taste, conspicuous behavior, lack of culture or conceit." But the regime's tacit and overt encouragement of the population's current quest for material comforts and possessions*

*This policy, manifested partly in the regime's tolerance of various illegal economic deals, has been described as follows by the emigre writer Peter Kende in *The Review* (Brussels), July 1960: "Tired of constantly preaching sacrifices, even the Communist Party itself has come to help along the general bourgeoisification."



Archbishop Jozsef Grosz visiting a farm collective. The clergy's active support in promoting regime programs, such as collectivization, remains a basic goal of the State's present church policies.

Hungarian Review (Budapest), December 1958

are regarded by Hungarians as rights they themselves have won. The prevailing attitude in the nation today is that the Revolt, though suppressed, enforced certain changes for the better, and this outlook, according to various accounts, continually frustrates the Party in its campaign to elicit popular gratitude and support.

Furthermore, whatever concessions Kadar has made, he has been intransigent in his denunciations of the Revolt, and the ruthless persecution of the 1956 rebels has hardly raised him in the public esteem. In 1957, during the height of the reprisals, the regime claimed to have sentenced 3,021 persons for their part in the uprising. Subsequently, the Party stopped publicizing its roundup of rebels, probably to placate world opinion, but the arrests continued, and it is estimated that since the Revolt a total of 2,000 persons have been executed. British sources in Hungary recently reported that at the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, around 150 persons were sentenced to death—about ten under the age of 18.

A Soviet Colony

In all respects, the "middle line" of Kadar is a reflection of Soviet policy and if, on the one hand, the regime has tried to be conciliatory in some areas, its primary aim has been to carry out Communist programs as envisioned by the USSR. Recent travellers to Hungary claim that the Revolt has forced the Soviets to abandon their more obvious methods of plundering Hungary, although exploitation, of course, still exists. And in a visit to Hungary in November 1959, Premier Khrushchev tried to allay anti-Soviet sentiment by his ebullient presence. Attempting to

strike the note of "Soviet-Hungarian brotherhood," the Premier made inept references to the Russian part in suppressing the Hungarian revolution in 1848, and compounded the blunder by referring to the revolutionaries as a "small handful of reactionaries." His efforts notwithstanding, Khrushchev is considered to be the most hated man in Hungary today, and the nation a Soviet colony held in check by a puppet government and Soviet troops.

Although the Red Army has gradually disappeared from the surface of Hungarian life, the units around Budapest, even after being reduced in 1957, amount (in the most conservative estimates) to 50,000 to 80,000 men. This includes one tank division and a number of other mechanized infantry units. The capital is completely encircled by a ring of mobile forces; outside the capital, Soviet troops are strung along the Danube. In addition, directly across Hungary's borders, there is a massive concentration of Soviet forces in the Ukraine, and in Romania the USSR has built up a major communications and supply network. All airfields and ammunition dumps in Hungary remain in Soviet hands, despite the reconstruction under the strictest control of the Hungarian army (whose strength is now placed at 150,000 men—a 25 percent increase over 1959.)*

Details on the Soviets' interest in the Hungarian uranium mines have not been forthcoming, despite loud protests against Soviet exploitation at the time of the Revolt. Since 1958, the mining area has been kept under tight security guard reminiscent of the Rakosi era, and rumors circulating in the country assert that exclusive rights to the mines and the use of Hungarian uranium ore have been sold to the USSR for a period of 25 or 50 years at a scandalously low price. The only official statement on the subject to appear in the last three years was the following, published in the May 1960 issue of *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, the Party's theoretical review:

"Since the start of work connected with uranium, the Soviet government has given us many-sided and effective help. In geological prospecting, in surveying for uranium, and in organizing mining works, we owe a great deal to the qualified work of Soviet experts who, hand in hand with Hungarian experts, are laying the foundations of this . . . new branch of our industry. But over and above expert and organizational help, the USSR made it possible to realize the large-scale investments required for setting up the uranium industry by large-scale interest-free credits and by the delivery of installations. In view of the difficult position of our people's economy at the time, we would

*The Soviets controlled the border installations until 1958, when the installations were modernized and handed over to select Hungarian units. The Soviets are probably also present in the large sealed-off area of the Bakony Mountains in the Western part of the country. Although the USSR denies that it has rocket missile bases in the Satellites, sources in Hungary continually refer to rocket launching sites in the area and some evidence was supplied to confirm this in the espionage trial of Karoly Heidt, a West German citizen sentenced to eight years imprisonment last summer by a Budapest military court. During the trial Heidt testified that his task in Hungary was to contact two men who were able to supply information on rocket launching sites. This part of his testimony, recorded by a Western observer, was not mentioned in any of the reports by the Communist press agencies.

have been unable—and are still unable—to effect these large investments ourselves. In addition, the USSR undertook to purchase from us, at a price higher than that prevailing on the world market, the uranium ore exceeding the requirements of the Hungarian people's economy."

In general, the full facts on Hungarian-Soviet trade relations have not been made public. During the uprising, the Hungarian rebels attempted to expose and put an end to Soviet economic exploitation by making the demand that the price lists of Hungarian goods exported to the USSR be made public. The Kadar regime adamantly called such demands "counterrevolutionary" and to this day has maintained an unbroken silence on the subject. Information available on the prices of Hungarian imports from the USSR provides evidence, however, that Hungary—like the other Satellites—has disadvantageous terms of trade with the USSR. In 1958, Hungary's total imports from the USSR were valued at \$200,500,000. Thirty-four of the items imported—and valued at \$160,000,000 or 80 percent of the total—were items that were also sold by the USSR on the free world market. It seems that Hungary paid \$24,375,000 more for these thirty-four commodities than did the other purchasers.*

The Economy

IMMEDIATELY AFTER the 1956 uprising, the main economic task of the Kadar regime was to rebuild the nation's destroyed industry. By the end of 1958, recovery—made possible by substantial aid from the USSR and the Satellites and inconceivable without it (in 1957, for example, such aid financed half of Hungary's imports)—was finally accomplished. During the recuperation period, the regime had adopted a "go slow" policy: in 1957, to placate the bitter and disillusioned populace, the emphasis in industry was on the consumer sector, with the result that more and cheaper goods appeared on the market; and the original targets of the Three Year Plan, launched in 1958, were, for the most part, cautious.

In 1959, however, the government changed its policy. It announced that its goals had been too modest, and in March of that year embarked on an economic speedup. It publicized its intentions of fulfilling the major provisions of the Three Year Plan in two years, began a large-scale collectivization drive in the countryside, and in December 1959, promulgated a new Five Year Plan reminiscent, in many respects, of the first Five Year Plan carried out in the years 1950-1954.**

While official statements on the speedup emphasize that Hungary's future industrial development must be in accordance with the nation's own resources and capabilities, it is clear that any such development presupposes increased effort from the people. Since 1959, the regime has revived the old Stalinist devices of work brigades and labor competitions to step up production, and lately there has

been a movement to increase workers' norms. The new plan, in fact, involves a 37-40 percent increase in labor productivity, which means that about two-thirds of the total planned increase in industrial production (set at 65-70 percent over 1958) is to come from greater output per worker. This presumably is to be made possible by technological advances.

The failure to increase productivity in the first half of 1960, as compared with the latter half of 1959, has already created some difficulty. In an effort to ensure plan fulfillment, the industrial ministries and the Planning Office sent committees to various factories to examine wage and norm conditions and, according to reports from Hungary, there recently have been considerable norm increases, particularly in the foundry and machine industries which, along with the chemical industry, are considered to be the most important to the economy. The first enterprise affected by the "examination" was the Lang Machine Factory, where the norms of 700 workers were raised on an average of 12 to 19 percent as of July 1, 1960.

Articles in the Communist press have hinted at large-scale resistance to this action, not only by workers but by managers as well. The Party daily *Nepszabadsag* (August 4, 1960) called upon workers and members of factory Party organizations not to be "spokesmen for the backward strata," and the trade union paper *Nepszava* (August 7, 1960) intoned: "According to the ironworkers' trade union, factory leaders who do not see fit to change [i.e., raise] norms in view of technological changes . . . are violating the laws and regulations in force."



Khrushchev during his first public visit to Budapest after the Revolt. The time: the 1958 anniversary of Hungary's so-called liberation.

Hungarian Review (Budapest), May 1958

* See Horst Mendershausen, "The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis," *The Review of Economic Statistics*, May 1960.

** For details on Hungary's economic plans see *East Europe*, January 1960, pp. 19-21.

Farm Collectivization

THE RETURN to emphasis on heavy industry and the increase in norms can be expected further to demoralize Hungary's urban population. In the countryside, morale has already reached an all-time low. By a great "leap forward" in early 1959, the regime tried to make up for the large-scale dissolution of farm collectives in the 1956 uprising. The collective sector rose from 14.6 to 36.6 percent of the total arable land, and the total "Socialist sector" (with the inclusion of State farms) amounted to 52 percent of the arable land. Since that time, with a second wave of collectivization, the "Socialist sector" has been increased to almost 75 percent, and complete collectivization is scheduled for the near future.

Although few of the reports reaching the West from private citizens in Hungary speak of actual violence or brutality in the campaign, almost all of them describe an atmosphere of fear and despair. The individual farmers are being taxed out of existence, the countryside is infiltrated with brigades of Party recruiters and cadres to manage the collectives, and young peasants are fleeing to the cities in droves. Since the first wave of collectivization, agricultural production has been disrupted and the markets, previously well-stocked, are showing the effects. In the cities there are recurring shortages of meat, bread, vegetables and fruit. One woman from Budapest recently wrote: "When poultry is available, the market looks like a boxing ring. It is impossible to plan a meal in advance."



May Day festivities in Budapest. Stalin's statue, formerly in the Square, was destroyed in the 1956 Revolt. In its place, a Red Star.

Hungarian Review (Budapest), May 1960

Mechanization is not adequate to compensate for the rural manpower shortage, and most of the new collectives are disorganized and lacking in sufficient capital. Unofficial accounts of conditions in the countryside refer to constant delays and quarrels on the kolkhozes and claim that resistance to collectivization is spurred by the low incomes of long-standing kolkhoz members. Some of the young people who have fled to the cities send money home to support their families. They insist that the older peasants do not want them to stay on the farms because they see no future in collectivization. One desolate report from a collectivized community read as follows: "The village has changed since February. The dispossessed farmers are embittered and former abstainers now drink daily and family squabbles are the order of the day." Regardless of peasant resistance and past experience, the regime evidently believes it can now make collectivization work.

The Cultural Scene

WHATEVER HEADWAY the Party may have made economically, it has made few advances on the cultural scene in the past four years, and in science, literature and the arts there continue to be manifestations of hostility to the regime. This fact was admitted by the Party's chief ideologist Gyula Kallai at the Party Congress last year and is documented by frequent press criticism of the "lack of ideological content" in artistic and intellectual works.

In particular, the Party's effort to break the resistance of the nation's writers, who played a major part in the 1956 Revolt, represents a chronicle of failure. The battle began immediately after the Revolt, when Kadar tried and failed to win over the leading intellectual rebels. Faced with obstinate resistance, Kadar disbanded the Writers' Union, imprisoned such prominent literary figures as Tibor Dery and Gyula Hay, along with a number of their colleagues, executed several journalists, and threatened the writers still at liberty with penury unless they quickly returned to the fold. In this period, literary activity in Hungary was carried on by a small band of the faithful—mostly Party hacks and opportunists, who had little influence in the field.

Despite threats and cajolery, the writers held out. They embarked on what has been described as a "silence strike," refusing to put pen to paper for publication unless something was done for their compatriots in jail. Desperately, in 1958, the Party sought to end the silence by attacking the core of resistance. It embarked on a campaign to discredit the populist movement and its most eminent writers—among them the non-Communist authors Gyula Illyes and Laszlo Nemeth. The aim, aside from puncturing the influence of these writers, was to draw them out of their isolation into debate. This tactic failed despite numerous denunciations of the populists for supporting the "counter-revolutionaries," being precursors of "national Communism" and having ties with "the imperialists," "the racists" and "the chauvinists." On October 10, 1958, the editor-in-chief of *Elet és Irodalom* complained: "The silence of



"Combat" is the name of this statue by Sandor Mikus. It depicts the crushing of the Hungarian "counterrevolution," shown as a serpent.

Hungarian Review (Budapest), April 1959

the populist writers is the more incomprehensible as it has the effect of defying the patience of the Party as shown in the field of literary criticism. . . . Perhaps there are individuals who interpret this silence differently. I myself, and probably every sensible person, feel that the populist writers are—to put it mildly, disloyal. They have kept silent for two years instead of explaining their old attitude and helping the Hungarian people to forge ahead."

In September 1959, the Party formed a new Writers' Association whose aim, according to Gyula Kallai, was to assert "in its work the important principles of Party leadership . . . to support creative literary work in building a Hungarian Socialist-realist literature, and to support the writers' ideological and professional progress. . . ." (*Magyar Nemzet*, September 26, 1959). In the spring of 1960, in the course of an amnesty, the Party finally released Tibor Dery and Gyula Hay from prison after much pressure from writers in the international PEN Club. Although recently there have been signs that the silence strike is breaking down, neither Dery nor Hay nor such writers as Zoltan Zelk and Tibor Tardos (prominent leaders in the Revolt who were imprisoned but released earlier) have made their reappearance in Hungarian literary life. And it is unlikely that the Kadar regime will ever win such men to its cause.

From numerous reports it appears that the Party's main efforts in the ideological field are being directed toward the very young—despite the glaring example of the failure of such indoctrination provided by the Revolt. But there is no choice; the Party can hope for very little from those who were totally disillusioned by the bloody suppression of 1956 and who today are trying to live as best they can in an atmosphere over which they have little control.

The Lesson

Hungarians tell a story of a young peasant who went to his village schoolmaster in search of enlightenment. "Tell me," Laszlo asked, "what is this dialectics I hear so much about?" The schoolmaster shook his head. It was a difficult question, he emphasized, but he would try to explain. "Now listen to me, Laszlo. Two men go to the river. One is dirty, the other is clean. Which one takes a bath?" "The dirty one," Laszlo answered. "No, no," the schoolmaster protested. "You've got it all wrong. The dirty one is used to dirt. It's the clean one who bathes. Now, try again. Two men go to the river. One is dirty, the other clean. Which one bathes?" "The clean one," Laszlo said triumphantly. "No, no! The dirty one, because he is dirty. Try to concentrate. Two men go to the river. One is dirty, the other clean. Which one bathes?" Laszlo brooded for a few minutes. "The dirty one," he said finally. The schoolmaster rubbed his nose in exasperation. "No, Laszlo. They both bathe. The dirty one because he is dirty, and the clean one because—" "Stop it!" Laszlo cried. "I don't understand a word you're saying. It doesn't make sense!" "Ah," the schoolmaster replied. "Now you understand the meaning of dialectics."



Christmas in a peasant home in the Polish provinces.

Nasza Ojczyzna (Warsaw), December 1959

Battle for Belief

This is the second of two articles on the struggle against religion in Eastern Europe. The first, in the October issue, dealt with the Communist concept of freedom of conscience and the campaign to discredit religious belief by "scientific" argument.

Ethics and Society

THE COMMUNIST VIEW of religion's role in society is clear-cut and poses little theoretical or practical difficulty: religious ideas and precepts are simply instruments in the class war. Injunctions to humility and universal love, the offer of the compensations of eternity to those who meekly bear the inequities of life on earth—such notions of duty and justice are advanced by the lords of society to protect and justify their own lordship.

The Communists recognize that even in a society which has set foot on the road to Communism, enlightenment, and "classlessness," many believers cling to religion, less as a metaphysical than as a moral guide. *Věcni Praha* (Prague), October 31, 1959, spoke of the "many" who had long abandoned orthodox church dogmas but who still believe in Judeo-Christian ethics and "fear that the destruction of religion might lead to moral debasement." Young people, even if they reject the validity of saints and miracles, often defend religion as a system of morality: "The students understand religious morality as a universal morality; they point out that even if these ideals have never been completely realized they were considered imperatives in all previous societies and play an important role today as well. They say that religious ethics helps them in their personal life . . . in finding a positive attitude . . . and providing a standard of right and responsible conduct."¹

The claim that there is a supra-rational being who gives a moral order to the universe and is the basis of both individual and social virtue is, to the Communists, one of the most pernicious concepts of religion. "Religious apologists argue the eternal justification of religion on the grounds that there is no moral value without faith and that without morality no human society is imaginable. . . . The essence of morality is faith in God, without which 'man is the same as those beings who lack intellect.' In other words, without religious morals men are not human beings but animals. This conception, which misleads many well-intentioned persons, presupposes a single link between men—i.e., the religious bond."²

This, the Communists contend, is a patently misleading conception of human solidarity, the only relevant bond being that of class interest. Whether religious doctrine divides and judges men in terms of the religious faith they hold, or postulates the unity and equality of all "under God," its assumptions about the basis and values of human society are completely opposed to the central Marxist-Leninist thesis that relations between men are determined by their "class origin" and economic function.

Change and Reform

Whatever their content or context, religious movements cannot, by Marxist law, advance human progress. To the

question "raised by a number of readers" whether there had not been occasions, such as the Hussite period in Czech history, when religion had a progressive function, a Czechoslovak paper replied that the Reformation led by Jan Hus merely happened to coincide with the collapse of feudalism, and that it was not really a religious movement but a social one "employing religious terminology." Religion is always and inevitably on the side of reaction, the paper assured its readers.³

Contemporary movements for social or economic reform inspired by religious bodies or doctrines are similarly dismissed. "Since they are unable to conceal the existence of misery to the working classes, religious ideologies sometimes resort to hypocritical criticism of capitalism. The deep and incurable plagues of contemporary bourgeois society are presented as small isolated blemishes which have to be patched up. The way in which religion understands this can be deduced from the demagogic sermons on cooperation between classes, industrial peace, etc., which is an appeal for peace between exploiter and exploited."⁴

A certain moderation in the criticism of religious ethics is currently discernible in the Soviet bloc. Religious standards of conduct in family and civil life, and more recently, religious teaching on peace and universal brotherhood, are found to be "not in conflict" with the regimes' drives to curb crime and social irresponsibility at home and to promote peaceful coexistence abroad. The Hungarian trade union monthly *Munka* (Budapest), January 1960, recalled that Thomas Munzer, the leader of the German peasant uprising, invoked the Bible when branding the exploitation of serfs as robbery. "Let us add that today many people condemn the bloodshed of war in a similar manner [i.e. on religious grounds]. They stress the importance of industry, honesty, unselfishness, and purity in family life. They even emphasize that damaging social property is a crime and that fulfilling one's duties to the State is a virtue." The fact that, historically, religious morality served the exploiting classes "should not lead us to the conclusion that religious people are individually immoral," the paper said.

Such tenuous conjunctions of principle do not obscure the fact—to either side—that conceptually, if not always practically, Communist and theological ethics are on divergent planes. The split is most conspicuous between Communism and Catholicism as they simultaneously cooperate and compete for moral authority in Poland. *Polityka*, the organ of the Gomulka regime, thus categorically rejected a statement in the Pax (pseudo-Catholic) organ *Kierunki* that "there is no absolute contradiction between Catholic and lay ethics." While commending the tolerance of this position, as compared to the orthodox Catholic repudiation of all secular systems, *Polityka* said that, beyond the well-known differences in the secular and religious view of such matters as abortion and illegitimacy (what *Polityka* called "the traditional small-town moral dilemmas"), it must be understood that "Socialist ethics occupies a special place among the systems of secular ethics. . . . It links the concept of good to social progress and the struggle for Socialism." The paper went on to fundamental points of opposition on both the theoretical and practical levels:

"Exploitation of the fruits of someone else's labor is, from the point of view of Socialist ethics, something abnormal; Catholic ethics sanctions private property, which is the basis of exploitation, and gives it wide theoretical justification as a 'natural law'. . . . The conflict between Catholic and lay ethics is also apparent in the current question of attitude toward social property. The position of Socialist ethics on this requires no explanation. Catholic ethics, however, includes the principle of *occulta recompensatio* which grants the moral right to reward oneself on the quiet if the compensation for one's work is inadequate.

"The class significance of Catholic ethics is also clearly visible in the attitude toward authority and . . . State laws. State laws, according to moral theology, are obligatory for a Catholic conscience only when they conform to God's laws and are not contrary to religious morality. In practice, the first to come into conflict with religious morality appear to be the legal acts of the Socialist State. . . . It is thus difficult to talk about a common platform on which religious and lay ethics meet or about the similarity of natural ethics of both systems.⁹ . . ."

Communist ethical doctrine—whose premises are the "relativism" of all ideas of morality and the principle of "justification by necessity"—is unequivocally condemned as perverse by all Western religions; and it has also been found less than adequate by those who do not reject its premises *a priori*. The Communist movement, based on an ideal of social equality and justice, has always represented itself as the moral superior of all other social systems. But from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Hungarian Revolt, the large-scale decampments (whether formal, as in the Western Parties, or "internal," as in Communist-controlled countries) of Communists from the "cause" have always been on primarily moral grounds. For the ordinary citizen living under a Communist regime (remote from the crises of conscience of Party intellectuals), what is presented as "Socialist" ethical precepts, consisting almost exclusively of the duty to work and to put the interests of the "collective" ahead of other individuals or private concerns, occupies about the same dimension of moral profundity as a set of police traffic regulations.

"The Individual Human Being"

In a survey of the views of students at Cracow University, *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), No. 9, 1960, cited a young man who follows the Church but who "cannot be considered a bigot, a militant, or even a so-called good Catholic." He scorns religion—any religion—as a means for knowing the world, said the paper, but he sees in it a system of mental guidance. "Marxism, even if it is conceived of as a religion, does not lend itself to this. . . . The present state of Marxist philosophy shows certain weaknesses, a fact often commented upon by certain writers (including Adam Schaff);* it overlooks a certain range of problems, among them the question of the individual human being, his existence as an entity."

* Leading Polish Marxist theoretician.

"We consider it correct to state that religious morals have not yet a sufficient counter, that we do not offer our youth an adequate replacement," said *Tvorba* (Prague), February 4, 1960. However, the Communists maintain, the problem lies not in the absence of a practical "Communist" ethic but in their failure to codify and popularize it for the masses. *Tvorba* argued against adopting the "oversimplified methods of religious teaching—i.e., catechizing and moralizing." The Hungarian regime, on the other hand, seems to favor an unabashed imitation. A recent editorial called for the construction of a "Ten Commandments of Socialist Morals" which would replace the Old Testament version. The development of Socialist society, said the paper, would be spurred by "working out for our whole society fundamental principles, deriving from the essence of our regime, in a clear unambiguous manner comprehensible to the masses." For the sake of easier consumption, these rules should be given a "concise and poetic epigrammatic formulation."^{**}

Religion In Practice

ESCHewing PARTY clichés on the subject of the social role of religion, a Warsaw journalist, Dionizy Tanalski, though himself a professed non-believer, asserted in an article in the Polish press that religion is neither a yoke foisted on the masses nor yet an empty ritual, but rather that it uniquely meets certain felt requirements of its followers. Its major function, which is in the countryside, is not primarily a matter of providing a speculative "world view": "The Church understands the needs of the peasant relatively well," Tanalski said. "The country priest does not hold theoretical conferences. He has other things to do. Here, he must arrange a procession in the fields . . . there, a farmer wants him to bless the new house he has built . . . now, he must supervise the baking of wafers . . . bless a herd of sheep. There are infants to be baptized, young people to be married, old folks to be buried. All these things the people need. They need them not only for eternal salvation, but for life on earth. We should not make the mistake of thinking that all these tasks are only the priest's interest. It is the faithful who are concerned with them, who demand them. That is why the countryside needs a priest. That is why the people drop their money on the tray each Sunday, and why they pay—sometimes with difficulty—for the privilege of receiving certain sacraments."

The church, with its elaborate ceremonial, is a source of aesthetic beauty, often the only such source in the rural community. (The church organ, typically, may be the community's only musical instrument.) Tanalski termed

^{**} Readers' comments on this proposal, subsequently published, suggested that since the fundamental principles of Socialist morals are universally valid in every Socialist country, the elaboration of the "Ten Commandments" should not be the work of a single country. It was suggested that the Hungarian Institute for Philosophical Science convoke an International Socialist Congress on Ethics: "The outcome of such a Congress would be very inspiring and indeed, revolutionary in the history of ethics." (*Nepszava* [Budapest], April 4 and May 14, 1960.)

AGAINST THE CLERGY

One of the oldest means of anti-religious propaganda is to blacken the morals and motives of the clergy. Tales of drunken revelry in monasteries, of financial chicanery and religious hoaxes, are still widely disseminated in the Soviet bloc press. The "confessions" and renunciations of disillusioned seminarists and apostate priests are a regular feature of the provincial newspapers.

The Communists also seem to be concerned with discouraging the younger generation from taking up clerical vocations: thus, the clerical life may alternatively be represented in less lurid terms, as not so much criminal as futile, a lamentable waste of young lives and energies. The Bulgarian newspaper *Borba* (Turnova) recently quoted an Orthodox priest who had labored in monasteries "day and night" for 14 years "without pay." When, in dire need he applied to the Metropolitan's office for the means to buy shoes, he was accused of the sin of avarice, whereupon he abandoned holy orders. A Burgas newspaper cited a former priest in Yambol who "exchanged his cassock for overalls" because he felt that his mission was superfluous. Another former priest described his existence as "a living death" until he was "resurrected" by returning to society and taking his place in it as "an administrative employee." In his free time he reads scientific atheist literature and hopes to become in the near future one of its "most fervent propagandists." (*Otechestven Glas* [Plovdiv].)

The Hungarian *Elet es Irodalom* viewed with mixed distaste and pity the appearance of two young seminarists on the streets of Esztergom: "Two children are coming towards us—nice young boys. Girls turn around because they are good-looking, charming and healthy. We too stare at them. . . . Two seminarists, two black cassocks, gliding black shadows. Anachronisms! The boys appear so strange in this era and belong so much to the past that they do not even arouse a lively passion, merely surprise—for gradually the weapons with which we attacked them as a historically outmoded phenomena will be exhibited in museums. . . . They are reduced to a futureless and sterile life . . . while around them more and more exciting perspectives are opening out. . . ."

"It is possible to assume the burdens of privation, poverty and asceticism and to cast aside the pleasures of youth for the sake of the great ideals of mankind which further its progress. But what kind of senseless sacrifice is that of the two boys? To sacrifice their young lives for the sake of a dead ideal? For a bubble of the Middle Ages, a bubble which bursts at the contact of the first real object?"

the church ritual an "exotic element" in the Polish countryside, "richly embroidered and endowed with an aura of mystery: no wonder it is so highly valued by rural Catholics." The religious pilgrimage provides "an excellent occasion to break the routine of life and see new places and things in addition to any spiritual experiences it may provide."

Another human need met by the Church is that of organized, non-utilitarian contact between men, especially among peasants who often lead extremely isolated lives and for whom the unifying role of religion is considerable.

Thus the main function of religion in the country is "direct aid in concrete matters of daily life." The theoretical or "ideological" aspect is secondary to this, Tanalski averred.⁶

The Bulgarian Party Agitators' Handbook for September 1960 stresses the point that religion is as much a matter of social custom as of ideas, and warns that it cannot be fought solely by the dissemination of "scientific" atheistic ideas or attacks on its reactionary role in the class struggle.

It is with religion as "a way of life" that the East European regimes must contend on a practical level. Religious customs and observances not only perpetuate religious ideas and sentiments but are directly inimical to Communist economic organization. Practices such as fasting "impair the capacity for work," the Communists complain, and attendance at religious festivals and church services leads to mass absenteeism in field and factory.

The regimes conduct a war of attrition against the Church holy days and festivals: the Sabbath, Saints' days,* Christmas and Easter, among others. These are seen as an alien and incongruous intrusion on the cult of labor. "Religious survivals are causing, directly and indirectly, enormous material damage to collectives' production," complained the Czechoslovak *Nase Pravda* (Gottwaldov): "It is by no means rare for kolkhoz workers to refuse to work on Sunday, even when this means immediate losses to the cooperative effort. . . ." *Trud* (Sofia), January 8, 1960, rebuked "the worshippers of 'saints' and wine—the violators of labor discipline" who, at a time when the Christo Smirnenki plant in Sofia was filling an urgent order, left work early in order to celebrate Christmas Eve. Moslem women who attend Friday religious meetings, according to the Bulgarian press, lose 78 days a year in the fields apiece.

Holidays and Festivals

RATHER THAN outright suppression of the main Church festivals, such as Christmas and Easter, the regimes are trying to neutralize them. In Bulgaria and Romania, Christmas is still a regular working day (as it was throughout except in Poland under Stalin); but since 1956, the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak regimes have tolerated the traditional religious observances. (In 1956, for the first

* A side campaign is waged against the custom of naming children after the calendar saints and the subsequent celebration of name-days rather than birthdays. *Vecerni Praha* (Prague) said that the names of the Christian saints are "alien and mean nothing to our people," and called for the preparation of new calendars with names "closer to our people and our conditions."

ATTITUDES AND ASSUMPTIONS

Analyzing the religious and moral attitudes "revealed" by a poll of Polish youth, Radio Warsaw, in a program series in August 1960, deduced that youth is at the same time less religious and more moral than is widely believed in Poland. A considerable diversity and inconsistency in views was allegedly found among believers:

"Among those persons who consider themselves Catholics, one sixth do not believe that the world was created by God. Over two thirds do not condemn abortion. Only one fifth regard the spreading of Christianity throughout the world as of prime importance for humanity."

The survey indicated that religious allegiance was not compelling. "To the question of whether one would sacrifice one's convictions for a loved one, 84 percent of the professed Catholics gave an affirmative answer. It is worth noting for comparison that among those regarding themselves as Communists, less than 10 percent replied in the affirmative. . . ."

Allegiance to Catholicism does not determine either political or moral views, Radio Warsaw maintained. "Among professed Catholics there are, according to their own statements, persons of quite radical political views."

Turning to the basic moral values of youth as shown by the poll, Radio Warsaw observed that "it could be safely said that all the crying over the general demoralization of youth appears, at the very least, to be exaggerated, if not completely groundless. True, a complete conclusion about morality cannot be drawn on the basis of moral judgements alone, since the moral character of an individual is the sum of both judgements and deeds. Nevertheless, the recognition of certain things as moral and of others as immoral is

of great importance. . . . It is significant that over 30 percent of those polled regard an increase in honesty in the community as the most important moral problem today.

"Such actions as theft of common property, lying for personal gain, marital infidelity, violation of the military oath, and lack of conscientiousness in work are condemned by the great, in some cases overwhelming, majority. . . ."

"If we accept judgements as a criterion this presents a picture of a fairly rigorous standard of morality. And contrary to what is still proclaimed in some quarters, this rigorous morality is not contingent on religious belief. Persons professing to be atheists condemn more categorically than do the believers such actions as theft of public property or lying for personal gain. . . . It can clearly be said that the poll has shattered one of the most stubborn legends—the legend of the moral decline of youth, caused by a religious decline."

In contrast to this sanguine (from the regime's point of view) appraisal of the poll's results, the weekly *Argumenty* (Warsaw), organ of the Association of Freethinkers and Atheists, in reference to what was evidently the same survey, showed the other side of the coin—the beliefs of the professedly "Communist" portion of the sample: "Those who conducted the survey have asserted the fact that 14.5 percent of Communist students and 10.6 percent of socialist students expressed the opinion that the spreading of Christianity over the entire world is of supreme importance for humanity. A very large percentage of youths professing to be Communists and Socialists not only [hold this opinion] but actually believe in a number of Church dogmas, attend religious services, and intend to give their children a religious education. . . ."



Prague's newest citizens are addressed by a Pioneer in the ceremony devised by the Communists to displace church christenings. Vlasta (Prague), February 4, 1960

time since 1948, the churches in Prague were reported "filled to the doors" with worshippers at Christmas Eve Mass.) But the regimes are trying to reduce these holidays, first by divesting them of any religious significance and symbolism. (A wistful note was struck in a Czechoslovak newspaper account of how mothers had pleaded with a teacher in an elementary school not to deprive their children of the traditional legends of Saint Nicholas and "Little Jesus"; the teacher refused to comply because she held it "the duty of the teacher to free even the littlest children from superstition and religious holidays.") However, decorating trees, exchanging presents, holding family gatherings are officially approved as good for morale. "People's customs and holidays, purged of all religious and superstitious remnants, should be observed in our present life. . . . Such festivities inculcate a spirit of patriotism and national self-respect," declared *Narodno Mladej* (Sofia), December 11, 1959. Denouncing the religious holidays as stultifying to the popular "consciousness" and harmful to the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan, *Narodna Delo*

(Varna), December 30, 1959, said: "Socialist society has its own holidays, optimistic in nature. The day of the Great October Revolution . . . September Ninth . . . May First . . . the New Year. These are connected with the new victories of human genius, and their celebration is a stimulus to new successes on the road to Communism."

In taking over or supplanting the Christian holidays, the Communists claim merely to be following the example of the early Christian Church's appropriation of earlier pagan festivals. In the USSR, the All-Union Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (the main organization for anti-religious propaganda) recently held a conference on holidays, ceremonies and "new traditions." Suggested occasions for new public solemnities were: the "jubilees" of factories and kolkhozes, the completion of the economic year, the fulfillment of the annual Plan.


According to the reports at this conference, "great strides" have been taken in this direction in some Soviet "Republics." In Lithuania, ten new festivals are allegedly already being widely observed: the winter festival, replacing Shrovetide; the spring festival, replacing Easter; a tree-planting and sowing festival to replace Whitsuntide, etc. When such festivals fall at the same time as patron saints' days, "the churches remain entirely empty," the report said.

Ceremonies and Rites

Even people who are only lukewarm in their religious attachment still look to the church to validate the important occasions of their personal lives, the Communists note, and pay tribute to the effectiveness of the church ceremonial in "stirring the emotions and the imagination." Whereas once the Communists had thought merely to secularize marriage and eliminate the other church ceremonies, they are now trying to compete with a matching set of new "Socialist" rites. True materialists, the Communists seek to lend the "drama" of the ancient church ritual to these Socialist ceremonies by staging them with lavish decorations, pomp and pageantry. The repeated use of the word "ornate" in the official descriptions of these performances is indicative.

The new ceremonies are handled by civil affairs boards at the national committees or people's councils. To replace the Church rite of baptism, a "name-giving" ceremony for newborn babies has been designed. *Krety* (Prague) hailed the new ceremony and the laudable absence of "the false baptismal font and the church mysticism." *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) April 8, 1959, gave an account of a name-giving ceremony in Krtiny where "the Pilgrim's Cathedral of the Virgin Mary now has to vie with the National Committee, the organ of the people's power." One of the cited superiorities of the new form is the gift presented to the child by the Pioneer (Communist) children's organization, and the lack of any fees.

The newest of these spangled rites is called "citizens' inauguration," at which identity cards are handed out to 16-year-olds; it is evidently the Communist answer to Confirmation. The first "citizens' inauguration" in Budapest took place last February. Two hundred boys and girls took



Processional for the consecration of the reconstructed Warsaw Cathedral which took place last June. Religious processions and pilgrimages are still a characteristic feature of the Polish scene.

Tygodnik Powszechny (Cracow), June 19, 1960

part (by "ornate" invitation), and the ceremonies were attended by leading government, Politburo, Youth League and Police officials.⁷

There have been numerous complaints in previous years of the bleakness of the civil marriage ceremony, perfunctorily performed by magistrates in "antechambers filled with clients settling other matters." Now, reports the Polish press, in Kielce Province "the solemnity and importance of the marriage contract is emphasized not only by the words of the magistrate but by the whole interior: the style of the furniture, the carpets, the flowers harmonizing with the Renaissance architecture of the parlor. . . ." Special "wedding halls" have been established in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Prague, "the halls have taken on a festive garb. . . . The pompous and stiff splendor of the churches has been replaced by airy, modern rooms with flowers and artistic decorations."⁸ Prague also boasts a State Wedding Bureau which procures documents for marriage candidates, sends out the announcements, hires the



A Communist gibe at religious festivals: three Saints shown sabotaging the Five Year Plan with a jereboam of holiday "cheer."

Vecherni Noviny (Sofia), January 6, 1960

cars, arranges for the flowers, the refreshments, the rings, the photographer, records, etc.

The least successful of the new Socialist ceremonies appears to be the "atheistic" funerals. The weakness seems to be in the speeches. *Nepszava* (Budapest), May 22, 1960, discussing "funerals without priests," said that the question of who should deliver the funeral oration was of utmost importance. Not only are many of the people's councils unwilling to provide such speakers, but "funeral speeches require special feeling, tact and aptitude," and not all council members are fitted for this task, "especially if they have to deliver several funeral orations in the same month." The paper supported a proposal that the services of "a few retired, cultured persons" be retained for this job.

Sweeping claims for the spread and public acceptance of the new surrogate rites are being made in Hungary. *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), February 25, 1960, declared that the number of "name-giving," "citizens' inauguration" and "Socialist" marriage ceremonies is growing rapidly, proving that "the ideology, morals, forms of culture of our social order [are] becoming a custom-shaping force."

From this the paper drew far-reaching political conclusions. "It is not just a coincidence that the development of Socialist customs is becoming apparent just now," said *Magyar Nemzet*. "It proves that the conditions for accelerating the building of Socialism have ripened, and that in the suggestion that the laying of the foundations of Socialism be completed in the next few years the Hungarian Party estimated correctly the state of our society. This is a case of mutual effects. New customs are beginning to develop because people sense the lasting nature and immense force of the Socialist order."

On the other hand, the Communist ceremonial appears to be virtually unknown in the villages, even in "advanced" Czechoslovakia where "civil marriage in our villages is almost always nothing more than an act of registration. Only seldom is there a festive ceremony [for] the newborn babies. . . . An atheist funeral is a rare thing indeed; even old Party

officials are buried in small villages with religious ceremonies."⁹

And in Bulgaria, the persistence of the religious ceremonial was thus revealed: "At a Komsomol [Youth League] meeting in Lopushna village, a Komsomol [member] has made a proposal for strengthening the anti-religious struggle against church marriage and baptism. The proposal has been voted and unanimously adopted. The same evening, several shadows are noticed in the darkness flitting over the church fence. Many people are waiting in the church. The first ones to be blessed by the priest are two Komsomols: the groom is the person who made the proposal at the Komsomol meeting, and his bride—the Secretary of the Komsomol in the village. In line after them are many young Komsomols, some there to baptize their newborn child, others as witnesses or to have water consecrated."¹⁰

Conclusion

AMONG THE PREDICTIONS of the early Communist prophets which have failed to come to pass is Marx's thesis that religion would disappear together with the social order which supported it. The theory of the "spontaneous extinction" of religion is no longer Communist dogma, indeed, is considered a heresy.

CRADLE TO GRAVE — IN (QUICK) MARCHES

The Hungarian trade union organ *Munka* (Budapest), January 1960, published "draft scenarios" for two of the new "Socialist" rites. The first scenario supplied the directions for a "name-giving" ceremony (replacing christening):

"In the hall the Pioneers [Communist children's organization] form a guard of honor. The parents arrive with their infants and are seated in the first row. The table in front is covered with a red cloth and the national flag. . . . The 'social registry' of the people's council or the mass organization holding the celebration is on the table. In it, an appropriate text pledges the parents to bring up their children as true Socialist men. . . . Next to the book are the ornately printed certificates for the children. After the first number by the choir, the chairman of the district council gives a seven to eight minute speech. Then he calls upon the parents to sign the oath and hands them the certificates. An approximately eight-year old Pioneer recites 'The Cradle Song' by Attila Jozsef. As many Pioneers as there are babies then present each mother with a bunch of flowers. One Pioneer greets the newborn babies on behalf of all the Pioneers. Then again a number by the choir, followed by a speech by the head of an industrial enterprise who talks on behalf of the 'larger family' and 'the community of the place of work.' This is followed by the distribution of presents and the closing number of the choir (a march with a quick rhythm).

"Where there are facilities for it, those present might

In Poland, some leading Communists have recognized and declared, that religion is not about to expire now nor in the foreseeable future. The regimes in the rest of the bloc claim that religious influence is diminishing, but admit that the decline is slower than it ought to be. The orthodox explanation is that the economy is not yet totally "Socialist."* The Hungarian paper *Társadalmi Szemle* suggested that "cold-war tensions" are prolonging the life of religious views. And a Slovak Party paper made the cryptic statement that "religious prejudices are aided by the difficulties in our life brought about by the building of Socialism."¹¹

It is impossible (for the Communists as well as the West) to ascertain the extent, the intensity or the significance of religion in Eastern Europe today. The only certain fact is that it exists, persists, and constantly resists the limitations and distortions which the Communists try to impose on it. Nor is it confined to the elderly, ignorant and female; it is still strong among youth and the intelligentsia. For all

*"Socialist production conditions are not yet universal and small-scale production still plays an important part in our economy. This is accompanied in the case of small-scale producers [private farmers, tradesmen] by a lack of scientific systematization, lack of conscious control, a sense of insecurity and dependence on alien forces. All these factors contribute to the maintenance of religious views." (*Társadalmi Szemle* [Budapest], November 1959.)

their show of confidence (which today is far greater than that of the Stalinists, who seemed to fear religion as much as they despised it), the Communists sometimes appear uncertain as to how to proceed, and somewhat baffled, even bemused, by the strength of religion and its expressions. By their actions as well as statements the regimes tacitly admit that religion does meet certain human needs which have so far not been accounted for by Communism. By their own doctrine, that religion arises from the misery and helplessness of an oppressed humanity, Communism stands chargeable as long as religion lasts.

SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- ¹ *TVORBA* (Prague), February 4, 1960
- ² *NEPUJSAG* (Budapest), April 7, 1960
- ³ *JIHOČESKÁ PRAVDA* (České Budejovice, Czechoslovakia), January 30, 1960
- ⁴ *VIATA STUDENTEASCA* (Bucharest), no. 1-2, 1960
- ⁵ *POLITYKA* (Warsaw), January 23, 1960
- ⁶ *PRZEGŁAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), September 24, 1959
- ⁷ *MAGYAR NEMZET* (Budapest), February 28, 1960
- ⁸ *VEČERNÍ PRAHA* (Prague), January 18, 1960
- ⁹ *OSVĚTOVÁ PRÁCE* (Prague), July 18, 1959
- ¹⁰ *RADIO SOFIA*, March 15, 1959
- ¹¹ *HLAS NITRIANSKEHO KRAJA* (Bratislava), September 13, 1958

drink to the health of the babies and the parents in an adjoining room."

The scenario for the atheistic burial was as follows:

"If possible, an important functionary should deliver the funeral address. The speech should be personal, should deal with the family, those left behind, and should affect the feelings of those present. It is not right that at the funeral of a progressive man dry, seminar-like speeches be made.

"After the funeral address, the procession accompanying the coffin to the grave should line up in a certain order. On the way to the grave, the choir or orchestra should start a funeral song. At the grave a close friend or colleague of the dead should make a short farewell speech, and to the tunes of a funeral march the coffin should be lowered."

"A FUNNY WELCOME TO LIFE"

In opposition and contrast was this distinctly jaundiced view of the church baptismal ceremony, in *Vlasta* (Prague), the Czechoslovak Women's Committee weekly, October 15, 1959:

"Today almost all our children are born in hospitals. . . . My wife has never ceased to be grateful to the Podoli Institute for Mothers and Children . . . its cleanliness and strict order, the important hygienic rules.

"The Institute has its own lovely garden which

stretches right down to the porter's lodge where the Institute ends and life begins. In fact life begins in the lodge itself. One of its rooms is rented to the Roman Catholic Church, and mothers of that religious denomination may have their babies christened here right off. The advantage is that it saves form-filling later on, a taxi to the church, celebration with the customary dinner, etc.

"As we stepped in, the priest welcomed us, took down all the details about the baby, its parents and grandparents. Three one-week old babies were being christened. Apart from the priest, a church warden and a photographer, there were eight adults and the three babies in the room. My wife felt faint from fatigue and bad air by the time the Lord's Prayer was said.

"I was angry when I looked at all this—a bad habit of no advantage to the child. How much nicer and how much more important to the new citizen is the festive welcome given to newly born babies at the local national committee; how much more useful is the parents' signature under the promise . . . to bring their children up as healthy and industrious people valuable to society? Will not the 'Parks of the Newly Born' be of more advantage to the children?

"My train of thought was interrupted; the ceremony was over. I stepped forward to attend to the last point—to thank the priest and pay. Twenty-five *koruny* for the ceremony and ten to the warden. What a nice tree in the Park this would provide!"

Facts and Figures

A Note on Some Soviet Statistics

by Elizabeth Marbury

THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY of economic statistics published in the Soviet bloc have greatly improved since Stalin's day, when precise data in this field were treated as a State secret and the science of statistics was reduced to a method of propaganda. The USSR and its European dependencies now publish monthly and annual statistical reports comparable in their scope and accuracy to those of other countries. However, some of the Communist statistics still tend to be misleading or inadequate, particularly those used to measure broad ranges of economic activity—e.g., the national product series, or those for total production in industry and agriculture. As a rule, these general economic indicators are compiled by methods which differ significantly from those used elsewhere, and although they are called by the same names as those published in other countries and are often treated as though they were perfectly comparable to them, they do not really measure the same things.

A case in point is the series measuring total industrial output. Communist leaders are fond of boasting that the Soviet Union has raised its industrial production more than thirty fold since 1928, when the First Five Year Plan began. Western economists have long disputed this. They argue that the figures include double counting—i.e., that a ton of coal used in making steel is counted once when it emerges from the mine and a second time in the value of the steel produced. They also point out that the prices used to determine the value of industrial production in different years include a substantial element of inflation. Because of these factors, the Soviet index of industrial production is thought by critics to show a much higher rate of growth than is actually the case. A number of Western economists have made their own estimates of Soviet industrial growth, using methods comparable to those employed in most non-Communist countries. They have been handicapped by lack of the necessary data, and their efforts have produced varying results; all of them, however, have concluded that the true figures for Soviet industrial growth are less than those published by Moscow. Their estimates have been attacked in Soviet publications as "bourgeois fabrications."

The method generally used in the West for measuring industrial growth is to construct an index of net output. This—as contrasted to the Soviet index of gross output—measures only the value that is added in manufacturing


and processing; that is, the value of the final product minus the cost of materials consumed in making it and minus the depreciation of equipment. The appearance now of a net production series in a Soviet publication is a noteworthy event, all the more so since it has been produced under the name of S. G. Strumilin, the dean of Soviet economists.¹

Strumilin published the two series shown in Table 1, which measure the value in rubles of Soviet industrial production over the period 1928-1956. One of these represents the gross value of output and the other the net value of output (both in terms of 1926/27 prices). The gross value figures correspond exactly (allowing for computing errors) with the official index of industrial production regularly published by the USSR's Central Statistical Administration—also shown in Table 1. His net value figures are, of course, consistently lower. He does not describe in detail how he derived them, and they should in any case be regarded as estimates rather than precise measures. Since he observes that the official figures for gross output "grow predominantly by virtue of the double counting of their material elements,"² it is reasonable to assume that he endeavored to adjust the official series in such a way as to eliminate double counting and thus to arrive at figures similar in concept to those used in other countries. Strumilin's series shows a growth of Soviet industrial production between 1928 and 1956 which is less than two-thirds of that claimed in the official index. (See Chart 1.) It does not, however, correct for the other major source of bias: the disparate prices used to combine different products in arriving at the value of total output.

The objection to the official Soviet index of gross output, as compared with the more widely used index of net output, has not been simply that the former involved double counting. If the degree of double counting remained stable

¹ The data, as presented in Table 1, appeared originally in a collection of Strumilin's articles entitled *Outline of the Socialist Economy of the USSR*, published in Moscow in 1959. The article under discussion was dated 1957, but had not previously been published. The present writer is indebted to Dr. Milos Vanek of Munich for the material on Strumilin supplied here.

² Strumilin, *Outline of the Socialist Economy of the USSR*, footnote on p. 234, as quoted by Francis Seton in a letter to *The Times* of London, September 12, 1960.



over the years, the index would not be affected by it since the gross and net values of production would grow at the same rate. In fact, if the degree of double counting tended to decline, the index of gross output would show less growth than an index of net output—and Strumilin's figures indicate that this happened in the years 1937-1940. But except for this period, when the figures seem to have been affected by a tightening in the organization of industry which reduced the amount of double counting, Strumilin's series corroborates the belief of Western experts that statistical double counting has grown with the increasing complexity of Soviet industry, producing a serious cumulative bias in the official index. The fluctuations in double counting indicated by his estimates for the years before 1956 also give strength to the assumption that the reorganization of industry into regional administrative units in 1957 has increased the amount of double counting in the official index since 1956.

Strumilin's figures, however, leave the element of price inflation in the official figures perfectly intact, for his series are reportedly composed of the "1926/27 prices" whose hybrid structure is regarded, by Soviet as well as Western analysts, as imparting an upward bias to the official index. The bias stems not only from the fact that the index up to 1950 is weighted by the prices of such an early year,³ but that as new products were added to the index they were valued on the basis of price levels considerably higher than that of 1926/27. During the drive for rapid industrialization which began in 1928, many new lines of production and new items of output were devel-

oped in the USSR—especially in the more rapidly growing branches of heavy industry such as machinery and armaments. At the same time, it is known that there was a considerable inflation in industrial prices under the early five-year plans, so that the actual prices of new products were well above what they would have been in terms of 1926/27. So far as is known, these values were not adequately deflated before the new products were added to the index, so that "1926/27 prices" are a polite fiction containing many items that are overpriced in relation to that year and which to the degree that their output grew more rapidly than other branches of production, inflated the index.

This bias applies primarily to the years up to 1950, because the price weights have since been brought up to date, with prices of January 1, 1952 used for 1950-1955 and July 1, 1955 for 1955-1959.⁴ There is still no certainty that new products are valued properly, and the absence of any general price inflation may be somewhat offset by the Soviet manager's tendency to introduce more new products with more comfortable margins of planned costs than would develop in the course of technological progress. But there is no reason to suppose that the official index is subject to any very great price inflation since 1950, although Strumilin's estimates indicate that it has continued to be biased by double counting.

Strumilin's net output figures, compared to a theoretical "true" index of Soviet output, give an index whose general level is too high. His series include the 1926/27 price bias, which was probably a major element in the output leap shown between 1937 and 1940 (when the USSR sped production of many new military items), and which can be assumed to exaggerate the growth of output up to 1950. His figures since 1950, however, come closer to the ideal

TABLE I

	Strumilin's Estimates of Industrial Output			Indexes of Growth, 1928 = 100	
	(billions of 1926/27 rubles)		Net as Percentage of Gross	Official Strumilin's Index of Gross Output	Index of Net Output
	Gross	Net			
1928	21.5	10.1	47	100	100
1932	43.3	19.4	45	202	192
1937	95.5	39.8	42	446	394
1940	138.9	69.3	50	646	686
1945	127.5	46.9	37	593	464
1950	240.6	81.1	34	1,119	803
1955	444.8	136.1	31	2,069	1,347
1956	492.4	147.7	30	2,288	1,462

SOURCES: NARODNOE KHOZYAYSTVO SSSR v 1958 GODU, Moscow, 1959, p. 136; Strumilin, OUTLINE OF THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY OF THE USSR, Moscow, 1959, as cited by Dr. Milos Vanek, "Growth of Soviet Industry" (mimeographed).

³ Usually, the earlier the year of the price weights used for an output index, the higher the rate of growth. This is because technological progress and mass production generally lower the costs of the rapidly growing manufactured items in the index, so that the same output measured in the prices of a later year would show a smaller increase.

⁴ The official index is thus composed of three consecutive series linked together, and Strumilin's series on gross output in 1926/27 prices was presumably derived by increasing the 1926/27-price output for 1950 by the subsequent index based on later prices.

TABLE 2
Comparison of Measures of Soviet Industrial Growth
(1928 = 100 and 1950 = 100)

	Official Gross Output	Strumilin Net Output (1928 = 100)	Western Estimates:	
			Seton	Moorsteen- Kaplan
1928	100	100	100	100
1937	446	394	380	249
1940	646	686	461	263
1950	1,119	803	733	369
1955	2,069	1,347	1,210	583
1956	2,288	1,462	...	634
1957	2,517	695
1958	2,800	746
1959	3,100
(1950 = 100)				
1950	100	100	100	100
1955	185	168	165	158
1956	205	182	..	172
1957	226	188
1958	248	202

SOURCES: NARODNOE KHOZYAYSTVO SSSR v 1958 GODU, Moscow, 1959, pp. 136-7; PRAVDA, Moscow, January 22, 1960; N. M. Kaplan and R. H. Moorsteen, "An Index of Soviet Industrial Output," AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, June 1960; Francis Seton, letter, THE TIMES, London, September 12, 1960.

measure since the element of price inflation in the official index on which they are presumably based should be far smaller. Strumilin's estimates cannot be quoted to corroborate or refute any particular Western estimate, but it is nonetheless interesting to compare his series with two different independent indexes (Table 2). As might be expected, when the base is 1928=100, Strumilin's series runs slightly above even Seton's estimates (which are among the highest made in the West), and far above the Moorsteen-Kaplan index (among the lower, partly because it excludes military production). When the comparison is made only from 1950, however, Strumilin is less at variance with either Western estimate than with the official Soviet index, though his series remains the highest of the three.

East European Methods

THE OFFICIAL INDEXES of industrial growth published by East European Communist governments are built by the same basic methods as the Soviet index and are presumed to contain an upward bias for the same reason. They show gross value of output, with double counting, and there is little assurance that statistical adjustments are made to offset the tendency toward an increasing volume of double counting. Despite the absence in these countries of a general rise in industrial prices comparable to that in the USSR under the early plans, they may still contain an upward pricing bias from the addition of new products. As in the Soviet Union, factory managers have great incentive to introduce "new" products with more generous cost mar-

gins, and thus higher prices, than the items for which they are substituted. There is also evidence that the new items are added into the index at prices based on their costs during the first year of production, and not adjusted later for the lowering of costs which usually occurs once the production routine is established.

The degree of bias, however, probably varies quite widely from country to country, and may be less than the bias in the Soviet index since 1950 in some cases, and substantially more in others. The basic price weights used in Eastern Europe are diverse (see Table 3) and the effect of the price bias presumably varies with the antiquity of the weights. The degree of double counting may also be greater in the less developed countries, such as Albania and Bulgaria, which have been creating a comparatively larger number of new industrial branches and units, than in Czechoslovakia or East Germany where a complex industrial structure was already established.

Economic publications in a number of these countries have carried technical criticism of the official gross value indexes, but so far Hungary is the only country that has offered an official alternate measure to meet the objections. The present version of the Hungarian net index (Table 4 and Chart 2) has appeared regularly in official statistical publications since January 1958, although it has been given almost no publicity in the general press. On a basis of 1949=100, it shows that industrial growth has run about ten per cent below that shown by the gross index since 1954, or, to put it another way, that the gross index developed a ten per cent bias by 1954, when its price weights were changed, though the bias has not increased much since.

The question of the reliability of this official net index demands more investigation and analysis than space permits here, but the description of its construction published

TABLE 3
East European Indexes of Gross Industrial Output
(1950 = 100)

Country	Year of price base	1950	1955	1957	1959
Albania	1956	100	274	375	535
Bulgaria	1956	100	190	253	350*
Czechoslovakia	1954	100	170	204	252
East Germany	"Plan" prices, derived from 1950 and earlier, used until 1956, and 1955 prices thereafter	100	190	217	271
Hungary	1949 prices until 1955, 1954 prices thereafter	100	222	226	307
Poland	1937 prices until 1956, 1956 prices thereafter	100	212	253	303
Romania	Not stated. 1955 prices implied	100	203	244	297

* Approximate figure.

SOURCES: Statistical yearbooks for 1950-1958, and plan fulfillment reports for 1959.

TABLE 4


Hungarian Indexes of Industrial Output, 1949-1959
(1949 = 100)

	Net Index	Gross Index
1949	100	100
1950	119	123
1951	146	152
1952	171	183
1953	189	204
1954	189	209
1955	204	228
1956	184	206
1957	215	240
1958	241	266
1959	264	294

SOURCE: STATISZTIKAI HAVI KOZLEMENYEK, Budapest, No. 7, 1960.

when it was introduced⁵ suggests that an effort has been made to approximate the value-added idea already described, while avoiding the pitfalls of the Hungarian price and wage structure.⁶

Making all the necessary reservations, and even assuming that the index still contains an upward bias, it nevertheless casts some light on the inadequacies of the official index of gross production. The gross measure, for example, shows some increase in output between 1953 and 1954, while the net index indicates none at all. Their divergence by about one-tenth since 1954 is an unflattering commentary



on the accuracy of the other East European gross indexes, which are still published as the only acceptable measures of growth.

⁵ Statistikai Havi Kozlemenyek (monthly), No. 1, 1958, p. 6.

⁶ Briefly, it is built of many separate industrial branch indexes which are derived in various ways. Most of them (reportedly covering over 80 percent of production) are based on the physical output of final products, and the rest on some measure of the change in value of the output of the given branch of industry, adjusted for changes in the price level. To combine the branch indexes into a total industrial index, the separate indexes are weighted not by prices but by the hours of work performed in the various branches of industry during 1954 (until 1958, when the weights were shifted to the hours worked during 1958).

Eastern Europe Overseas:

The Struggle for Influence

The East European Satellites have played a little-publicized but important part in the Communist drive to win friends and influence among countries that are not allied to the West. Trade missions, technicians and cultural delegations are in constant movement between the capitals of Eastern Europe and the "uncommitted countries." We give below a summary of the most important contacts made in the last month.

September 13 A three-member study delegation from the Guinean Youth Union, headed by Secretary-General Kande Tourre, arrived in Prague at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Youth League. During their three-week stay they will become acquainted with the life of Czechoslovak youth and the activities of the Czechoslovak Youth League in factories, villages and schools. (Radio Prague.)

A government delegation of the Federation of Mali visited Czechoslovakia from Sept. 10-13 on assignment by the Premier of the Federation of Mali, Medibo Keita. The delegation was headed by Minister Ousmane Ba. (Radio Prague.) Fadil Abbas al-Mahawi, president of the Iraqi People's

Court, was received by Bulgarian Premier Anton Yugov and Rayko Damyanov. They had a friendly talk. (Radio Sofia.)

A Romanian trade delegation is currently in Ghana with a view to developing trade exchanges with this country and to concluding trade agreements. With the same purpose in view, the delegation visited the Sudan and Ethiopia. (Radio Bucharest.)

September 14 Arrival of an official delegation of the National Conference of the Guinean Working People, at the invitation of the Central Trade Union Council. (Prace [Prague].)

(Continued on page 52)

Through Yugoslav Eyes

The Yugoslav press frequently comments on life in the countries of the Communist bloc, and publishes dispatches of more than passing interest from correspondents stationed inside those countries. These glimpses of the orthodox Communist world through the eyes of a maverick Communist press often contains facts and observations not to be found in the writings of orthodox friends and foes.

Bulgaria: Vacations and Tourism

A new vacationland is blossoming on the Black Sea—but for foreigners mainly.

SOFIA: Tourism and the tourist industry were almost unknown in Bulgaria before 1956 and no one bothered about it. There were only two luxury hotels on the Black Sea coast near Varna, and two others in Burgas, and that was it. Then a little unusual activity began in the rugged uninhabited area along the sandy coast of the Black Sea. First, hedgehog-catching was organized in the interior of the country, and the hedgehogs were then transported to this zone where they started to destroy the hitherto unspoiled empire of snakes.

"In this way the 15-kilometer long and comparably wide area around Varna was cleared. It is well known today, even outside Bulgaria, under the name Golden Sands. There are about 60 new modern hotels in this area and in the new tourist center Sunny Shores near the ancient city of Nesebur, on quiet bays with sweeping dunes of excellent fine-grained sand. The Bulgarian architects, who are restricted to fixed norms and limits in planned housing construction, have here been given a free hand and have come up with interesting and luxurious solutions in the construction of hotels, restaurants, small bars, etc.

"In Bulgaria it is held that the country has already reached the level of a modern tourist country in 1960. Bulgaria was visited by only 10,000 tourists in 1954, by 150,000 in 1959, and a still greater number is expected in the current year. The largest number come from the East European countries, which arrange group vacations and excursions. The first place is held by the Czechs, then the East Germans, followed by visitors from the Soviet Union and Poland. There are only very few tourists from the West, although the Bulgarian 'Balkantourist,' through its 220 offices all over the world, has made great efforts to attract the maximum number of such visitors.

"The domestic tourists are not in a favorable position. They are rarely to be found in the hotels of 'Balkantourist,' which administers the entire Bulgarian tourist industry and all tourism in the country, because the prices for board and lodging are fairly high under existing conditions. However, near the big edifices of the great hotels, a substantial num-

ber of rest-homes of trade unions as well as of the more important State agencies have been built in recent years. According to the published statistics, there now exist at the seaside, in the mountains and at the spas, 106 rest-homes. 26 mountain houses and 33 Pioneer camps. Two hundred fifty thousand workers and employees out of a total trade union membership of about 1,300,000, or about 16 percent, will spend their vacation in the rest-homes. Fifteen thousand more workers will vacation in the rest-homes of their enterprises and offices, while about 120,000 children will be accommodated in the Pioneer camps.

"According to the number of beds and the present existing possibilities, the Bulgarian worker will be able to get the necessary coupon for [such a] vacation only every fourth year. These coupons are very inexpensive and they cover only 30 percent of actual expenses, the rest being paid by the State. Therefore, those who receive this coupon are undoubtedly in a privileged situation, since the other workers' and employees' vacations are not facilitated in any way.

"There is still another difficulty. Only in exceptional cases may a worker spend his vacation together with his family in the trade union rest-homes. Therefore, it very often happens that the one who receives the coupon goes on vacation while the rest of his family stay home. The trade unions are taking steps to make a family vacation possible, but so far only to a very modest extent. For this reason appeals are made to enterprises and institutions to build rest-homes for their own staff." (Velimir Budimir in *Borba* [Belgrade], August 10, 1960.)

China: The Hundred-Vegetables Campaign

New truck garden campaign and the "back-to-the-village" movement.

PEIPING: Every summer Peiping enriches its general appearance with some new panorama and detail. This summer there are whole vegetable plots in the city streets and newly planted beds of rape and other vegetables even in places which only yesterday served as sidewalks along the asphalted roads, in the little courtyards behind the always densely populated houses, and even around such eminent institutions as the Central Peiping Bank for Currency Transactions.

"Today, there is little available space in vast Peiping, few footwalks along the broad boulevards and narrow thoroughfares in the cramped *hutungs*, on which new beds have not sprung up and onion or cabbage plantations made their appearance, according to the directives of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that every citizen ought to plant at least 10 *mou* of land with vegetables.

"In Peiping itself, as the press reports, more than a million people have so far complied with their obligations under the directives, but Peiping is only one city, and there are all the other cities and centers of millions and indeed all of China in which the vegetable campaign is getting under way with the impetus of all the previous great drives in the country. What are the basic reasons and motives of this huge action?

"The answer can be found in the Peiping press, and a very simple one it is: the towns and industrial centers in the country need more vegetables for food. The vegetable drive is only part of a larger and more general campaign [which] has been gathering momentum for the past few weeks and whose basic aim is to strengthen agriculture.

"'Back to the village' is the slogan which is always revived in China when it becomes obvious that all is not as it should be in agriculture; for instance, that the previous campaigns of 'everything for industry,' 'everything for steel,' 'everything for transport,' etc., drained the countryside of so much labor that many fields remained untilled and even the harvest was not reaped when it had ripened.

"'Back to the village' has also been the constant appeal to intellectuals, artists and experts to change their outlook. 'Back to the village' is launched now against the background of a situation in which, all over China, a campaign is on foot to give agriculture every priority and to mobilize all the forces of nature to help agriculture. Agriculture is the fundamental and most important branch of the national economy. Agriculture is at the present moment everything. Without agriculture there can be no progress in any other branch of the economy—this is what the politicians, theoreticians, and economists assert today.

"In accordance with this interpretation, the popular slogan 'Back to the village' has also received a fresh meaning. It is now less of a campaign, more long-range in character. What distinguishes it in particular is that for a great many selected executives who are sent to the rural areas nowadays, this move is no longer meant as an educational measure, but on the contrary, the executives are sent primarily to educate others—that is, members of the communes and the peasants in general—on the spot, and to take over the direct management of all spheres of life and activity in a vital sector such as agriculture.

"In some provinces, the provincial administrations have already been halved, in regions and districts more than half the tested cadres have left to take up new executive functions in production brigades and teams in the communes. In some provinces, norms have been established: the leader or deputy of a production brigade should be at minimum a member of the cadre of a provincial administration and on no account somebody with a lesser rank.

"The papers recently carried articles pointing to the differences in aims between sending away the executives and the continued drive to dispatch intellectuals to the villages. When he moves to a commune, labor brigade, or production team—the articles stress—an executive should continue to perform his executive function, to lead and raise the masses to a level of better understanding of State and Party policy, and to organize an optimal implementation of the State tasks on the spot.

"For writers, artists, experts, and intellectuals generally, the main purpose and meaning of the action remain unchanged. For them 'Back to the village' continues to mean above all 'tempering in physical labor and a curing of their ideological and moral-political ailments.'" (Branko Bogunovic in *Borba* [Belgrade], September 7, 1960.)

Czechoslovakia: The Birth Rate Declines

Concern over the population growth rate: explanations and remedies.

PPRAGUE: The natural growth rate of the population in Czechoslovakia has been falling continually and substantially in the past ten years. There were 70,000 fewer babies born in 1959 than in 1950, and the total figure was the lowest in the history of Czechoslovakia since that country came into existence. The decline is particularly sharp in the Czech regions. In the past three years in Prague the number of deaths has exceeded the number of births.

"On the other hand, Czechoslovakia is one of the countries in which a minimum infant mortality has been reached while the average life span has been extended by ten full years in the postwar period.

"What are the reasons for this situation? Will the decline of the natural population growth be stopped and superseded by the normal increase of population 'so necessary for the future productive era' as was emphasized at the recent national conference of the Czechoslovak Communist Party? This is now being discussed by the government and sociologists, political organizations, health workers, the press and others. A State population commission was established two years ago with the task of observing and analyzing this problem and proposing appropriate measures. . . .

"Unlike previous times when more practical-political reasons were claimed and when the press crusaded against the 'reactionary attitude' of parents without children or with only a few, the entire problem is now approached from a much broader perspective.

"Three factors in Czechoslovakia are now pointed to as influencing the decline of population growth: the housing problem, abortion, and the employment of women. All agree on the first problem; opinion, however, is pretty well divided on the other two.

"The housing problem, as in other countries, became particularly acute after the Second World War. All agree today that the housing crisis was one of the factors which had a negative effect on the growth of population, not only by reducing the number of births but in a broader sense.

During recent years, for instance, the number of marriages declined while the number of divorces simultaneously increased.

"The data on abortions also show that poor housing conditions were given as the reason for two thirds of the requests for abortion in Prague.

"If it is correct that housing is the problem, then the prospects—so it is thought here—are good. A broad housing plan was approved last year and the construction of 1,200,000 apartments by 1970 is planned, which would basically resolve the housing problem.

"Another much-discussed reason is abortion. The law permitting abortion was passed in 1958. The number of abortions increased and the number of newborn decreased still more. The experts, however, state that this is a normal phenomenon at the beginning, that the number of abortions should not cause concern because this is only a transformation of illegal abortions into legal. Steps are being taken only for a more precise interpretation of the law and for preventing its abuse. The [abortion] commission has, for instance, been accepting as a justified reason the fact that a mother already has two children. According to the new instructions it will be a justified reason only if a mother has three children.

"The third problem, employment of women, is not officially considered to be a reason for the decline of population growth. The women in Czechoslovakia make up 41.6 percent of the total labor force and it is a possibility that this figure will increase even more. The investigations made by special commissions proved that women do not look for a solution [to their family care problems] in giving up their jobs but rather in the creation of better working conditions, organization of services and institutions for aid to families and the care of children, etc.

"Some measures based on these analyses are being taken in Czechoslovakia. The approved principle has been to give to families with more children priority in the improvement of the standard of living." (Pero Ivacic in *Politika* [Belgrade], August 29, 1960.)

Bulgaria: Return to the Household Plot

Difficulties and new conditions in agriculture.

"**SOFIA:** The problem of the household plots within the Bulgarian collectives [kolkhozes] is not yet resolved everywhere in accordance with the present instructions of the higher economic and political officials. The Bulgarian press reports that there are still many collectives in which the household plot is severely restricted or completely abolished, which is now considered to be a damaging practice not in line with the general economic policy in the villages. However, it is believed here that this problem will be resolved by fall and the collective members will again have the right which was taken away from them last year: to cultivate their two to five hectares of land as granted to them under the collective statute. But there are some new features concerning this right.

"As a result of various organizational changes in the Bulgarian collectives last year and also because of the insufficiently realistic plans to double agricultural produc-

tion, the majority of collectives have either simply abolished the household plots and added them to the kolkhoz land, or have reduced them to the minimum. The collectives, of course, have not done this on their own initiative but according to instructions received from the highest economic agencies. At the time, the press welcomed this as a step for promoting agricultural production. However, it was proven last year that this measure not only did not contribute to production but, on the contrary, did considerable damage to the general development of agriculture and particularly to cattle-breeding. At that time the collectives and people's councils were advised to return to kolkhoz members their household plots and also the cattle which had been forcibly purchased from them. It was even suggested that [the collectives] aid them in the care and feeding of the cattle which they were allowed to keep under the statutes.

"The return of the household plots, however, has made surprisingly slow progress. The Bulgarian press reports that many collectives have not acted according to the new recommendation even though a year has already passed.

"In Bulgaria today the prevailing point of view is that the household plots, regardless of principles and extreme Socialist solutions, are still very necessary. The Ministry of Agriculture emphasizes that 'the previous action for abolition of the household plots by the collectives was too precipitate.' It is said that the household plots are first of all necessary to supply the daily needs of the collective members so that they should not continually turn to the collective for their basic food requirements (vegetables, eggs, milk, meat, etc.) and thus reduce the quantities earmarked for the State. Furthermore, work on the household plots can be performed by household members (children and old people) who are not otherwise able to work within the collective; and, in this way, the plot will become an additional source of agricultural production.

"One of the major reasons for the return to the plots and for a new evaluation of their role and importance is the necessity for doing something to promote the most backward branch of Bulgarian agriculture, cattle-breeding. Because of the current far from enviable situation in cattle-breeding, it is believed that even the breeding of the small number of cattle which the collective statute allows its members (one cow, five sheep, two hogs and an unspecified number of poultry) would be a substantial contribution.

"The abolition of the household plots and the purchase of cattle from the collective members did serious damage here. Only one sixth of the 1,300,000 rural households in Bulgaria has a cow today. And it has been calculated that even 350,000 cows owned personally by the members would secure a substantial production of meat, milk, hides and other products outside the plan.

"Therefore another step has been taken concomitant with the return of the household plots: the collective members are encouraged to raise forage on them above all else. As laid down by the Ministry of Agriculture, the peasants are free to decide what they want to cultivate. But it is obvious that the majority of collectives do not respect this recommendation, but influence the peasants in various ways to use the household plots for the production of forage. The

press too aids this action by criticizing fairly sharply those who sow vegetables and other products on the household plots. Collectives even resort to the assignment of the plots in blocs, which they then engage to cultivate with their machines, with the understanding, however, that corn be sown as recommended by the collective conference. The members receive from plots cultivated this way an average share, but they have to pay for the services provided by the collectives and machine tractor stations.

"Thus the household plot is transformed into a supplementary but—as seen here—an important form and method for the development of cattle-breeding and increasing meat production, which has been lagging seriously for two full years." (Velimir Budimir in *Politika* [Belgrade], August 18, 1960.)

China: Sowing the Forests

The doctrine of intensive cultivation is "revised."

PEIPING: The Chinese *People's Daily* published an editorial a few days ago containing a directive for sowing crops in forests in order to increase agricultural production. Only two years ago another principle was proclaimed as absolutely binding on Chinese agricultural policy—to sow as little land and to reap as much as possible. The meaning of this somewhat enigmatic directive was based on the doctrine of that time as well as on practical experiments: increase the yields on smaller surface areas by deep plowing, dense sowing, generous fertilizing and continual irrigation as well as by putting to work the largest possible labor force to such an extent that vast China would be able to feed its population of 600 million from only one third of its arable land.

"The highest authorities stressed at that time that by a general application of the new measures it would suffice for the entire country if only one third of its acreage were tilled every year, one third left fallow, and one third planted permanently with orchards and covering plants. At that time it was even assumed that by 1961 the land might have produced [enough] food reserves to feed the entire population for one year [thus releasing] the labor force to work in the building industry, transport and communal tasks in the following year.

"After only one year, however, there was a change and new, different instructions issued. After the harvest and during the preparations for the next sowing the old slogan was disclaimed and replaced by a new one: sow as much and reap as much cultivated land as possible. In other words every peasant and citizen of the People's Republic of China was requested not to 'sow less and reap more' but to utilize every bit of uncultivated land to raise some crop or other.

"This directive was issued almost one year ago. And now, at the very beginning of this year's sowing campaign, a further step was taken. It will henceforth be obligatory to sow the forests, and not only the forests which are newly planted but also the centuries-old fir and oak forests in which until recently only acorns or medicinal herbs were gathered.

"The *People's Daily* points to the advantages which may



More than a million people were said to have taken part in this Peiping demonstration last May against the US-Japan security pact.

China Reconstructs (Peiping), July 1960

be derived from sowing the forests, what has been overlooked so far in this respect, what it would have meant for Chinese agriculture and the country if, in the previous large afforestation drives, a labor force of several millions had been used at the same time 'without extra expense' for sowing crops in the newly planted forests.

"Thus within two years the idea of sowing only one third of China's arable land was abandoned and replaced by the demand to cultivate not only every path and border but also the new and the old forests.

"Explaining the need for sowing in the forests, the *People's Daily* gave some calculations and estimates. If out of the total area of new and old forests, the paper says, only 150 million *mou*—about 100 million hectares—are used for sowing and only 7.5 metric centners of yield per hectare obtained, China would get at least another 15 billion *keti* (7.5 billion kilograms) of grain above the present yield.

"The ideas of yesterday about scoring high yields out of only one-third sown arable land are no longer mentioned. What is relevant now is to increase the food output at any cost and to use China's new and old forests for this purpose." (Branko Bogunovic in *Borba*, August 29, 1960.)

Soviet Bloc: Economic Integration

A Yugoslav analysis of the decisions and discussions at the thirteenth meeting of COMECON, the Soviet bloc economic organization, held in Budapest in July 1960, in which the Soviet Union and East European Satellites participated.

A NEW DEVELOPMENT at this meeting was the preparation of recommendations for coordinating the long-term economic development plans for the period up to 1980. The drafting of long-term development plans became necessary in order to achieve [a level] of cooperation and specialization . . . which was almost impossible to attain within the framework of short-term plans.

"Another innovation was the acceptance of the Polish delegation's proposal to extend coordination of planning to the field of investments. This means that coordination should not be limited only to production and to exchange of technical experience, [production] licenses and projects. The COMECON commissions now have to deliberate on the principles by which coordination of investments should be carried out and to prepare recommendations for the next meeting.

"The inclusion of investments in the system of division of work will show that it is not a matter of inconsequence who the investor is and what he invests in, that differences in this respect may also mean differences in the level of development of the individual countries. It is obvious that it makes a major difference whether investments are made in the basic and fuel industries or in the processing industries; whether investments are made in the machine or the textile or food industry. Investments in each of these sectors lead to differences in the time it takes for the investment to yield a return and to differences in costs. . . .

"Including investment in the system of plan coordination will thus raise the question of distribution of costs for the exploitation of production sources within the countries of the Socialist camp. It means that investments are jointly planned and used, and that the country which has an interest in the raw material bases of another country will participate in financing the opening up of these bases and thus enable the country which has raw materials to invest its own funds in processing [them]. . . .

"The meaning of the Polish proposal is that the developed industrial countries [of the bloc] shall, by participating in investment, aid the countries whose financial resources now go into the development of production of raw materials—that is, into basic industry and fuels. In this way Poland is aiming primarily at getting aid from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia to extend its sources of financial help now mainly supplied by loans from the USSR.

"The coordination of plans in the field of investment is, of course, only a part of the [integration] process which has to be worked out. It is, not to be sure, trivial, but a very important detail, the discussion of which by the COMECON commission will lead to other questions including, ultimately, the question of granting a part of the accumulations [i.e., profits] by the developed countries to the underdeveloped; that is, if there exists a real desire to

overcome the disproportion in development of the [individual countries'] economies and a real application of the law of proportional development of their productive strength, which is a basic postulate of COMECON activity.

"At the sixth meeting of COMECON in Warsaw (December 1955), two decisions were passed regarding coordination, and this was said to represent 'a decisive step in the direction of an effective coordination of the plans of the Socialist countries,' which starts from the principle of mutual distribution of work through the methods of cooperation and specialization. At the seventh COMECON meeting in May 1956 a thorough revision of coordination methods had to be made which limited them to the basic key industries.

"In April 1958, when the Soviet State and Party delegation visited Hungary, the Soviet Premier stated among other things in his speech to the Csepel factory workers: 'Everybody understands the necessity for and desirability of cooperation, but when they return home from the conference everything remains as before and matters make no progress.' A similar judgement was made by the chairman of the Polish Planning Commission, Jedrychowski, on the eve of the thirteenth COMECON meeting. He emphasized in an article that 'in fact very little has been done in the way of cooperation and specialization, especially when compared with the extensive propaganda for it. Little has been done because very little attention has been given to meeting the preliminary requisites.'

Jedrychowski then stated that specialization and cooperation schemes could not succeed for the simple reason that they were too short-range, amounting to one, two or at most a few years. If division of work, he continued, between the Socialist countries is really to function then cooperation and specialization have to be put on another basis. In Jedrychowski's view it is important to analyze and determine the long-term exigencies of all COMECON member countries, first of all, the exigencies which are now being met by imports. Gomulka spoke previously on this subject at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. He too stated that very little has been done in the field of cooperation and coordination. In saying this he had in mind first of all the situation of Poland, which is continually making greater efforts to develop its mining and extractive industry and receives no financial aid from the other countries, although these depend heavily on [Poland's] raw material sources. On this occasion Gomulka criticized the policy which can be summed up in the words: 'everyone for himself' with no willingness 'to make any sacrifice for a joint economic planning by the Socialist countries.'

"These discussions in Poland prior to the thirteenth COMECON meeting threw more light on the real situation of distribution of work within [the COMECON area] as well as on the forms of cooperation and specialization. Obviously, certain difficulties exist in this respect which in Poland have been partially faced. It can be taken for granted that the carrying out of the Polish proposal will result in some other problems.

"From the point of view of the development of production, the recommendations of the [COMECON] consulta-

tions regarding agriculture and the consumer goods industries are of particular interest. The recommendations regarding agriculture demand increased production of grain for human and animal food [to advance] cattle-breeding and cattle products. The importance of increasing corn production as the basis for cattle breeding is specially emphasized. The recommendations stress the absolute necessity of taking additional steps to increase this production. According to the communique these steps consist of an efficient distribution of work among the member countries which besides industrial production should also include the production of agricultural machines and chemicals for agriculture.

"The recommendations to increase consumer goods production have the same goal. They emphasize the importance of specialization in the production of machines and equipment for the food industry, particularly for canned goods and the milk industry. Specialization as an instrument for a rapid increase of production was also recommended for the building materials industry.

"These recommendations show that in the actual policy and practice of economic integration, cooperation and specialization are considered as important instruments for increasing production. They are therefore the subject of discussion and resolutions at every COMECON consultation." (*Rad* [Belgrade], August 20, 1960.)

"The Sunlit Way"

A curious essay on the future of Soviet society appeared in the July issue of the Moscow literary magazine Novy Mir. The author of this utopia was Professor S. G. Strumilin, a member of the Academy of Sciences and an eminent economist whose contribution to Soviet statistics is discussed elsewhere in this issue (see Facts and Figures). The essay, from which excerpts are given below, is of interest not only for its nineteenth-century naivete—it smacks of Edward Bellamy and Charles Fourier—but also because it seems to be a quasi-official Soviet dig at the Chinese Communists. Strumilin sees the Soviet man of 1985 as living in a "social commune" where there will no longer be families and where private property will have been totally abolished—even to children's toys. But he warns that communes cannot be established hastily (as they have in China) and quotes Lenin's admonition that "one must first work for such a noble name."

IN THE YEARS OF BUILDING COMMUNISM, it is interesting to sketch out for the sake of clarification how life will actually look in that period, and what will be the most important landmarks and characteristic tendencies of this new type of society.

What will be people's attitude toward the family, toward property? Will there still be marriages, divorces, alimony cases, wills and savings books?

How will the conflict between the collective consciousness and the remnants of individualism in the family develop? . . .

The Passing of the Family

Let us begin with the nature of the family under the conditions of Communism. Our social structure as well as the new productive relations result in a tendency for the traditionally large family to grow continually smaller. The wife is economically independent, and works in a different enterprise than her husband. Meals are taken in public dining rooms and the children are brought up in nurseries, kindergartens and boarding schools. Young people are no longer dependent on their parents, while the elderly and those incapable of working are no longer dependent on their children. . . .

Too much parental love often has catastrophic results

for the children, hindering the development of the individual. We are absolutely opposed to the old tradition which regarded children as the "property" of their parents. . . . Society should concern itself with the upbringing and education of children. Parents will retain only those functions which exert no unhealthy influence on the child. Not every mother has teaching ability. Maternal egoism is a poor basis for the upbringing of a child. The best mothers will, however, be employed in the supervision and upbringing of small children who grow up in the collective. Mothers' boys only become egoists who look down contemptuously upon their surroundings, poor delinquents who have no place in Soviet reality. The advantages of socialized child-raising are so great that they are well worth every necessary expense. The collective of a children's home is in a position to offer the little ones more . . . and they are also much happier among their peers. We must expand this kind of child rearing in coming years so as to include all children and young people from the cradle to maturity. Every Soviet citizen who enters the world will automatically be enrolled in a nursery, transferring to an established children's home and then, ac-

(Continued on page 32)

He and She:

The Manners and Morals of Poland's Youth



The girl has just said goodbye to a young man "but the bunch of tulips will make her remember him for a long time."

Poland (Warsaw), No. 6, 1960

"It would seem that love, the mutual inclinations of both sexes, love's endeavors and intimate coexistence, are matters so 'simple' that even the most simple-minded man can manage them successfully. However, experience teaches us that this is not so: with ever-increasing frequency voices can be heard to the effect that at the root of marital and family misfortunes, and thus by the same token, social misfortunes—such as divorce, abandoned children and wronged women—lies the frighteningly low level of our society's sexual culture."

Sztandar Młodych (Warsaw), March 4, 1960

IN STALIN'S TIME, love in Communist Europe was (officially) a simple matter. Or rather, from the Party's oversimplified standpoint, the prime purpose of love was to further Communist economic progress and the development of the "new" Communist Man. Sex appeal was equated by Party propagandists with "Communist appeal"; that is, the dedicated, non-drinking, non-smoking puritanical male, radiating strength and optimism, was purported to be the choice of all right-thinking females; and the frivolous, clothes-conscious, man-conscious, dependent girl supposedly lost out in competition with the female shock-worker, whose true love was the Party, and who despised mooning and spooning as legacies of the decadent past. The model couple had no interest but the regime's interest, and together they marched forward to a shining future, happily working overtime in factories, attending innumerable Party meetings, and breeding model vegetables on model collective farms. In fact, the two rarely had time for each other, so immersed were they in activities for the cause.

The Red Square

Needless to say, this version of life and love remained in the category of fable, and existence in Communist Europe was neither idyllic nor antiseptic—as the official literature would have everyone believe. However, stories and articles educating readers in the new values appeared constantly, and such "poems" as the one below were by no means rare:

"Why is she so attractive that every boy looks at her
When she walks in the evening through the streets of
Warsaw?

Her work is what makes her so beautiful
Everybody would like to marry a girl like her.
This morning she mixed cement at the building site;
Tonight she attracted the interest of every boy."¹

When some of the true facts of life in Eastern Europe began to be exposed shortly after Stalin's death, even the Communist authorities were forced to acknowledge that they had pushed the depersonalization of human relations too far. Not only was much of what they had proclaimed patently absurd, but it was also a contributing factor in the postwar breakdown of marriage, the family and civilized social norms. Juvenile delinquency, illegitimate children and soaring divorce rates had been encouraged by the Party view of human beings as cogs in production, and economic exploitation and police terror had produced a dangerous brutalization of life.

Recognizing this, the Communists readjusted their social outlook while enacting a number of concessions in the political and economic spheres. The press, for example, opened its columns to complaints by neglected husbands, who claimed that their working wives were no longer women but machines; and although the "bourgeois" or "backward" male who regarded woman as a domestic slave continued to be criticized, some attempt was made to acknowledge the validity of basic human emotions and to raise family life in public esteem. From that time on

femininity and women's fashions were no longer abhorred as "anti-revolutionary" preoccupations, and the militant puritanism which characterized the official attitude toward sex was softened to coincide with facts: kissing, for instance, was permitted in novels, and the love lyric, hitherto banned as undignified, became an acceptable literary form. Symptomatic of the changing times was a verse by the Polish poet Leopold Staff, who wrote:

"You forbid me to write
About nightingales, moonlight and roses,
Saying: these are trivial things
Unworthy of poetry.
Doubts rise in me:
If, years ago,
Two people had not walked in the moonlight
Listening to the nightingales sing
(And the roses bloomed on that evening)
Would you be here now?"²

These changes, however beneficial, were, of course, a far cry from what was needed to solve postwar social ills—a fact tacitly recognized by the Polish regime, which remains unique in the area in its willingness to jettison some of the mythologies of contemporary "Marxism" and to apply some reason to part of reality. In recent years, the Polish press has acquired what might be described as a sociological cast, and one of its main preoccupations has been youth. The desires, ambitions and feelings of young people have been catalogued in articles and polls, and the latest trend in this survey has involved an inquiry into their social-sexual habits. Instead of announcing what model couples should be like according to the "Marxist" lexicon or denouncing deviations from the ideal, the discussions are an attempt to comprehend the younger generation and to bridge the gap between Party prerequisites and the real.

Conducted mainly by the youth and literary periodicals, the discussions are, in some respects, comparable to similar discussions in the Western press. That is, they reflect the usual preoccupation of the middle-aged with a new generation they mistrust and fear. Beats, jazz fiends, Sagan-type heroines, rock and rollers and angry young men have provoked laughter, fear and handwringing in Western Europe and the US, while the young organization man has been the subject of microscopic study. In Poland it would appear that youth is addicted to the same "imagery" despite years of Communist indoctrination, and experts are now trying to find out what some of youth's fads and fancies mean.

However, because of years of hypocrisy and silence on the true face of youth, and because of youth's crucial role in building Communist society, the discussions in Poland have a special character. On the one hand, they represent an effort to assess the actual and enormous changes in outlook which have taken place since the prewar period (a privilege which was denied in earlier years of Communist rule); and, on the other, they are directed at uncovering and eradicating the cynicism which has developed in the postwar period and which, in part, is directly or indirectly attributed to poor living conditions and the abuses and



A Warsaw girl.

Stolica (Warsaw), March 6, 1960

corruptions of the Stalinist epoch. Guilt is apparent in many of the articles, as though the authors felt that they were to blame for shortcomings of the young.

Athletes and Apes

SIGNIFICANTLY, opinions about the contemporary character of Polish youth are by no means unanimous, and range from the optimistic to the glum. "Vulgarization," however, is a key word in many of the articles, and expresses the view of one group of writers who feel that the younger generation is sadly lacking in romanticism, and that standards, if and when they exist, are unhappily geared to the pragmatic rather than the ideal. The well-known Communist journalist Jerzy Putrament painted a dismal picture of manners and morals in artistic circles, indicating that Bohemia had totally lost its charm:³

"I read about still another court sensation in our community. A budding poet catches his wife with his stepfather. A thrust of the knife, complications, the stepfather dies. I am not directly acquainted with the affair. Allegedly, he's a real poet. Rather stereotyped, if not by talent, then by inclination. Despite the fact that he writes ultra-modern verses, he loves like a romantic, is jealous and suffers like a decadent. I read about this poet's wife. A 20-year-old college student. Very modern, i.e., of the opinion that relations between young people of different sexes belong in the category of medical treatments or gym-

nastic exercises. With full premeditation, she arranges an 'affair' of several days with her husband's friend, also a young poet, allegedly of considerable athletic construction. After which, she begins visiting the stepfather, an older man and an alcoholic, but 'well-born' and from 'society.'

"We live in a small and closed environment. We know too much about one another. Basically, our world differs structurally from the rest of society, which considers the so-called family or couple as the basis. Among us, the basic element is the triangle. And not even a triangle, but a multi-angle. And even something more complicated than that, some figure which, although flat, is still multi-faceted. And only the devil knows what else.

"God knows, I am fully aware of the fact that this whining tone is not at all suitable. But the point here is not morality, which none of you gives a hoot about, but aesthetics, allegedly so dear to you. The worst of these customs is not the geometry, but the attitude toward it expressed by those interested. Those husbands who walk hand-in-hand with their wives' consoler, those wives, past and present, who chirp with their rivals, those pairs, those pairs of pairs, those groups of three and row upon row of pairs which like soccer teams have engaged in championship playoffs . . . each team against every other team, and are now resting amicably together on the Sopot beach or in a Zakopane tavern—that's real shoddiness in its clinically purest sense. If they at least would knock one another's teeth out, there would be some sort of morally extenuating circumstances. But when it does come to blows . . . it's never because of 'those' things. If at least they would stop talking to each other—but no, they don't even get piqued. More, they seem to find some sort of masochistic pleasure in their social proximity."

Another article, bemoaning the prevalence of young "lady-killers," also tried to point the way to morality through aesthetics. In fact, the tacit assumption of these Polish critics that no absolute ethical standards exist is as indicative of the atmosphere in present-day Poland as the "vulgarization" they describe:⁴

"Among a certain segment of our youth there exists a pugnacious nonchalance which demands trivialization of affairs of the heart. In the end, anything can be belittled: love, art, ideas. Ridiculing girlish sensitivity, overcoming resistance, quick and easy conquest—these are the things that flatter the brutal young shaver. In this basic atmosphere, in this climate of knavery and cynicism, love suffers degradation. Swaggering vulgarity, insensitivity and brute force—in the mind of a certain type of man—are evidence of the modern approach to sex matters, disgust with prejudice, and a new way of life.

"In reality, however, they constitute a pitiful moral recession, a return to primitive human relations. Meat can be torn with the fingers and eaten raw, but civilization has changed this custom, while the culture of the palate has inoculated people with a sense of taste. Similarly, the culture of feelings has transformed the physiological act; that which can be accomplished by any savage has been transformed into a beautiful and enlightening experience. The search for facility leads to impoverishment of human

existence. Our life is difficult and brimful of conflicts; that is why sensitivity, delicacy of feelings, sexual desire and great passion constitute an indispensable condition of personal happiness. Inability to feel deeply, to experience that which is commonly called love, is the same as a hash-house in gastronomy, or overalls in the world of fashion: a sad and repulsive grayness. . . ."

While the critics seem to be in accord in regard to the "vulgarization" of love among certain youths, not all of them are willing to assert that romanticism is a thing of the past. When interviewed by the Communist youth paper, *Sztandar Młodych*, a Polish psychiatrist declared that he believed that new and different forms of romanticism were beginning to appear but that the "transient epoch, ennui, fatigue, and a great number of changing incentives" were stifling its characteristics: "As a result of this mental burden, people search for the simplest forms of expression. In a certain sense, it is a law of nature and psychology." Few of the experts, however, have carried their analysis of causes very far.

Disorder and Early Sorrow

The preoccupation with the decline of idealism among Polish youth—if not actual loose living—has also found its way into the public opinion polls. One poll, conducted by the Psychology Department of Warsaw University among 300 girls between the ages of 13 and 18, led the literary paper *Przegląd Kulturalny* to some disappointed conclusions.⁵ The paper found that although the majority of young girls identified sex life with marriage, their arguments were not motivated by "traditional morality" but by "traditional fear."

"Extremely interesting are the arguments the girls use to support their point of view that sex life should not begin 'too early' [Ed. note: 33.5 percent of the girls claimed it should not begin until after 20.] We find such opinions as: 'Sex life begun too early is harmful to health, the body is not yet fully prepared for the functions of maternity'; 'Early motherhood conflicts with education and professional attainment'; 'One should not burden oneself with responsibilities too early in life—early motherhood takes away youth. Early marriage entails economic difficulties.'

"We have cited the above opinions in such detail, not to point out the differences which separate them, but rather to underscore the similarities. . . . The most striking thing is the manner of argumentation. It is sensible, practical and lacking in elements of moral evaluation. In view of this realism, one is surprised by the naivete with which the girls identify sex life with motherhood. Fear of illegal or premature motherhood is clearly evident in a majority of answers."

Similar conclusions were reached by *Magazyn Polski* (Warsaw), June 1958, after surveying the results of a poll taken among Lodz students. The periodical said that although 45 out of the 48 students interviewed disapproved—at least in theory—of sexual freedom among teen-age youth, the reasons given deserved special attention: "No




Watching the world from a bench on Warsaw University's campus.
Stolica (Warsaw), April 24, 1960

one—literally no one—cited the arguments of traditional morality (that it is immoral, sinful, etc.). The motivations are practical: 'whatever will hurt or help my own interest' is the common basis. . . . We are not evaluating this phenomenon; we point it out because it puts a question mark over the effectiveness of the arguments used by mature society in its not overly successful dialogue with youth on the subject of sex.'"

The concern with youth's morals is balanced by an equal concern with their poses which, in the Stalinist era, most certainly would have been decried as "decadent" and bearing little resemblance to the attitudes expected of a new "Socialist Man." How indicative these poses are of youth's true character, and whether they bear any direct relation to their morals are some of the questions raised in this study, although few of the articles go very deep. In the main, the analysts of youth seem to display a nostalgia for the past and a simultaneous desire to accept contemporary modes with some measure of optimism and grace.

* The regime Catholic paper *Slowo Powszechne* loudly assaulted the survey (conducted by *Dookola Swiata*) as being an example of the worst sort of pseudo-sociology. The paper maintained that the editors of *Dookola Swiata* had used the poll to propagate their own doctrine of "free love" and had given a completely false picture of Polish youth. The regime, however, evidently finds the sex habits of youth a matter of concern, and recently increased film censorship to curb "spreading demoralization." The decision, taken in the spring of 1960, will involve severe preliminary screening of scenarios featuring sex, illicit love and juvenile delinquency. Bans will also be imposed on foreign films, such as those featuring unclad Brigitte Bardot, despite the opposition of French producers. To facilitate matters, the Council of Censors is being reshuffled and "overtolerant" film workers will be replaced.



A group of young Wrocław artists in their basement club, "Hades."
Poland (Warsaw), No. 4, 1959

In the fall of 1959, one Polish writer described in detail the differences between the modern 17 year-old girl and her counterpart of 25 years ago. He came to the conclusion that the cynicism of today's young woman was only skin deep, and that actually she was as sentimental and timid as the 19th century bourgeois youngster of his memory. If there was a change, he claimed, it was that the modern girl knows much more about the "facts of life." The "superficial" changes he described as follows:

"When, a quarter of a century ago, one used the term 'seventeen year old,' the image associated with it was concrete and schematic. Thus: a slender youngster, equipped with two blond pigtails, raptly listening to her own awakening femininity. The description . . . included those symbolic blushes and apprehensive but simultaneously coquettish glances. . . .

"The prewar teenager curled her hair secretly and defended her honor with the statement, 'it's naturally curly.'

Thusly coiffured, one schoolgirl would select [for her model] the royally unapproachable coquetry of Barszczewska [Polish actress], and another, the boyishly impish coquetry of Andrzejewska [operetta star]. After which, both schoolgirls would fall in love for real 'til death do us part,' and frequently with the same adolescent object. . . ."

As for the modern girl: "When today we say, 'seventeen year old,' we think most frequently of 'kitten.' A 'kitten' is known as amoral, cynical, and a highly and coolly profligate creature. A 'kitten' is contemptuous of adults, their morality and way of life. Statuesque Barszczewska has been replaced by Marina Vlady . . . and impish Ada by the obnoxious and excellently undressed Brigitte. . . ."

A Tribe Is Not a Sect

More pessimistic was an article entitled, "The Puzzling Tribe of the Young." In dismay—half-serious, half-humorous—the author described some of the signs of youth's contempt for the older generation, and contended that their conduct could not be explained adequately by the terms "revolt" or "escapism." What characterized the young, he maintained, was a disbelief that maturity was something to be grown into and youth merely one stage in personality development:

"The tribe of the young is wreaking havoc with the centuries' old symbolism pertaining to early and late years, and frequently reaches for attributes previously synonymous with 'age and position.' For quite a few years now, very young girls have favored the wearing of dark colors, with particular stress on black. Recently . . . they have taken a fancy to white hair, and only the lack of clear-cut support from *Przekroj* [a popular magazine] and the cost of the necessary preparations is responsible for the fact that not all young girls have adopted grandmother's coloring. . . . Initiative is on the side of the young . . . and older folks often are faced with the problem of adapting under a violated system. I asked one of my contemporaries why she dyes her white hair and wears colors which, in my old-fashioned view, are simply schoolgirlish: 'Are you crazy?' she answered. 'I'm no longer 20, capable of going about with white hair and black sweaters.' . . .

"Being 'young' one combs one's hair, dresses, walks and talks differently on principle. This sort of folklore is fluid and changeable, like fashion and slang. . . . Yesterday, it was a haircut à la the boy idiot, and jeans. Perhaps tomorrow it will all be forgotten.

"There are also unintentional imitators. . . . Each style has them. In the field of dress, the radiation of 'intellectual' youth is expressed, for example, in the fact that slightly worse-for-the-wear gentlemen run around in the rain without their hats. . . . Similar radiation is given off [in other fields]. Entertainment centers patronized by the young, and student theaters, are nothing new. What is new . . . is their popularity. . . . If, in the beginning, the 'cult of youth' linked itself circumstantially with revolt, it now is developing without a struggle and without enemies. That is why . . . I have called the group a tribe



At a Warsaw high school graduation dance.

Zycie Warszawy June 26, 1960

and not, for example, a sect. It does not exist against somebody, it exists alongside of. . . . One goes to the Student Satirical Theater as one goes to see Anna Magnani, that is, to get a taste of a different style, or because it happens to be popular. . . .

"The careers of novels written by the very young are based on something analogous. Besides a more or less creditable decription of morals and manners . . . they contain mainly symptoms of an unusually unhappy egomania—an expression of rather unmotivated unfulfillment, rather unjustified perplexity. They consist primarily of descriptions of personal cases, while circumstances are accused very indirectly. Most often, there are no accusations at all. These books are accepted as signals from another world, and that is why they awaken the interest of even very mature people, who know many reasons for human unfulfillment and very many causes of perplexity. In order not to offend anyone, I will mention only a foreign example: F. Sagan. [Ed. note: The author probably had in mind Marek Hlasko as a Polish example.]

"What is accepted in these novels are . . . the different styles and, indirectly, the ideology. That is, the conviction

they express that youth's world of experience is different, is not a doorway to some sort of fuller sphere which constitutes a development. All the Sagens are possible, because there is no longer a hierarchy of age groups. . . . Today, it is as if the older generation had been relieved both of its merits and its mistakes for reasons of having arranged the world which the young are now taking over."⁷

Still another writer brooded about the disappearance of the old-fashioned formal engagement, with its strict laws and rituals, and tried to evaluate the postwar custom of "going steady." Happily, the author decided that despite the absence of parental controls and clear-cut rules and intentions the new system did have a "measure of respectability" and was not lacking in "ethical norms": "I exclude from this the youth groups with clearly evident anti-social intentions. However, they constitute an insignificant minority and appear to be decreasing in number. . . ."⁸

Conclusion

TO GENERALIZE about youth is, of course, a dangerous occupation and most of the Polish commentators seem to feel uneasy in their roles. Probably a large proportion of Polish youth is conservative both in manners and morals and young Brigitte Bardots and ape-men are not as ubiquitous as some of the articles would lead one to believe. The Communist youth paper, for instance, recently conducted a poll among 20 young workers in suburban Warsaw factories and came to the conclusion that the men were not interested in "easy conquests." Questioned about their taste in women, they gave answers such as: "My ideal is a very modest girl, not necessarily beautiful, capable of falling in love forever and very faithful"; "I don't like: gullibility, absolute lack of feminine dignity, lack of morality"; "A girl should be educated and pretty according to her possibilities. She should dress nicely and tastefully, not necessarily expensively. She should know how to behave in company, be clean and, most important of all, she should have spiritual qualities." The one conclusion that the youth paper reached was that the "difficult" and "superstitious" woman was out of date.⁹

The Catholic Church is still enormously influential among all age groups in Poland, of course, and great numbers of the young are still following the Church's teachings on manners and morals. The Church has not engaged in the sort of generalized criticism of youth as a whole that is so striking in the Communist press.

An earlier poll suggested that many Polish youths tended to be too cautious rather than too extreme. According to the findings, the main desires of young people were the acquisition of good professional qualifications and a happy home life. In fact, on the basis of this survey, it would appear that the postwar generation was singularly unadventurous, bureaucratic-minded, and pragmatic rather than motivated by high ideals.¹⁰

The charges of cynicism and vulgarity, however, are clearly not figments of the writers' imagination. These attitudes prevail among a large segment of youth—princi-



Young actors getting ready to shoot a scene from a movie called "Lunatics" depicting the attitudes of "difficult youngsters."

Poland (Warsaw), No. 10, 1959

pally, the intelligentsia which was expected to take over the reins of Communist leadership in coming years. The young people have turned their backs on "Marxism" and the "new Socialist Man" and, disillusioned, have voiced their rebellion by showing disrespect or contempt for traditional social norms. Attempts to woo them away from this cynicism are interesting in that the writers rarely make reference to Communist standards, tacitly conceding that, in all probability, such appeals would fall on deaf ears.

SOURCES

- ¹ *NOVO POLSKO*, organ of the Czechoslovak-Polish Friendship Society, October 1954
- ² *SZPILKI* (Warsaw), January 10, 1954
- ³ *PRZEGLAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), December 10, 1959
- ⁴ *SZTANDAR MŁODYCH* (Warsaw), March 4, 1960
- ⁵ *PRZEGLAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), November 26, 1959
- ⁶ *PRZEGLAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), September 24, 1959
- ⁷ *PRZEGLAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), February 25, 1960
- ⁸ *PRZEGLAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), March 3, 1960
- ⁹ *SZTANDAR MŁODYCH* (Warsaw), March 31, 1960
- ¹⁰ *Radio Warsaw*, October 3, 1959

"THE SUNLIT WAY" (continued from page 25)

cording to age, placed in a boarding school. His transition to productive life or to further special studies will also be prearranged. The children's homes should of course be in the same building in which the adults live. Nobody will be prevented from visiting his children during his free time and in accordance with the daily schedule. The "vitamins of love" are essential and should be distributed equally to all, even to orphans and half-orphans. And this again can be done much more profitably in public institutions for raising children than in an individual framework. . . .

In the future social commune a council of women will be set up to run the economic life and handle the affairs of the children and old people.

There are still people who think that . . . those who have passed the age when they are able to work should not be included in the financial plan of a commune, since they are a public burden. . . .

From a practical point of view this is certainly correct. Yet this position is absolutely false. The future commune will be rich enough to support its pensioners. In addition these people still have cultural and social tasks which they can certainly carry on to the end of their days. In the conditions of a social commune, in which the aged do not constitute a burden for the children and the children for their part do not look for an inheritance, even deeper and purer family feeling will develop.

Consequently the married couple still remains the ultimate cell of the family. So soon, however, as these last two exponents of a family unit recognize that it is uneconomic

and time-wasting to maintain their own household, the family will become an economic cell in a larger economic unit, will in a certain measure merge with the collective. The family will thus have melted away in the era of the social commune.

A World Federation

The communes, mutually supplementing themselves and having their productive activities coordinated by a central plan, will unite in themselves all the functions of production and consumption. The radius of action of this central plan provides for a system of onion skins, that is, it will embrace local areas, national and international territories, and extend all the way up to a world federation of all lands and peoples. This federation will be in the Marxist sense a purely economic organism, without any State structure. Unlike the anarchists, the Communists will base this system on the principle of democratic centralism. . . .

[In the time of Lenin] the solution of this problem was not yet conceivable. And when we took the concept of a "commune" too lightly, V. I. Lenin said, like the great realist he was, that "one must first work for such a noble name, must fight for it, must prove through practical achievements in the building of real Communism that one is able to lead a life worthy of the Communist system." . . .

And it required forty long years before we were prepared in 1958 to take the initiative toward this end in a collective framework and to set forth the solution: "Work, learn, and live in a Communist way!" And in this new stage of the fruitful building of Communism a well-thought-out

program for the development of a network of social and labor communes becomes to an increasing extent a real, urgent necessity.

Now what will such a social commune look like? How can we completely collectivize everyday life, and free women completely from household tasks, from the lot of joyless drudgery in an individual household? For this purpose, "commune palaces" will be established in the vicinity of large industrial centers. Every commune must be equipped with supply and maintenance services, with working communes to take care of the educational, health and nutritional sectors. Complex communes of this kind will be established as tiny districts in the large cities, where the inhabitants will have everything for the satisfaction of their cultural and other requirements. Our best architects are already busy with the constructive solution of this question. It is anticipated that everything will be arranged so that the population will not come in contact with the traffic of the streets. The individual buildings will be connected by covered passageways, and the children will go from their homes to school without danger and without getting wet.

In the countryside the architectural question will be easier to solve. Scattered, single peasant households will disappear, and there will be no more one-family houses. The agricultural commune will be one big grain and meat factory, which will also undertake the primary processing of all agricultural products. Our progressive kolkhozes are already beginning to expand, to unite, and to take on the character of a city. . . .

The Communal Palace

Since single enterprises in the USSR seldom employ more than a thousand workers, and with automation the quantity of manpower is not likely to increase, it is to be expected that a commune will accommodate approximately 2,000 to 2,500 people including children and pensioners. Medium-sized cities would therefore comprise 15 such communes. The proposed buildings should have three floors, a living space of 150,000 cubic meters and be surrounded by a green space of 7.5 hectares. The total size of such a modern city would not be more than three square kilometers, of which half would be green space. In this city the center can be reached on foot from every point in at most ten minutes. Here no subway would be necessary, no bus-line or other means of transportation. . . .

In every communal palace all administrative offices will be located in the basement—the ambulance, the postoffice, the barber and hairdresser, the laundry. All the children will be accommodated in one wing of the ground floor, and all the old people and those requiring special care in another. On the first floor there will be two- and three-room apartments for families. On the top floor there will be single rooms for students and unmarried people. According to our calculations we should be able in 20 years to give everybody more than 16-18 square meters of living space. . . .

Fortunately the commune of the future no longer appears today as an ugly mass hostel in which the common

kitchen produces constant quarrels among the inhabitants. People must have the opportunity, for privacy's sake, to retire and relax in their own rooms. Also, a loving couple should have the chance to use one "nook and corner" as their own. But at the same time everyone will seek to be socially united with his companions, with the collective. Eating meals together will insure a constant contact with the collective even during leisure hours. In this way the commune is a well-knit economic and social organism designed to condition people to heed the interests of the collective. The social commune is the basic element in the Communist organization of society.

The question naturally arises, whether it is not too soon to raise such questions. Certainly we still have many problems which await solution. We still have a considerable lack of housing. In order to satisfy the most elemental requirements of decent living conditions, we need at least ten more years and hundreds of millions of rubles. And even though it has been decided to provide every family with its own dwelling, in practice every dwelling contains more than one family and conditions exist in places of mass accommodation which have the effect of driving people away from the idea of "togetherness in a commune."

No More Property, No More Crime

A commune such as we have described would require a capital outlay of 50 million rubles. This means that for the whole Soviet Union 5 trillion rubles would have to be invested. Even in 15 years, when we shall be five times as rich as we are now and shall have long overtaken the USA, this project will require another ten years of effort. However, the time is already fully ripe for single experiments. . . . Siberia and our whole East would be a suitable area for the first steps in this direction. . . . In the region of the Angara and Yenisei rivers the conditions of production are such that we could build such experimental communes without further preparation and encourage the Communist Youth to move and live there on a voluntary basis. . . .

The training of people for this new life must begin as early as pre-school age. . . . Personal property in toys, ice skates, bicycles and so forth will not be recognized in the commune. All gifts received by the children will go into the "common pot" and be there for everybody. . . . This is an elementary law, in which are anchored the basic ideas of the Communist consciousness. . . .

The question of offenses against property and of criminality in general will be fundamentally changed. . . .

Let us envision such a communal palace in which everything . . . even shoes and clothing, will be equally distributed, and where the workers will be paid for their labor in script with which they can purchase essential goods. What incentive would there be for a thief or a speculator? Nobody will be able to sell anything, and who would accumulate unnecessary things for mere pleasure when there will be neither place nor opportunity for that in a dwelling that is rationally equipped and maintained. . . .

The criminal code will altogether lose its effect. . . .

And today there is no longer any power which could prevent us from striding forward upon this sunny path!

Current Developments

INTERNATIONAL:

East European leaders at the General Assembly meeting in New York support Khrushchev while stressing interests of their own (p. 34).

Hungary follows the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in signing a trade, credit and technical assistance agreement with Cuba (p. 46).

Prague plays host to conferences of churchmen and students (p. 44).

POLITICAL:

Polish bishops draft a pastoral letter on Church-State relations (p. 38).

Hungarian birth rate reaches all-time low (p. 47).

ECONOMIC:

Polish Communists begin campaign to force peasants to use improved methods in agriculture (p. 39).

Poland increases the excise tax on foreign parcels (p. 42).

Czechoslovakia completes rural electrification (p. 45).

AREAWIDE

Soviet Bloc Leaders at the UN

From September 20 to October 13, the Communist Party chiefs from Eastern Europe,* led by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, vied with each other in supporting the Soviet Union's foreign policy positions. Compared with their fist-banging, mercurial ring-leader Khrushchev, the words and deeds of the Satellite rulers were subdued; they acted as a chorus or claqué to the Russian, little else. Yet differences in tone were discernible. Wladyslaw Gomułka, Polish Party First Secretary, was seemingly quite reasonable in his speech on disarmament, September 27, but the final proposals put forward echoed the Soviet Union's line for immediate disarmament, with or without adequate inspection, abandonment of missile-launching sites in countries which do not yet possess nuclear weapons, and an end to all atomic tests. Commenting on Gomułka's words, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 28, wrote:

"The Polish delegation approaches the basic political questions of our time seriously and with restraint. While supporting large-scale, radical solutions which would remove the threat of war once and for all, it also submits more modest propositions intended, at least, to help curb

and not intensify the arms race, to prevent the creation of additional dangers, thus, by the same token, improve the international climate and clear the path leading toward agreement in the matter of total disarmament."

Balkan Pact Urged

The following day, Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian Party chief, resurrected the old Romanian proposal for a Balkan entente which would bind together the Communist Soviet bloc nations of Bulgaria, Albania and Romania, plus Yugoslavia, and the NATO nations of Greece and Turkey. The Balkan countries would pledge themselves to renounce nuclear weapons, sign a mutual nonaggression pact and "transform the Balkans into an area in which the idea for a general and complete disarmament would first find its application." The "important contribution" of Todor Zhivkov was trumpeted over Radio Sofia, September 29: "Yesterday's remarkable speech . . . was directed against the dark forces of imperialism and colonialism. This speech is an important contribution to the work of the present session of the UN General Assembly. . . . Every citizen of our country who last night was listening to the speech delivered by Comrade Todor Zhivkov . . . had, first of all, a feeling of joy and legitimate pride in the worthy position that Bulgaria has taken in international relations. . . . In the loud applause of the delegates, in the congratulations presented by Khrushchev and [Cuban Premier] Fidel Castro and others to Comrade Todor Zhivkov, one may feel the respect and love which the People's Republic of Bul-

* Except Albania, which sent Premier Mehmet Shehu in lieu of Enver Hoxha, the Albanian Party First Secretary.

garia is enjoying in the midst of progressive mankind."

The disarmament theme was also sounded by Romanian Party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej on September 27. He accused the West of balking disarmament in order to use their military bases not only against "the Socialist countries, but also against the liberation movement in Africa." In less detail than Zhivkov, Gheorghiu-Dej repeated the suggestion for a Balkan "zone of peace."

The Romanian press seized on this latter proposal to show that Athens was "keenly interested" in inter-Balkan cooperation. *Scinteia* (Bucharest), October 2, reported that Greek political leaders had told their correspondent that "an eventual rejection of the Romanian proposal [for a Balkan Pact] would be unreasonable and would constitute a disservice to the aspirations for peace of the peoples of the Balkans." A Greek ex-cabinet minister allegedly said: "Although Greece still has disputes with some neighboring States, Romania's proposals are a sound basis for reaching a speedy understanding among the countries in this area." Official Greek reaction to the Balkan Pact was cool. In an effort to make the idea more palatable, Gheorghiu-Dej modified his original position by stating in an interview with a correspondent of *The New York Times*, October 1, that a pact could be signed without disturbing the present alliances of the signatories.

Novotny Defensive

In his major address to the United Nations, September 26, Czechoslovak President Antonin Novotny vehemently rejected Western charges that Czechoslovakia was, in fact, a Satellite State of the USSR. "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is an independent sovereign State," he protested. "We are by no means dominated by what US representatives here call Soviet imperialism. Our relations with the Soviet Union are based on the very essence of our national existence. . . . The fact that our people have definitely parted company with the representatives of the capitalist world is the fault of these representatives. It was they who in 1938 delivered their loyal ally, the Czechoslovak . . . Republic, to the tender mercies of Hitler, a ferocious beast, assuming that they would satisfy him and at the same time open to Hitler the gates to the East. This is why in February 1948 no revolution occurred in our country. The



Secretary Herter at the United Nations: "Yes, we have thoroughly isolated him."

Nepzabadsag (Budapest), September 23, 1960



Polish official propaganda at the time of the General Assembly meeting followed the Moscow line. The Statue of Liberty inquires, "What are you looking for, gentlemen?" Their answer: "Freedom." The statue replies, "Let us look together."

Szpilki (Warsaw), October 2, 1960

people's democratic system has existed in our country since 1945 and developed successfully." (Radio Prague, September 26.)

This curious apologia was coupled with a vicious attack on West German "revanchism" and "imperialism" although these words were not to be construed as springing out "of fear for our national independence, nor out of hatred for the German nation." Czechoslovakia, he declared, "has completely solid and reliable bonds of alliance with the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. This is a guarantee which safeguards the security of our republic as never before."

Kadar Restricted

Hungarian Party chief Janos Kadar, like Shehu and Khrushchev, was restricted to Manhattan Island during his stay in the United States for the UN General Assembly session. The Hungarian government sharply protested to Washington, calling the restriction a slanderous and shameless attack against the Hungarian people. With sightseeing limited to Manhattan, the Budapest press and radio quoted Kadar frequently as he exclaimed from the top of the Empire State Building: "Magnificent!" or came up with that familiar cliché: "You can work in New York but not live in it." (Radio Budapest, September 28.)

When Kadar rose to address the General Assembly, large numbers of delegates left the hall in protest. Although he, too, spoke in support of the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals, much of his speech was devoted to an attack against any discussion of the 1956 Hungarian Revolt in the United Nations. His explanation of the "counterrevolution" was standard Communist dogma. Although he admitted that his government had refused to allow officers of the United Nations to enter Hungary for the purpose of

investigating reports of official repression, he offered to receive individual UN personnel as "guests," at which time they would be treated with the "courtesy and hospitality" due high-ranking visitors.

The implication that he may have betrayed the 1956 "revolution" came from Janos Kadar himself when he stated: "I have often been personally attacked in this place. May I therefore be allowed to make a remark of a personal nature. . . . One can make mistakes and one can err. But I believe I am serving a true cause and I am proud that in a grave hour of history, together with my loyal companions, standing up for the working class and my long-suffering Hungarian people, I was where I had to be and I did what I had to do." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], September 5.)

"Pride" was voiced by the official Party organ "to hear the representative of our people assist with constructive proposals the position of the Soviet Union in the United Nations."

Albanian Ire

Albanian hatred for Yugoslavia and friendship with Communist China was much in evidence when Premier Mehmet Shehu spoke before the United Nations in defense of Communist China's admission to the world body, October 3. After praising Peiping's economic achievements which had become "the property of the masses . . . who until yesterday were kept in darkness and misery by imperialism and the anti-people regime of Chiang Kai-shek," he went on to slander Yugoslavia, though not by name, for its "fantastic and completely reactionary theories that People's China is for war and against peace." (Radio Tirana, October 4.)

More Attacks on Kardelj Book

Although Yugoslav President Tito was busy at the United Nations often defending Soviet policy, and his relations with the Soviet Premier could not have appeared more cordial, in Tirana the anti-Yugoslav campaign showed no sign of letting up. The recent publication of Yugoslav Vice President Edvard Kardelj's book, "Socialism and War" (see *East Europe*, October, p. 43), gave the Albanians an opportunity not only to castigate Belgrade but also to defend Communist China: "In engaging in acrobatics with Marxism-Leninism," said *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), September 25, "Kardelj widely attacks the Chinese Communists in order to propagate openly his own anti-Marxist revisionist views, conceal the aggressive nature of modern imperialism, defend the real planners of aggressive wars, paralyze the peace-loving forces, and attack and distort the victorious Marxist-Leninist ideas." Another article in the same Party organ, September 5, averred: "In attacking the Chinese Communists [Kardelj] attacks Marxism-Leninism, because the Chinese Communist Party has been and remains placed on correct ideological positions and in fact consistently defends Marxism-Leninism."

In reply, Belgrade made it clear that Albania was the only member of the Soviet bloc which refused any cooperation with Yugoslavia. Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic

pointed out in a speech in Titograd, September 26, that Yugoslavia was successfully promoting all-around cooperation with its neighbors, except Albania. "The hostile attitude and policy of offense, slander and imputation," he said, "as well as insolent provocations pursued by some Albanian leaders toward Yugoslavia, have aggravated, and are still aggravating, relations between the two countries, and have spoiled the brotherhood and friendship which were built up between the two peoples in the past struggle against the same enemy by common and great sacrifices." (*Tanjug* [Belgrade], September 26.)

Czechoslovakia Attacks Kardelj

After publishing a translation of the Moscow *Pravda* critical estimate of Kardelj's book, a few days later the Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 10, printed its own refutation of the "Yugoslav revisionist pamphlet." Prague's central criticism of Kardelj was contained in the following paragraph:

"He [Kardelj] elaborates abstract considerations on the necessity of war and the possibility of avoiding it on dozens of pages. At the same time, the real contemporary world and specific tasks do not exist for him. He is concerned about captivating the readers with his malicious 'arguments' and allusions so they can arrive at the conviction that it is possible for Socialist countries to wage unjust wars. Today, with many thousands of proofs of the detestable provocations of American imperialists and of the West German revanchists . . . the Yugoslav revisionist theorist proves the possibility of a threat of war coming from Socialism."

Moscow Criticized

The hostile reception accorded the Kardelj book in Moscow has also aroused Yugoslav ire. The Belgrade Party organ *Borba*, September 17, cited a speech by N. S. Mukhitdinov, a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Party Central Committee, delivered in Hanoi, capital of Communist Vietnam, when the Soviet Communist allegedly said: "In present-day circumstances, the Yugoslav revisionists are making futile efforts to prove the impossibility of preventing war, denying the decisive influence of the Socialist camp on the fate of peace." Incredulously, *Borba* commented: "It seemed unbelievable that a responsible leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union set forth at a public meeting an irresponsible assertion such as the one that the Yugoslavs are trying to prove that war is inevitable, although he is perfectly aware that we have for years been asserting precisely the opposite, that is, that war can be prevented. . . . In the falsification of Yugoslavia's views, this can be considered the extreme limit—for the time being, anyway!"

The Soviet Party organ *Pravda* specifically came under fire for its critical review of the Kardelj book (see *East Europe*, October, pp. 54-57). *Borba*, September 12, described the Soviet review as a "polemic" written "from the angle of dogmatism." Since Kardelj's thesis was in part a defense of the current Soviet position that "war is no longer inevitable," even though "imperialist nations" still exist, *Borba* concluded:

"When [*Pravda*] criticizes dogmatists, [it does] so by using arguments which constitute the substance of the pamphlet written by Edvard Kardelj. But when [*Pravda*] attacks Yugoslav 'revisionism,' then [it] either adopts positions of dogmatism as such, which [*Pravda*] otherwise criticizes, or criticizes the alleged concepts conceived by Kardelj which have, in fact, been invented, and then criticizes these points by resorting to arguments which are contained in Kardelj's concepts."

With the other Satellite countries, Belgrade's relations have been satisfactory. A Polish-Yugoslav protocol on scientific and technical cooperation for 1961 was signed in Warsaw, September 26, according to the official Yugoslav news agency of that same day. Another Polish-Yugoslav accord was reached in Belgrade, September 30, on cooperation between the radio and television network of the two countries. (*Tanjug*, September 30.) A session of the Yugoslav-Romanian joint commission for investigating and settling frontier incidents between the two nations was held in Belgrade, September 26-29, in an atmosphere "of full understanding and friendship." (*Tanjug*, September 30.) Finally, a delegation of Yugoslav journalists arrived in Sofia, October 7, for a two-week stay as guests of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists. (Radio Sofia, October 7.)

Comecon Activities

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—the body charged with instituting a division of tasks among the European members of the Soviet bloc—has been increasingly active in recent weeks.

Plans for a semi-automatic telephone network connecting the capitals and major industrial centers of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany reportedly have been completed. Bucharest, Sofia, Tirana and Budapest are to be hooked up to the network by the end of 1962, and by 1965 the Communist countries of Asia will be included.

On September 5, Poland's Party leader Gomulka, the most outspoken critic of Comecon's lack of activity, received the President of Czechoslovakia, a country which by implication has been one of the prime targets of his recent criticism of Comecon's international investment policies. (See *East Europe*, August, pp. 39-40.) The joint statement published upon President Novotny's departure indicated that the Poles had made headway in pressing for their demands. It contained a statement calling for more "effective exploitation of investment capital," and included a proposal for a new project which involves developing Poland's natural resources with Czechoslovak capital. "Both sides decided to cooperate in . . . developing the copper industry in Poland and advised appropriate organs to draw up the scope and conditions of such cooperation in the shortest possible time." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 13.)

Raw Materials

Cooperation to overcome the shortage of raw materials in Eastern Europe, which has been the most positive area

THE SOFT LIFE

A recent Soviet radio program raised the question whether improved living conditions may be sapping the fiber of Communist youth. To show the insidious effects of bicycles, automobiles and television sets upon the character of the young, the commentator read the following letter.

"Oleg and I have been friends for a long time. Oleg was making good progress with his studies and had always been very assiduous in his work and very sociable. He was elected to the Komsomol [Young Communist League] bureau, and no venture could be launched without his participation.

"Two events recently took place in Oleg's life. First, he was allotted a room of his own by the factory, and second, lucky fellow, he won a motorcycle in the lottery. Everything seemed to be fine. Friends congratulated him and rejoiced at his successes; yet it seems that they went too far in their congratulations. Oleg has completely changed. He gave up his Komsomol work, no longer takes part in mass ventures, and shuns the collective's Sunday tasks. As soon as his work shift is over he repairs to his room and there sits like an owl. He doesn't even invite any of the boys to come and see him. He has begun to look down upon us.

"What is happening, comrades? Every year we are better off. Our living standards are improving, so what shall we do? Shall we all retire to our little rooms and flats and admire our bicycles, automobiles and television sets? People like that are not needed by Communism, and yet Communism means abundance and wealth for all, and it is necessary to know how to use this wealth without impoverishing our spirit. . . ."

Radio Moscow, Home Service, September 15, 1960

of Comecon's work, received attention in the Hungarian economic journal *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (Budapest), August-September, 1960. It cited a project recently agreed on by Hungary and Poland. Using its relatively more abundant electric power generated from coal supplies, Poland will process Hungarian bauxite into aluminum for use by both countries.

Increasing attention is being given to a more important question involving raw materials, namely, the supplies from the Soviet Union. The trend now is for the USSR to require investments in the form of machines and equipment from Eastern Europe in return for these supplies. For example, according to the Hungarian journal cited above, Czechoslovakia recently agreed to furnish chemical-industrial machinery and mining equipment to the USSR in return for future supplies of non-ferrous metals and iron ore. But the focus of interest is on the question of Soviet shipments of iron ore and pig iron. For economy in transportation, the Soviet Union wants to ship a larger proportion of its future deliveries in the form of pig iron rather

than ore. The organ of the Polish Planning Commission *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), July, noted that such a shift "will have far reaching consequences for defining the size of investments in iron foundries." The implication was that in the future the East European countries will stop expanding their smelting capacity and may even invest in smelting capacity within the Soviet Union.

Agricultural Conference in Sofia

The fourth conference on coordinating scientific research work in agriculture and forestry met September 22-October 3 in Bulgaria. According to Radio Sofia, October 3, the conferees discussed the progress made on decisions taken at the third conference in Moscow in October 1958 and heard special reports from the four permanent commissions: plant cultivation, livestock breeding, mechanization, and electrification and agricultural economy. Specific information on the work undertaken, however, was not published. The conference evidently is scheduled to meet every two years; the next session was set for 1962 in Bucharest.

Comecon's specialization schemes have met the most serious obstacles in agriculture. *Planovane Hospodarstvi* (Prague), journal of the Czechoslovak Planning Commission, admitted in September that "agricultural production in individual countries . . . has been influenced very little by mutual cooperation up to the present." In the long and detailed article that followed, the author urged that further work be done in this direction. Czechoslovakia is particularly interested in agricultural specialization because of the stagnation of its own agriculture and the small amount of agricultural land available relative to its population.

POLAND

Church-State Relations

The aspects of foreign policy reflecting Polish national interests are often supported by both Catholics and Communists. In part because of this, and despite regime harassment of the clergy, the shaky truce between Church and State endures. On the occasion of a conference of Polish bishops in early September, the Polish Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński had prepared a pastoral letter criticizing the State, particularly for regime threats against continued religious instruction in the schools and demands for payment of taxes on church property (for text of letter, see *Texts and Documents*, p. 50). Learning that the Cardinal's missive was to be read in all churches, the government insisted that he withdraw it at this time, since publication would only embarrass the Polish Party chief as he was about to depart for the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, where he was to defend the Polish Western Territories against "German militarism."

EVERYTHING OUT IN THE OPEN

"They began by putting up the tents, and then the field kitchen to hold the caldrons for cooking. They had hardly finished this job when they started to assemble in the big tent to talk about the international situation. They sat on blankets with notebooks on their knees, and one could scarcely have imagined the variety of subjects that interested these 45 boys and girls aged 15-17 years, chairmen of youth organizations at Prague secondary, vocational and health schools. They were preparing for responsible political work in the coming school year. . . .

"What is behind the dispatch of espionage aircraft into the USSR? Who forms the nucleus of the revenge-mongering and fascist forces in Western Germany? Will the people of the Western countries succeed in curbing the monopolists and warmongers so that they will not be able to provoke a war? . . .

"The discussion continued during lunch while the young people spooned their goulash soup. Democracy and freedom were also discussed, what they look like in the West where they serve as a cloak for the exploitative aims of the capitalists, and how consistently they are applied in our country by the broad masses of the working people. . . ."

Rude Pravo (Prague), August 7, 1960

The Polish Episcopate acceded, but distributed copies of the letter throughout the parishes.

Evidence that the highest Polish Church circles share the Party's avowed fear of West German revanchism came when Cardinal Wyszyński harshly criticized a Western political leader (whom he did not name but who almost certainly was West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer) in a sermon at Malbork in the Western Territories, August 18: "We hear from the West menacing sounds from a man who does not like us," the Primate said. "This proud man, sure of his power, threatens the lands of our ancestors as well as our liberty." (*Tygodnik Powszechny* [Warsaw], September 25.)

Catholic Writers Urge Cooperation with Party

Three leading Catholic journalists, members of the "Znak" group in Parliament, published in the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, September 4, articles favoring close ties with the Soviet Union and the Polish Party. An article by Stefan Kisielewski viewed with optimism Church-State coexistence. Stating that Poland is the meeting ground "of two concepts of life . . . Catholic spiritualism and Marxist materialism," he added that "those who accept the true and permanent elements of religious spiritualism and those who see concrete and tangible historical influence of the elements contained in Marxist materialism, must appreciate the universal significance of the meeting of these two attitudes on the stage of our traditionally Catholic country."

In another article entitled "The Polish *Raison d'Etat*," Kazimierz Studentowicz declared himself in favor of co-operation with the Communist Party in the face of the West German threat to Poland's western frontiers: "We are living at a moment in history when the line of the ruling party coincides with the nation's *raison d'etat* on the most important plane, namely, the retention of territories indispensable to the maintenance and development of the nation's . . . strength."

The managing editor, Stanislaw Stomma, in the third article, discussed the international situation from the point of view of someone who feels that every effort must be made to keep up contacts with the West. Since "all that leads to war is bad," it follows that "everything that leads to understanding, decreased hostility and establishment of bridges between nations and opposing camps is good."

The Party Replies

The leading political weekly *Polityka* (Warsaw), September 17, praised the Catholic publicists for their support of the Party's foreign policy positions, but sharply questioned their desire for an "independent standpoint" on other matters. The main lines of *Polityka's* argument were as follows:

"We carefully read this special edition of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, remembering that this publication is connected with the Church hierarchy. In this case, it is impossible not to ask: why does the . . . Polish Church hierarchy remain silent in those matters of paramount importance to humanity? . . . Studentowicz, discussing the problem of the Polish position in Europe, states: 'Who can guarantee Polish frontiers? Only the Soviet Union because if we had found ourselves after World War II in the sphere of Western influence it would have been impossible for us . . . to implement our most justified claims against Germany.' . . . Studentowicz is . . . right when he emphasizes the fact that the Soviet Union is our only guarantee of our national independence yesterday, today and tomorrow."

"The view on the subject expressed by Kisielewski is somewhat different: 'Our guarantee for the frontier on the Oder-Neisse is provided by one of the leading partners in the present "game for the world." . . . But we read with amazement . . . his thought: this new Polish situation often leads Marxists to formulate the mistaken belief that 'the only basis for the full acceptance of our alliance with the Soviet Union is Marxist internationalism.' . . . Dear Lord, where did you get that notion? . . . He seems to say, here I am, a Catholic publicist, pointing out that the Marxists are limited, cannot raise themselves above Marxist internationalism, while we rationalize the need for a Polish-Soviet alliance on a broader basis, because we do not think in terms of doctrines, but empirically, thus our rôle in this alliance is great. . . ."

"It is very nice to read that Kisielewski is for coexistence. . . . But does his support for coexistence mean that he will persuade the Church hierarchy to accept the Socialist system? . . . Finally . . . the author says that the situation greatly strengthens the position of the ruling Party, 'but



The Polish press may be censored, but it is still uninhibited. This picture appeared on the cover of *Swiat* (Warsaw), September 25, 1960.

with it grows its responsibility and lack of any kind of justification should it reject the cooperation of those Poles who offer it on condition that they be permitted to keep their independent standpoint on matters of action—in addition affirming the fact of Socialism existing in Poland."

"One gets the impression that there is a desire to present a bill for our foreign policy. . . ."

Gomulka Addresses Harvest Festival

The annual harvest festival in Warsaw is always the occasion for a speech by First Party Secretary Gomulka in which he summarizes his regime's current farm policies. This year, on September 4, his speech anticipated a much longer one that he was to make a week later to his Central Committee (see below). The theme of his speech to the festival was that the technical level of Polish farming is not only low—a point which needed no emphasis—but is not improving as fast as it should. "Is it normal and necessary," he asked, "for our country, in which over 40 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture and in which over 15 million hectares of farmland are cultivated, to import increasing quantities of cereals and to be dependent on foreign countries in providing food for our cities?"

The new Five Year Plan (1961-1965) stresses heavy investment in the agricultural sector: the supply of tractors

and farm machinery is to increase 2.5 times; chemical fertilizers by 70 percent; mixed fodder 4 times; and building materials by 100 percent. Never before, he said, had the Polish farmer received such assistance from the State, and it was the farmer's obligation to make the best possible use of it. "You will not be able to do this if you stick to old, individual methods of antiquated farming, and allow old habits to get the better of you. Only collective, organized efforts by farmers can insure rapid progress. . . ."

Some of these "collective efforts" were devices the regime has stressed in the past: agricultural circles for the purchase of machinery, and collective farms which Gomulka again referred to as "the future of our rural areas." But he asserted that even the present structure of Polish farming, which is predominantly that of small independent peasants, can be made to yield much more than it does if the farmers will adopt better techniques. In an effort to persuade them to do so, the government will "declare war on those who impede agro-technical progress and lower the level of agrarian culture, thus inflicting damage both on themselves and the entire community."

"We must make it the legal duty of farmers to sow select seeds, to utilize weed and pest killers, to cultivate improved land, to maintain land-improvement installations, and to participate in operations which raise agrarian culture and which require efforts and cooperation of the entire village."

"State authorities should obtain the necessary prerogatives enabling them to apply compulsion and sanctions with regard to those who, despite objective conditions and the aspirations of the majority of peasants, impede or simply nullify measures for the benefit of agricultural progress and increased production through their backward, slovenly farming. We must no longer tolerate those who defend their backwardness, negligence, and antisocial attitude by insisting that they can do as they please on their land and freely foster backward agriculture."

Another new move will be the dispatching of large numbers of agricultural specialists into the countryside. While the Communist regime has trained thousands of these technicians, they have shown little desire to work on the farms. "It is high time," said Gomulka, "to send to rural areas . . . those hundreds and thousands of experienced specialists who . . . will insure the correct structure of sowing and of cultivation of fields and meadows in every village, will supervise replacement of seeds, will teach peasants how to fertilize and how to feed and breed animals, and will spread agrarian knowledge in rural areas as organizers of agricultural courses and preliminary training schools." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 5.)

Central Committee on Agriculture

A shift in tactics in the countryside was the keynote of the sixth plenary meeting of the Central Committee on September 13-14. Instead of focusing on mechanization, as in the past, the Party's ruling body emphasized the need to spread better techniques and to put more agricultural specialists to work in the countryside. The CC announced that it will use legal sanctions and "administrative measures"

to back up its campaign for better farming. First Secretary Gomulka set the tone when he said:

"It is our task to mobilize all means to increase agricultural production. In the field of investments we have already made our maximum effort. But it is not investments that govern agricultural development. The organizational work of all State organs and of social organizations working in and on behalf of agriculture is equally important. Increased agricultural production is affected as much by the standard of agricultural knowledge on the part of the producer as by investments."

"Organizational work in and on behalf of agriculture, as well as the producer's ability to make practical application of the achievements of agricultural sciences, are the two basic areas which, in our current situation, provide great reserves for increased agricultural production."

In the last five years Polish agriculture has shown the usual tendency to disappoint the hopes of Communist planners, although it has done better than in the more dogma-ridden farm sectors of the other East European Satellites. Total output has risen about 19 percent, according to Gomulka's report, but this is 5 percentage points lower than the planners had hoped. Livestock production has risen 21-22 percent, outstripping the supply of fodder and requiring a further increase in Poland's already large imports of grain. These imports during the five years amounted to about 11.5 percent of Poland's own production, and rose to nearly 2 million tons in 1960.

Surveying the prospects for the next five years, Gomulka admitted that "caution is more than justified." Nevertheless, he maintained that agriculture could and must progress faster than it has—even though some elements of the Party "are of the opinion that the targets of agricultural development . . . are too high and will be difficult to meet." He called for: changes in the crop structure (less rye and oats, more wheat and corn); better seeds; a stronger fight against weeds and insects; better use of fertilizers; and more rational use of land.

The Arm of the Law

To strengthen the Party's appeal for better methods of farming, Gomulka called for legal measures "permitting the use of sanctions against those who, owing to negligence or backwardness, harm the development of production":

"The new law on the use of seeds should stipulate that:

(1) In given areas only those brands of crops can be sown which are approved as suitable for the local soil and climatic conditions; (2) According to the rural community's sowing plan, every rural community is obliged to replace seed grain and potatoes for planting within set deadlines and in agreed quantities.

"The new regulations on crop protection should: (1) Enforce throughout the country or in given areas the duty to combat pests and disease which threaten agricultural production; (2) Lay down the principle that given enterprises carry out compulsory protective measures on fields of those users, and at the users' expense, who failed to do so themselves in defiance of regulations; (3) Make it possible for agricultural services to enforce sufficient quarantine measures to protect the borders against penetration of new and menacing pests and diseases, and to prevent



Children playing in a Warsaw street.

Swiat (Warsaw), September 18, 1960

the spread of various species quarantined within the country to areas free from them."

Experts to the Countryside

The Party will also begin a campaign to get more agricultural technicians into the countryside and down to the community level, armed with the right to take legal action against peasants who refuse to follow their instructions. While the Communists have trained thousands of agronomists, veterinarians and other experts, many of them have chosen to work in offices and factories rather than endure the rigors of the countryside. The program announced at the CC meeting calls for the construction of "agrocen-ters"—1,000 of them in 1961—to provide lodging for the specialists and land to be used for demonstration purposes. Local governments, in cooperation with agricultural circles, will build the centers and finance them from that part of the Agricultural Development Fund which is at the disposal of the District Unions of Agricultural Circles. To help recruit the necessary personnel, "we must see to it that an agronomist working in a rural community is paid the same salary as the specialist working in an agricultural institute, and that, at the same time, he is materially interested in the production results of the area in his charge." In the future, moreover, agricultural experts will not be allowed to work in non-agricultural jobs without government approval.

The much-publicized program of mechanization launched in the summer of 1959 received scant mention in Gomulka's report to the CC. However, he said that the practice of concentrating tractors and machinery in specific areas should be continued on a much larger scale in 1961. Of 8,500 tractors which will be allotted to the agricultural circles next year, about 2,000 will be concentrated in selected communities at the rate of 8 tractors per village. In cases where the circles cannot pay their share of the cost of the machinery and facilities (25 percent of the price, the remainder being supplied directly by the Agricultural Development Fund), the District Unions of Agricultural Circles will be authorized to grant ten-year non-interest-bearing loans. The villages are to be chosen largely on the basis of their financial resources, their experience in using machinery, access to good roads and their degree of electrification. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 15.)

On Coexistence

The Central Committee, in its only significant political pronouncement, sent Party leader Gomulka off to the United Nations General Assembly with its full support for the belief that peaceful competition between Socialist and capitalist countries is possible. Reporting on the Bucharest meeting of the Communist leaders in June, Gomulka declared himself a fervent advocate of Khrushchev's interpretation—which asserts that war is no longer inevitable—

WHOSE SIDE ARE THEY ON?

"I happened to be in Wilanow [near Warsaw] on August 29. While waiting for a streetcar I saw a brutal fight going on between a drunken hooligan and two policemen. I observed with horror that the policemen had to give in to a crowd of 'defenders' who gathered within a few minutes (including the conductor of the streetcar), tore away the briefcase of one of the policemen, threw the cap of the other in the mud and called both of them the most vulgar names. . . . Throughout the civilized world a policeman receives the respect of society and can count on its aid against lawbreakers. It is intolerable that honest men should defend a criminal. Perhaps those 'defenders' failed to understand that but for the police we could not sleep peacefully at night."

Express Wieczorny (Warsaw), September 12, 1960

as have all East European leaders. The Central Committee's resolution stated that the Party "approves in its entirety" of the position taken by Gomulka at the meeting. The Bucharest meeting "correctly acknowledges the struggle for peace as the main task of the Communist movement . . . and despite the continued existence of imperialism, it is still possible to prevent war and maintain world peace. This does not mean, however, that already today peace is permanently and automatically assured." While the resolution stressed on several occasions the solidarity of the Polish Party with the Soviet Union, it did not make any direct reference to Communist China, Khrushchev's chief foe in the ideological clash over coexistence. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 16.)

Gomulka on Peace and Trade

As the guest of honor at a dinner given by an American industrialist, Cyrus S. Eaton, in New York, Poland's Party leader spoke out strongly in favor of expanding trade relations with the West, according to *The New York Times*, October 4. In his opinion, peace could be assured if "the Socialist countries were to participate in 30 to 40 percent of the West's total trade." He also said that Poland wanted to expand its trade with the United States, but he added that there must first be a change of the State Department's attitude. Gomulka evidently was referring to the extension of most-favored-nation treatment to Polish goods entering the United States, to which the Poles feel they are entitled since the signing of the compensation agreement with the United States in July. After returning to Warsaw, however, the Polish chief said that he had indeed received assurance from the State Department that such preferential tariff treatment will soon be given. (See p. 43.)

Steep Foreign Gift Tax Imposed

By decision of the Council of Ministers, a heavy tariff will be imposed on consumer gift packages from abroad, effective November 15. The measure will have a direct

and unwelcome impact on many Polish families since more than one million foreign gift parcels are received in the country annually, according to *The New York Times*, October 9. Previously such gifts could enter duty free.

The decree lists 470 goods on which one of two tariff rates will apply depending on whether the weight of the parcel exceeds a specified maximum. Above the maximum, the tariff increases by varying amounts ranging from 50 to 150 percent. For example, a parcel containing sweaters and weighing no more than two pounds will be taxed 400 *zloty*; if the weight exceeds this, the tax becomes 900 *zloty* for each additional two pounds. Rates on coffee are 100 and 200 *zloty* and the weight limit is also set at two pounds. Certain groups of underprivileged persons—invalids, pensioners and individuals on social welfare—will receive concessions in the form of lower rates. For example, the tax on a pair of shoes to a person in this category will be only 5 *zloty*. Factory-packaged pharmaceuticals weighing no more than one pound will not be taxed. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], October 6.)

One special provision contained in the decree is curious. If an individual receives an excessive number of parcels which according to their weight are in the first category of tariffs, then the higher, second set of rates will be applied, irrespective of weight. However, the actual number of packages regarded as acceptable for a given period of time was not specified. (*Dziennik Ustaw* [Warsaw], October 4.)

Since the average monthly wage in Poland is roughly 1700 *zloty*, the impact of this move will in many cases be heavy. The regime evidently intends this measure to accomplish two purposes. One, the authorities have never been happy about the large inflow of gift packages from abroad, and they would like to minimize the possibilities of such goods finding their way into the black market. Second, the country is in dire need of foreign exchange, and this formidable tariff is likely to shift the gifts into another channel which the regime has provided especially for this purpose. The Polish Savings Bank maintains branches abroad in which foreigners can deposit dollars, for example, to the credit of their family or friends in Poland. The State treasury gets the dollars and the designated person gets either goods from special stores operated by the Bank, or *zloty* which can be used in these stores to purchase a wider selection of goods than are generally found in the State retail outlets. The Bank is now offering 84 *zloty* per dollar as compared with 24 *zloty* per dollar at the official tourist rate—a fact which underlines Poland's urgent need for foreign exchange.

23 Jailed in Black Market Case

Life sentences and 300,000 *zloty* fines were imposed on the three leaders of a leather industry racket, ending a dramatic trial that has captured top publicity in the Polish press during its eighty-day proceedings. (See *East Europe*, September, p. 51.) Prison terms ranging from 6 to 15 years, with fines of 50,000 to 250,000 *zloty*, were levied on the twenty remaining defendants accused of conspiring in the industrial black market ring which was said to have operated successfully for years.

The publicity and the severity of the sentences served official notice that the authorities are cracking down on theft, embezzlement and misappropriation of "Socialist property"—a social and economic affliction that is said to be widespread in Poland's State-run economy. The prosecution had asked the court for the death penalty in the case of the three ring leaders: Eugeniusz Galicki, former director of the Warsaw tanning works, and his two principal collaborators, Michal Nowik and Jan Wozniak.

According to the indictment, the defendants had pur-

chased cheap hides and substituted them for high quality hides at the tannery, selling the latter clandestinely in finished form to shoemakers. Nearly 9 million *zloty* were said to have been lost to the State treasury as a result. In reporting the outcome of the trial, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), October 4, urged its readers to inform on all persons whom they suspected of "economic crimes"—in the name of "social self-defense."

Preferential Tariff Treatment by US Claimed

First Party Secretary Gomulka returned home after his sojourn in New York at the United Nations General Assembly session claiming assurance from US authorities that most-favored-nation treatment would soon be restored to Polish exports entering the United States, according to a *New York Times* dispatch from Warsaw published October 14. The paper, however, also reported that State Department officials in Washington had declined to comment on Gomulka's assertion.

Most-favored-nation privileges were withdrawn from Polish goods in 1951, but the Warsaw regime in recent months has hopefully anticipated that they would soon be reestablished, especially since the signing of a financial agreement with the US in July compensating American citizens for property confiscated through Poland's nationalization policies. (See *East Europe*, September, p. 50.) According to the *Times* dispatch, Polish foreign trade experts estimate that this would mean a 50 percent increase in exports to the US next year. The US now holds eighth place in Poland's total foreign trade, but the bulk of Poland's trade with the US consists of imports—chiefly of agricultural surpluses—financed largely by American credits. Although the credit is long-term, Poland needs a means of repayment as well as additional foreign exchange to pay for the country's growing imports.

The dispatch said that the next Polish objective is to get the US to amend the Battle Act of 1950, which forbids the sale of strategic commodities to Communist countries and bars US commercial banks from doing business with financial institutions in the Soviet bloc. Polish authorities, it said, want to reinstitute banking relations in hope of raising investment loans from private sources in the United States.

Planning Automation

The creation of a special interdepartmental commission empowered to draft plans for the production of automation equipment was decreed by the Council of Ministers, September 19. This move follows from decisions taken at the fourth plenary session of the Party Central Committee last January which devoted its discussions exclusively to technical shortcomings in the economy—and which was unique in its solicitation of views from non-Communist scientists and technical experts. (See *East Europe*, March, pp. 40-41.) According to the new decree, heavy industry will "considerably expand" its capacity for research, design and production of automation equipment. All planning and coordinating work in "creating a foundation for the development of automation" will be the joint task of the

WHY WON'T THEY BELIEVE?

A leading Polish journalist dwells upon the cynical attitude of the Polish people toward all Communist propaganda, even when it has to do with matters of fact:

"During the year of the great school crisis, (are these years really past, or do we only think so?) the following anecdote was circulated in Poland: A young teacher was telling the children how glass was made. She began by saying that glass was made from sand. There was an outburst of laughter in the classroom. . . . Finally she asked one of the brighter boys why the children were laughing. He replied: 'Because everybody knows that you have to say such things.' I was reminded of this story whenever I talked with skeptical readers of my articles on the future of the country. They pointed to the passages where I reported on the achievements of Polish industry or on some other positive aspect of our reality. They would remark: 'You have to say all this probably. You praise various things, but why doesn't one see them in real life rather than only on paper?' As a matter of fact, why? What is happening that there is such difference between our real achievements and the general attitude of public opinion toward them? Why is everybody who dares to praise something regarded as a propaganda trumpet? . . .

"I am interested [not in the opinions of people who have failed in life but] in the discontent of those who are victors in the difficult struggle with economic and political circumstances and with the other hazards of life. I am thinking of those who have finished their studies, who are well paid, have their own apartments, etc. What do they need to make them stop complaining, since after all they have considerable wealth for a poor country and considerable political freedom for a time of social revolution. What do they need to prevent them from smiling in a sour way when somebody utters a slogan about Poland's achievements? . . .

"There are similar conditions elsewhere in the world. In many other countries people also are not fully satisfied with the work they do. But nevertheless, those countries are somehow politically stable and it is impossible to find in them the seeds of ferment."

Aleksander Malachowski in *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), September 8, 1960

Planning Commission, the Technology Commission and the Polish Academy of Sciences. (Radio Warsaw, September 20.)

Albanian Ambassador Expelled

In an unprecedented move, the Polish government requested Tirana to withdraw its Ambassador. The envoy, Musin Kroi, had been appointed to the Warsaw post in October 1957. Western sources reported that the minister had spoken slightly of Polish "Socialism," calling Poland a country "where capitalism still reigns and where people make eyes at the imperialists." (*Die Welt* [Hamburg], October 10.)

Riots in Gdansk

Western sources reported that workers in the Gdansk shipyards rioted on September 30, when an assembly was called on payday to whip up enthusiasm for the Polish and Soviet performances at the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. The industrial guard was called out to quell the rioters and 19 men were arrested.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prague Peace Conference

At the Communist-backed Third Christian Peace Conference, over 200 Protestant and Orthodox delegates and observers, primarily from Communist countries, gathered in Prague, September 6-9. Unable to ignore the irony of an avowedly atheistic regime sponsoring such a conference, the trade unions' daily *Prace* (Prague), September 13, explained:

"On the one hand, we are waging a scientific struggle against religious prejudices, on the other hand, we grant to priests, bishops and theologians of the whole world a forum for the dissemination of their ideas. Is that perhaps not compromising? Is that not opportunism? Such a question could only be asked by a dogmatist. . . . When one hears how Patriarch Jefrem from Georgia [USSR] unmasks in glowing words the inhuman, warmongering character of the 'servants of God in the Vatican,' how the Leipzig theologian Dr. Fuchs complains with obvious pain that the West German ecclesiastics have joined the services of militaristic propaganda, how the West German church dignitary Dr. Niemoeller rips the masks from the faces of the Bonn hypocrites . . . one had to recognize that we Marxists are linked in some ways to our ideological opponents."

Foreign Students in Czechoslovakia

An International Students' Conference began in Prague, September 29, in preparation for the Sixth World Congress of Students which would meet in Baghdad, October 8-17. At the Prague convention, 72 delegates from 32 countries

participated. The extent to which Czechoslovakia has become a center for foreign students was dramatized by the Education and Culture Minister Frantisek Kahuda, in a speech before the gathering:

"In 1959-60," he said, "2,065 boys and girls from foreign countries studied at our institutions of higher learning, among them, 1,056 from Latin American countries and underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. During this school year, 800 more students have joined them. Approximately 500 applications were filed for 30 scholarships which our government offers to foreign students through the United Nations. In addition, Czechoslovakia awards 40 scholarships through the International Students Union and World Federation of Democratic Youth, and 250 directly to the individual countries. Of them, 100 go to countries in Africa, 90 to countries in Asia, and 60 are earmarked for Latin America." (*Mlada Fronta* [Prague], October 2.)

Anniversary of Party Organs

The 40th anniversary of the founding of the Czech Party daily *Rude Pravo*, September 12, and the Slovak daily *Pravda*, September 15, were celebrated with "festive evenings" in Prague and Bratislava. Delegations from the Communist press of the USSR, China, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Romania and France were on hand for the celebration. The main address in Prague was delivered by Vladimir Koucky, a Secretary of the Party Central Committee. It contained fulsome praise for the "Party's indispensable weapon." He stressed the rôle of the press in recent years, particularly its struggle "for peace, disarmament and against West German and American imperialism," as well as its attack on the "counterrevolutionary events in Hungary in 1956."

Much of his speech was devoted to enunciating the ideological basis of the Czechoslovak Party, based on the "Leninist principle" that "distribution according to need must be preceded by the systematic implementation of the Leninist demand that 'he who does not work should not



A Brigade of Socialist Workers at the Tesla electrical factory in Prague votes unanimously to support Soviet Premier Khrushchev's policies at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York.

Rude Pravo (Prague), September 25, 1960

Light on Masaryk

The photo at right shows a monument at Hodonin in Czechoslovakia to the founder of the Czechoslovak Republic, Thomas G. Masaryk. It is thought to be the last such memorial remaining in the country. Unable to remove it because of public sentiment, the Communist authorities erected a sign in front of it which reads:

"In 1918 T. G. Masaryk made 200,000 rubles available to Russian terrorists for the purpose of killing Lenin.

"While he was President of the Czechoslovak Republic, the working people were fired upon more than 40 times. The targets of the police guns were workers, farmers, men, women and even children. The 70 who were murdered and the more than 300 who were seriously wounded had committed just one crime: they wanted to live a human life! Masaryk knew about these crimes. He did not take countermeasures because he agreed with them.

"In addition to the hundreds of thousands of families whose breadwinners were unemployed, each year there was an increasing number of heads of families shot dead.

"This is how the bourgeois democracy treated the work-



East Europe photo

ing people. This was the 'humanism' of T. G. Masaryk: corruption, unemployment, poverty, suffering, murder."

When it was first erected, people in Hodonin came at night and smeared the sign with dark paint. After several repetitions of this, the authorities put up bright lights to keep the marauders away.

eat." The current foreign policy of the Soviet bloc, rejecting both "revisionism" and "dogmatism" in interpreting the policy of "peaceful coexistence," was also repeated, though no references were made to either the "Yugoslav revisionists" or the Communist Chinese "dogmatists."

"Our peace policy," he declared, "is absolutely realistic . . . and is not an expression of any weakness. . . . That is why any spirit of capitulation . . . is absolutely alien to us. This is displayed only by the revisionists, who embellish imperialism. . . . But we also reject idle phrases of the dogmatists who avoid a realistic analysis of the world situation . . . and sow doubts about the realistic possibility of peaceful coexistence and underrate the power of the Socialist world system." (*Rude Pravo*, September 21.)

Students Flunk

News that 30 percent of Czechoslovakia's full-time university students and 50 percent of part-time students are failing to complete their courses of study was featured in an article in the Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16. The situation is particularly grave, since most of the failures are occurring in engineering, foundry, building and agricultural courses. According to the article, reasons cited for this condition include the paucity of facilities for study, apathy on the part of the "working collective" toward those trying to complete their courses, absence of proper textbooks, and frequency of unqualified teachers.

Trial of Athletes

A group of athletes and sports officials accused of rigging the results of the State sports pool "Sazka" in the 1959-60 season recently received jail sentences ranging from one to six years. Now, some of the offenders were stripped of their "Master of Sports" titles; in addition, the athletic activities

of these men and other ice-hockey players, soccer players, wrestlers, table tennis champions and one cyclist were restricted. The court trial took place in August and was followed by proceedings before special honor courts of the physical training sections. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 12, 1960.)

Rural Electrification Completed

A celebration honoring the completion of rural electrification in Czechoslovakia was held September 4 at Zlata Bana in Eastern Slovakia, the last community in the country to be connected with the national grid. According to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 5, the work was finished four months ahead of the planned schedule. On October 5, the Party daily claimed that Czechoslovakia is now fifth in Europe, and ahead of England and France, in rural electrification. The leaders, it said, are Switzerland, West Germany, Holland and Belgium.

Brno Trade Fair

The Second International Trade Fair in Brno, which specializes in demonstrating the products of the machine-building industries, closed its 6,000 exhibits on September 25 after 14 days of displaying the wares of 26 nations. Heralded as an outstanding success by the Czechoslovak press and radio, the Fair, which takes place in the country's second largest city, was said to have been a third larger than in 1959. A total of 560 foreign trade organizations and firms participated, and an estimated 1,300,000 persons saw the goods on display, of whom 20,000 were from foreign countries. Contracts valued at 4,500 million *koruny* were concluded by the closing date, exceeding last year's sum by 13 percent. About 90 percent of this business, how-

ever, was done with other Soviet bloc countries. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], September 27.)

When the Fair first opened its doors on September 10, the Party daily wrote that the main interest this year was centered on machine tools, agricultural and building machines, equipment for rolling mills and metallurgical plants and power plant equipment. The exhibits, it said, reflected a growing development of specialization in the products of the machine-building industries. Deputy Premier Rudolf Barak, who officially opened the festivities, stated that not only would machinery and equipment share increasingly in Czechoslovakia's total exports (55 percent by 1965), but that as a result of specialization, imports of these goods would also expand (to about a third of total imports by 1965). Of the 12 large pavilions set up on the Brno fairgrounds, that of the Soviet Union was the biggest.

Throughout the two weeks, the press trumpeted the show's value as a builder of peaceful relations among nations, but it took special care to impress visitors from the underdeveloped countries and solicit their views of the event. An Indonesian official was quoted as saying: "Czechoslovakia takes first place among our four largest suppliers, before the US, West Germany and Japan. We hope that in the future Czechoslovak-Indonesian cooperation will broaden even more because we need Czechoslovak machines for our new factories. In return we can supply a wealth of raw materials." (*Ceteka* [Prague], September 22.)

HUNGARY

Trade and Credit Agreement with Cuba

Following the examples of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, a trade mission from Budapest concluded a comprehensive set of economic agreements with the Cuban government on September 15. Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Gyula Karadi, who headed the special mission to Havana, agreed to a ten-year credit accord which extends \$8 million in loans to Cuba for the purchase of Hungarian machinery and equipment.

Under terms of a five-year trade agreement, most-favored-nation treatment was accorded to the goods of each country (despite the fact that such a concession has little or no meaning in a barter agreement in cases where the State has a monopoly on foreign trade). The list of Hungarian exports includes industrial equipment for the food and agricultural processing industry, trucks, buses, and light industrial articles; in return Cuba will ship iron ore, non-ferrous metal ores, artificial silk yarn, raw hides, tobacco and sugar.

Finally, a technical and scientific cooperation agreement provides for sending Hungarian technicians to assist in Cuba's development and for the training of Cubans in Hungary. The provisions include training and exchange of specialists, organization of study tours, and the exchange

of technical and scientific documents. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], September 17.)

Real Wages Drop

The effective purchasing power of industrial workers' earnings has dropped by roughly 6 to 8 percent in the one-year period ending July 1960, according to figures published in the government's official statistical survey *Statistikai Közlemények* (Budapest), No. 9, July 1960. While the prices of consumer goods increased slightly, workers' money incomes declined—largely as a result of the regime's policy of tightening loose work norms and bonuses. As in all the countries of the area, the Hungarians have recently been attempting to increase output per worker by a drive to correct out-dated production norms and bring them into line with technological change in the factories. The process means, in essence, that more goods must be produced in the same period of time, either by greater effort on the part of the workers or by better tools, techniques and organization, if the workers' earnings are to remain unchanged.

Officially, wages were not supposed to drop in consequence of the drive, but labor productivity has not responded to the changes. In 1959, two-thirds of the expansion in industrial output resulted from increased employment. So far this year, production is said to have climbed 14 per cent while productivity has increased only 6 percent.

The problem and the reasons for it are drawing more and more publicity in the press. The economic weekly *Figyelo* (Budapest), September 9, for example, cited an investigation carried out by the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Industry in six large industrial enterprises. The probe discovered that more than 40 percent of machine capacity is unexploited, it said, and that personnel are idle 32 percent of the time. The main reasons given for this state of affairs are: shortages of raw materials and spare parts which frequently bring production to a standstill, substandard raw materials and lack of coordination among enterprises, poorly organized work procedures and slack in production norms. The drop in wages suggests that norms are being tightened before other obstacles to better labor productivity have been eliminated.

No Discipline on Collective Farms

All is not going well on the countryside's new collective farms; and the struggle to turn them into viable economic units is running into apathy and lack of discipline, judging from the incessant hammering on this theme by the official and provincial press. The regime called a halt to the signature-gathering phase of its collectivization campaign last February—after transforming over 40 percent of the country's arable land into collective farms in a little over a year—and turned its attention to consolidating the gains. The difficulties now are to persuade the peasant members not to regard "common property as everybody's prey," and to work as hard and as long on the collective farm as they did on their own individual land.

The daily organ of Abauj-Zemplen county, *Északmagyarorszag*, September 21, carried examples of the kinds of



The Slovak village of Zlata Bana, where the electrification of Czechoslovakia was completed on September 4.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), September 17, 1960

problems that are emerging. It cited a collective farm in the county which had brought in 20 soldiers to help with threshing the grain harvest; while the soldiers worked, the members watched and divided the grain advances. Most of the members were said to be spending their time on private plots instead of in collective work. Before the harvest, the council secretary of the farm and his wife had gone from house to house to mobilize people for work. "Their efforts were futile, not even the members of the Party cell were willing to work systematically on the collective farm."

With about 75 percent of the arable land in the "Socialist sector," the government cannot blame the individual peasant farms for what appears to be another short year for grain. The remaining individual peasants are criticized for hoarding their grain and selling it on the free market rather than to the State, but the collectives are doing the same—despite the fact that they receive a bonus. According to the provincial daily *Zalai Hirlap* (County Zala), September 6, many collective farms are already dividing shares of the harvest so that members can sell on the free market for a higher price. The paper quoted the chairman of one of the county's oldest collectives as saying: "We surrender the amount we have contracted for; don't expect anything else from us."

The regime has taken a variety of measures to counteract this "self-interest" and apathy. It has issued new regulations which provide that the private plots of collective members can be reduced if they stay away from common work and disobey work brigade leaders. It has also authorized cuts in pay, assignments to lower work categories and places of work, as well as the dismissal of leading functionaries who fail to carry out the regulations. It is attempting to strengthen the "control committees" on the collective farms which in many cases are said to exist only on paper or at most function only to audit the books.

The carrot as well as the stick is being employed. For example, a new campaign has begun to see that land rent

is paid at the end of each year to members who have contributed land to the collective farm. While this provision has been on the statute books for some time, it has been observed only sporadically. According to *Zalai Hirlap* (County Zala), September 9: "In 1960 our government will put an end once and for all to the negligence and delay connected with the payment of land rent."

Abortions Up, Births Down

Since the law dealing with abortions was liberalized in 1956, increasing numbers of Hungarian women have flocked to the State-run clinics. The number of legal abortions jumped from 78,500 in 1955 to 123,591 in 1956. It continued to rise in following years, and in 1959 it reached 187,681 (in Budapest, 56,779). At the same time, the live birth rate has fallen from 23 per 1,000 in 1954 to 15.2 in 1959. Total live births in 1959 were 151,183—i.e., less than the number of legal abortions. (*Nepegessegugy* [Budapest], August.) The average number of members of the family is also decreasing, as compared with 10 years ago—3.2 persons (in 1960), 3.6 persons (in 1949). (*Uj Ember* [Budapest], September 4.)

"Comrades' Courts" Expanded

The number and scope of so-called "Comrades' Courts" (where workers try each other for various forms of minor delinquency) are to be expanded in Hungary over the next few years. Under the new plan, "Comrades' Courts" will be set up in any enterprise where the personnel number 100, or, in some cases, 50 (at present, courts have been established only at enterprises with 300 employees); at certain institutions such as universities; within agricultural and small-industry collectives; and in cities and villages through the auspices of the Local Councils. (*Jogtudományi Kozlony* [Budapest], July-August.)

Hungarian Premier on Communist China

Queried on the campaign against "dogmatism" by a group of French journalists in Budapest, September 28, Premier Ferenc Munnich admitted that there were "tactical" differences between Hungary and Communist China on internal matters, according to Agence France Presse of that same date. In reporting the interview, Radio Budapest, as well as the Hungarian dailies, omitted any reference to the Premier's remarks on Peiping.

BULGARIA

Bulgarian Heads Atomic Talks

Professor Georgi Nadjatov, Bulgarian delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, was elected chairman of the agency's 1960 general assembly meeting on September 17. On hand to support the Soviet-sponsored delegate was V. M. Molotov, former Foreign Minister of the USSR who was dropped from leadership in 1957. The deposed Soviet leader returned from political obscurity in Outer Mongolia shortly before the assembly opened to assume his new post as the USSR's permanent representative to the international atomic energy group.

Nadjatov was also a candidate in 1959, but he failed to obtain the chairmanship as a result of a United States veto. This year the Professor was selected in a compromise agreement in which the United States acquiesced to Soviet demands in return for posts for Western delegates in important technical committees. The main topic discussed at this year's two-week assembly session over which the Bulgarian presided was a Western plan on safeguards and control of atomic energy materials and equipment. (*Otechestven Front* [Sofia], September 21.)

The American Exhibition

For the first time in its history the Plovdiv International Fair (September 18-October 2) featured an American pavilion, devoted to "Medicine in the USA." The official Communist press reaction to this event was to compare unfavorably the American display with a similar Bulgarian exhibit. While disclaiming any scientific superiority over the United States, the Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 26, insisted that the Bulgarian pavilion showed a true "care for mankind" by providing free medical care. By contrast, few American workers could afford the latest drugs or hospital expenses. What was shown by Americans was billed as "sensational," but the article concluded, "how many can benefit from the achievements and developments of the medical services in the United States?"

US Official Detained

Eugene V. Prostov, an official of the United States Information Service, was arrested for disseminating "subversive literature" at the Plovdiv fair. Radio Sofia, October

THE SKELETON AND THE BABY

One of the darker aspects of life in the first land of Socialism was the subject of a shocking expose by Radio Moscow on September 18. The Home Service listeners were told of a man who went into the Leningrad House of Commerce to buy himself a shirt. There he was set upon by three frightful characters. The first, seedy and unshaven, approached him and muttered darkly about a skeleton in a suitcase. The second, a young girl, whispered something about wanting a baby. The third, more dreadful than the others, said he was opening a new beer hall. Frightened out of his wits, the man dropped his briefcase and ran to the nearest police station. When the three people had been tracked down and arrested, it turned out that they were selling home-made phonograph records with the titles: "A Skeleton in a Suitcase," "I Wanna Have a Baby," and "A Beer Hall Has Opened in Derebasovskaya Street."

The broadcast continued: "The police went to the place where the phonograph records were being manufactured and discovered the proprietor, Babayev, at a highly inopportune moment. Weary from his labors, Babayev had organized a little recreation for himself and his friends, such as dancing in negligees. The police also called upon [other member of the firm] Gleb Ivanovich Uvarov and his colleague, Mikhail Borisovich Lepin, at a moment of creative work. They were industriously recording 'Murka' and 'Rock for Two.' By the way, these 'manufacturers' of phonograph records do not complain about their lot. True, now and again they are caught, their equipment is liquidated, and they are even taken to court. But then they are released again and are free to go wherever they like."

6, claimed that the periodical *America* had been distributed to visitors at the exhibition and contained propaganda. The US State Department protested the "improper and unwarranted detention" of Mr. Prostov. (*The New York Times*, October 3.)

Zhivkov on Greece

Suggestions from both Romania and Bulgaria that a non-aggression pact be signed with Greece have been repeatedly rejected by Athens. The question of Bulgarian wartime reparations has further exacerbated Greek-Bulgarian relations, since the Bulgarian offer is below the minimum set by Greece. Party chief Todor Zhivkov, in an interview with the Italian Communist paper, *l'Unità* (Rome), September 9, declared again that "the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has been striving to normalize and improve Bulgarian-Greek relations." Although the policy of the "Socialist countries" is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, Zhivkov said, Greek membership in NATO "is diametrically opposed to this concept."

The Greek reply can be summed up with its concluding statement: "Greece is not prepared to abandon her own

safe alliances in favor of the Bulgarian signature whose value is very well known by now." (Radio Athens, September 18.)

ALBANIA

Albanian-Communist Chinese Relations

In the current Sino-Soviet dispute concerning the inevitability of war, the Albanians have seemed increasingly to support the Chinese line that war between the Communist States and the "imperialists" is inevitable. Recent evidence showing the identity of views between Tirana and Peiping came to light during the celebrations of the Communist Chinese National Day, October 1. At the reception given in Peiping on this occasion, the Albanian Deputy Premier Abdyl Kellezi was the only top-ranking European Communist in attendance. At that time he stated that the Chinese Communists had "persevered in safeguarding the purity of Marxism-Leninism." (*The New York Times*, October 5.)

In the celebration of the same anniversary in Tirana, the Communist Chinese representative Lo Shih-kao spoke vehemently of "imperialism, especially American imperialism, as the enemy number one of the people of the world." The Albanian Party chief Enver Hoxha, in reply, echoed the sentiments of the Chinese:

"Marxism-Leninism teaches us that as long as imperialism exists, there will always be cause for wars of plunder. Therefore, we must always be vigilant, because it is only in this way that we shall impose the will of peace-loving mankind on the imperialist beasts with human faces. And this will be achieved only . . . by refusing to make any concession to the imperialists from the point of view of principles." (Radio Tirana, October 1.)

This speech of Hoxha's marked the first time he had spoken at a public gathering in many weeks.

Further speculation on Albanian-Soviet coolness appeared in an article in *The New York Times*, October 7, which contended that Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, in New York City for the General Assembly session of the United Nations, had been "an infrequent caller at Mr. Khrushchev's headquarters in New York" and "had seldom been found conversing with the statesmen of the other Com-

REMAIN SEATED, PLEASE

"Tell me, why do some people love to create panic? Why do they disturb calm waters with such Bacchanic delight, why do they whisper into your ears all sorts of secrets, strictly confidential of course? . . .

"Thus one morning you may hear in your dairy store that there will be no milk and butter because all the cows within 150 kilometers are dying of the hoof and mouth disease. . . . Or word is spread that the local hospital has been filled since yesterday with people suffering from food poisoning after eating meat imported from abroad. . . .

"An excellent breeding ground for panic is international politics.

"The individuals specializing in this field possess an extraordinary ability to discover connections and relations where not even an Einstein could. With a conspiratorial look they will tell you that all this rain is not just an ordinary freak of nature, oh no, don't you believe that. The Americans have succeeded in discovering with their satellites the weather secrets of the atmosphere and ionosphere, and they are sending us these near-catastrophic rains. Clever people, aren't they? And if they wanted to they could easily do the same thing with drought, fog, storms, hail, high winds, blizzards—the seven lean years would be idyllic in comparison! Well, clever boys.

"These panic mongers reached their apogee recently when they spread around news of the end of the world. You don't know? What a pity! Imagine, somewhere high above us in the universe a large chunk of matter has got loose and is heading straight at Mother Earth. . . . What a morsel for the panic mongers! In some places where the panic reached a height, the inns and the churches were full. Some people wanted to have a last go at worldly pleasures, others were getting ready for their coming trip to heaven, some did both. . . ."

Jiri Navratil in *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), August 7, 1960

munist States." Another possible sign of divergence between Albania and the other members of the Soviet bloc came over the question of overturning a motion by the UN president: while all the other Satellite countries voted against the chairman, Albania abstained.

Texts and Documents

PASTORAL LETTER OF THE POLISH BISHOPS

On September 4 the Polish Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church gathered at the monastery of Jasna Gora in Czestochowa and prepared a pastoral letter to their faithful, reviewing recent anti-Church moves by the Communist authorities. It was to be read from the pulpits of all the churches on Sunday, September 18. However, it was not read on that day although it had been circulated among the parishes in thousands of copies. No reason was given for its withdrawal, but there has been speculation that the hierarchy did not want to create a public issue involving relations between Church and State at a time when Gomulka was in New York attending the General Assembly meeting, where he was to make a strong plea for the recognition of Poland's western frontier on the Oder-Neisse.

BELOVED CHILDREN OF GOD:

Every year the Polish bishops gather at the feet of the Holy Mother of God, Our Queen, at Jasna Gora, and there, in a spirit of recollection, they give much thought to their vocation and to their pastoral work among the people of God. At the feet of Our Lady of Good Counsel we feel more than anywhere else the gravity of our responsibility for you before God.

It is the duty of good shepherds—and we wish to be such from the depth of our heart—to instruct you and warn you of dangers. Only “the hireling, who is not a shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, sees the wolf coming and leaves the sheep and flees. And the wolf snatches and scatters the sheep” [John 10, 12].

You often hear these words from the pulpit. In their light you observe closely our behavior, rightly expecting from us the best possible example. The faithful have the right to know about the fears, troubles, and anxieties of their bishops and priests. For together with them they constitute one great family of God. You might consider our silence to signify the acceptance of the many evils which the Church endures today. Therefore we cannot be silent, because both joys and sorrows are jointly shared in a family.

In the realization of that unity, and at the same time in the name of the truth, we draw your attention, beloved, to those dangers which threaten us at this time. We wish to fulfill our pastoral duty peacefully and with love, in order not to breach that greatest of Christ's commandments—Charity, even toward the adversaries of

God, whom He also commands us to love; in order to remain calm even when it is necessary to defend ourselves against activities that are dangerous for our souls.

I. Contemporary Threats to the Faith and Conscience

At the present moment the Christian faith is threatened—in almost all countries and in ours—by the attacks of atheism, which from month to month increases its activity and fights against the Church of Christ with truly inhuman fanaticism. In that fight it possesses all modern means, and at same time puts on the mask of tolerance, humanitarianism and progress. And when Catholics try to defend themselves, they are accused of being foes of the State, enemies of society and God knows what else.

That spreads confusion in the ranks of Catholics, who often turn to us for explanation and counsel. A truly strange phenomenon: Our holy faith and Church are attacked without any restraints, and when Catholics try to defend themselves they are branded as enemies of progress. This dishonest trickery is the peculiar trait of godlessness, which on the one hand seeks to discredit us, as alleged foes of everything which is progressive, putting us in opposition to the State, the nation, the community; and on the other hand attributes to us opinions which we do not proclaim.

How many times do we hear repeated the offending charge that our Holy Faith, which is the cornerstone that unites the nation and the State, which has educated all generations, among them thousands of

the best sons of the nation—from Mieszko and Boleslaw, through the Saints, the men of science, like Copernicus, and masters of the word like Skarga, Mickiewicz, Sienkiewicz, up to the priests and lay victims of concentration camps and the Warsaw insurrectionists—that this our Holy Catholic Faith, “our life and hope,” that all this is “retrogression, ignorance and backwardness. . . .” Can one therefore be surprised that we Catholics are aroused, when that which for us is most holy, is being scorned and trampled in such an inhuman manner?

One should not be surprised if Catholics are quick to defend their beliefs. They still remember well the time of the occupation and the times of the partitions when the whole nation, deprived of its statehood, defended with the stubbornness of self-preservation its “homes and altars,” defended them by unyielding faith and hope, often even against all human hopes. One should therefore have respect for all that we call holy, and not offend our deepest religious feelings that are so closely joined with our national ones.

We most solemnly take exception to having our Catholicism called “religious fanaticism.” Is it right to apply the name of fanaticism to our Corpus Christi processions, Marian and other pilgrimages? If they are more numerous than in some other countries, it is because of our religious fervor! But we are not alone in our fervor. Are there no great processions in Lourdes, do not great religious congresses take place in other parts of the world?

We would be religious fanatics only, then, if accents of hate, calls to violence and vengeance resounded in our churches and our places of pilgrimage. But no one has ever heard this, either at Jasna Gora or anywhere else. Instead, everywhere, in every confessional and from every pulpit, the Catholic hears not only words of mercy for him, but also admonitions to fervently observe the commandments—those which concern the worship of God as well as those which through love regulate our attitude toward the family, matrimony, the State, and private and public property.

Let no one make the accusation that it is the pious Catholics and the pilgrims who, by their behavior, replenish the ranks of drunkards and thieves. For we have already heard even that accusation in a direct form and in ambiguous insinuations. It would be easy to ascertain how many zealously practicing Catholics there are among the individuals who constitute the so-called social plague. If Catholics do not always achieve sufficient moral heights, it is not because they are

"overly" Catholic, but because they are "less" Catholic.

We refute with the same firmness the charge that we are supposedly "backward." We do not in the least wish to return to the bygone, and not always good, medieval social forms. We look calmly into the future, which comes toward us under the sign of increased technology, new forms of civilization and a more socialized manner of life. We are well aware that we shall also sanctify these new forms in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, if we carry in ourselves a sufficient amount of faith and Divine grace.

We take from the past only that which is permanent, what is still living and capable of life; while that which is withering away, let it pass along with its sins and faults.

We place the accent of Christian faith on the future and on tomorrow. "Leave the dead to bury their own dead, but do thou go and proclaim the kingdom of God"—said the Divine Saviour once to the wealthy young man [Luke 9, 60]. Those words are timely for us today. The charge that the Church in Poland is "capitalistic" seems obsolete. Indeed, we have been deprived successively of all important material means for the Church's existence. If the parishes, dioceses and religious orders still possess anything, they are insignificant remnants, which certainly no one envies us. Hospitals, educational and social institutions and other larger buildings have been confiscated for use by the State. And that which has been left to the Church is burdened by such heavy taxes that in spite of our best intentions we are unable to pay them. Priests and members of religious orders literally live today by the labor of their hands and the Christian generosity of the faithful. And those sums which they supposedly "extract from the people" remain in the homeland, serve to animate the national economy, and return to the people in the form of reconstructed and maintained churches and innumerable forms of social services.

Can we be accused if we defend the remnants of the so-called "material basis" of our religious seminaries, parishes and dioceses from confiscation, which is sometimes carried out in a demagogical manner, and at times certainly detrimental to the State, calling "ex-German property" that which is fundamentally ecclesiastical, and which to a large degree was reconstructed from the destruction of the war and cultivated by Polish hands? Indeed, only people who are not responsible for their deeds dare to make such an accusation against a nation that is united around the Western Territories.

"We Are Not Foes of the State"

We are not foes of the State, because as believing Christians we cannot be such. Indeed we proclaim the words of Christ: "Render, therefore, to Caesar the things that are Caesar's"—but also—"and to God the things that are God's. . . ." [Luke 20, 25.]

We defend ourselves legally against the possible abuses of the authorities. That is our human and civic right, and we believe that no one will refuse that right to us as Catholics. And, after all, there are so many possibilities of wrongs and mistakes, even without ill will. If, however, there is no malicious and fanatical attitude on either side, all possible tensions can be settled with benefit for the public good.

Not only the clergy and bishops, but the whole Catholic community takes a positive attitude toward all wise and prudent economic actions; all wish one thing—that an improvement in the welfare of the people result for everyone from these actions, from the new economic conditions. We most fervently wish an improvement in life conditions. Indeed, we have all that is necessary to that end: an industrious people, talented engineers, the treasures on the surface of the land and beneath it. And we point toward heaven as the ultimate goal, not in order to proclaim an escape from the earth. Indeed, we know the commandment of God: "Subdue the earth" [Gen. 1, 28].

A word must also be said about the defense of the honor and the good name of our clergy. More than one priest is being attacked in the press. Advantage is taken of the smallest slip to sound the alarm and portray us as evildoers and "enemies of progress." A priest who was alleged to have struck a child in school, was decried in all the newspapers. Later the trial in court took quite a different turn. He was absolved from transgression and punishment, but no retraction appeared in the press, at most a brief news item in one newspaper in one line. Because of such treatment the Polish clergy, which as a social class suffered the most numerous losses during the occupation, has a deep grievance against that press which acts in such a highly unjust manner toward us, evidently in order to undermine the confidence of the broad masses in the clergy. We are not exempt from human weaknesses, to which all are subject to a larger or smaller degree; on the other hand, we protest very resolutely, in the name of justice and truth, against being portrayed, as a class, in the role of malefactors.

To all these considerations one should also add an immense chapter concerning

the Catholic education of children and the youth of Catholic families. It is truly difficult to find an adequate description for what took place with regard to religious teaching in the past school year, while in the new school year matters are even worse. One simply forgets that religion was legally introduced in the schools; that this was a recognition of the rights of free men, of the commands of their consciences, of their freedom of religion and of their freedom to educate their own children in accordance with their Catholic worldview. These administrative practices violate the rights of the parents, without reckoning with the consciences of the children; nay, they even expose the educators themselves to a deep conflict of conscience, even to the denial of God, by forcing them to declare themselves partisans of a secular school. The propaganda of the omnipotent supporters of the so-called secular school often went so far as to say falsely that it was the "bishops and priests who do not want religious teaching in the schools." The arguments given against teaching religion in the schools, used in regard to parents, are often unethical and perverse. What must one think about the so-called secular ethics in the name of which such outrages are committed?

In recent times a painful blow was struck at the freedom of education of young priests in religious seminaries. It was an attempt to infringe upon the freedom of the Church and the conscience of the young seminarians. Only the Holy Church can supervise the education and maturing of the priestly vocation, because the vocation is an internal religious matter, the work of the Holy Ghost. Indeed, the freedom of conscience of the faithful, for whom the priests are destined, depends on the freedom of the education of the priests. The Polish Bishops looked with great anxiety and pain upon this heavy threat to the freedom of the Church and the conscience, and therefore lodged a protest with the appropriate authorities against these attempts.

In those matters also we do not have any anti-State policy, when, prompted by the natural law, we desire to assure freedom and education in the seminaries and schools, as was guaranteed to the Church in the Agreement of 1956. Failing to keep, or torpedoing, the laws of the land as the partisans of atheism do, is assuredly a more anti-State action than claiming that these laws ought to be observed.

Such are—and these are not all—the dangers and difficulties, through which the Church in Poland must make its way in the Year of Our Lord 1960.

II. Attitude of Catholics in the Face of the Tribulations of Our Times

For the times of tribulations the Lord Christ counsels great patience, humility, mutual love to His disciples. We consider that we do not need to counsel you to do anything more than that. "By your patience you will win your souls" [Luke 21,19]. If the world knew what forces it intensifies in us, in giving the opportunity to patient prayer and prayerful perseverance, it would pause and think twice before starting oppression. . . . We Christians have to draw internal strength where the sons of this world do not perceive it, or indeed disregard it.

"Watch and pray, that you may not enter into temptation," the Divine Master warned his apostles immediately before His arrest [Mat. 26,41]. Vigilance and prayer are equally necessary to the confessors of Christ. One must be watchful in order not to submit to the pleasant temptations of evil, which usually appear in the form of false good. One must also be watchful in regard to our unity, because in the moments of threat and oppression there always will be weaker ones, and even traitors, who for a few pieces of silver will sell that which only yesterday they considered as best and most noble.

We must watch ourselves courageously, so that fear of the future does not strike us down and paralyze us. If we truly believe in God, in the Resurrection and eternal life, then why should we not for these treasures of ours suffer a little and sustain temporal damages? Indeed it is an honor for a truly believing person "to suffer disgrace for the name of Jesus" [Acts 5,41]. If for our holy faith we suffer temporal losses with full consciousness

and submission to the will of God, then we will love this faith all the more affectionately and we will repeat together with St. Paul the Apostle, "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or hunger, or nakedness, or danger, or the sword?" [Roman 8,35]. For such a faith, Beloved Children, we beseech God for you and for ourselves.

On this spiritual foundation we will carry out in a godly manner our temporal fate, our faith, its application for every day, its courageous and prudent confession.

Our faith in the Kingdom of God would be indeed poor, if we sought to preserve it only in our own soul, as that "pearl of great price" of which the Saviour speaks [Mat. 13,45,6]. Every Christian is a confessor of the faith and its proclaimer. Thanks be to God that the great idea of the lay apostolate is spreading farther and farther. Lay Catholics in ever greater measure are feeling their responsibility for the fate of the Church of God, ever more often are taking a stand shoulder to shoulder with the priests. We invite all people of good will to an honest collaboration. Let them bear witness to Christ and His Good Tidings by courageous and noble words, and not only by words but also by their example, way of life, conscientiousness, good disposition towards their fellow-men. "Therefore, everyone who acknowledges Me before men, I also will acknowledge him before my Father in heaven" [Mat. 10,32]. The hour for the confession of the holy faith has come for all of us. Not only bishops and priests are confessors. Confessors are parents in regards to their

children and neighbors. Confessors are teachers, physicians, workers of every kind, because duties honestly fulfilled cannot deprive them of the right to confess the heavenly Father before men. If we did not confess God in the difficult trials of our faith, we would be ordinary renegades and apostates.

This believing nation is now in its pilgrimage toward the 1000th anniversary of Poland's Baptism. The Great Novena by which we prepare ourselves for that solemn moment is for us a deep religious experience. Let us live it in a most godly manner! It also has nothing in common with "religious fanaticism." We do not consider this visit to the image of the Mother of God as a show, but as an occasion for deepening religious life, for penance, for turning back from the evil road and reparation of evil. The image of the Most Holy Mother leaves deep traces everywhere it goes, and these are noble traces, warmed by the love of God. We thank the Lord God for this great grace: that everywhere, where She passes, people become holier.

May the Most Holy Mother, Our Queen and the Guide of the Great Novena, protect and continue to lead the people of God, the priests and the bishops in holy unity.

Sincerely requesting your daily prayers, which we need so much, we bless all of you by the power of the Most Holy Trinity, in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Amen.

Given at Jasna Gora, on the 4 day of September, 1960.

Signed: Cardinal Primate,
Polish Archbishops and Bishops.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE *(continued from page 19)*

The Somali Government has decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Albanian People's Republic at the embassy level. (Radio Tirana.)

September 16 A 13-member parliamentary delegation from the Republic of Ghana arrived in Prague yesterday. (Radio Prague.)

Five Year Trade Agreement signed with Cuba at Havana. (Radio Budapest.)

September 17 On the basis of the technical and scientific collaboration agreement signed in Bucharest on April 14 by Romania and Indonesia, the first technical aid contract was signed in Jakarta, September 16, by the Romanian Industrial Export State enterprise and the oil and gas de-

partment of the Indonesian Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining. Under the contract Romanian oil industry specialists will be sent to give technical aid to the Indonesian government. (Radio Bucharest.)

September 18 To consolidate the existing friendly relations between Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Cambodia, their governments have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the legation level. Lyubomir Popov, Bulgarian Minister to India, has been appointed envoy to Cambodia. (Radio Sofia.)

September 19 Foreign Trade Minister Frantisek Krajcir received the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs of the Egyptian region of the UAR, Mohammed Abu Noseir, and discussed trade relations with him. The Tunisian Min-

ister of Information, Mohammed Mashoudi, arrived in Prague at the invitation of the Minister of Education and Culture. (CTK, Prague.)

September 20 An agreement on air services between Czechoslovakia and India was signed. (Radio Prague.)

A trade agreement between Bulgaria and Tunisia for a period of one year was signed yesterday. (Radio Sofia.)

September 21 A Tunisian delegation led by Ahmed Noureddine, Minister of Public Works and Housing, was received by Bulgarian Premier Anton Yugov. (Radio Sofia.) Czechoslovakia's largest foreign trade enterprise, Technoexport, concluded contracts for export of investment units amounting to over 300 million *koruny*. Under one of the contracts, Czechoslovakia will supply Cuba with equipment for several factories amounting to 15 million *koruny*. Technoexport has a contract with the Iraqi Republic under which Czechoslovakia will supply Iraq with spare parts for an oil refinery, thus assisting Iraq in becoming independent of American imports. (Radio Prague.)

CTK reported the presence at the Brno Second International Engineering Trade Fair of R. Sanesi, Indonesian Deputy Minister for Development, who stated that Czechoslovakia takes first place among his country's four largest suppliers, before the US, West Germany and Japan. Other visitors were: Mahmoud El Kochery, General Secretary of the Electricity Board in Cairo, and Dr. Hospice Coco, Minister of Trade, Industry and Finance, of Togo. (Radio Prague.)

September 23 After over a week's stay in Hungary, where he visited factories and had talks with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade on economic questions, Musa Arafah, minister of Public works of the UAR Egyptian region, left together with his family. (Radio Budapest.)

Czechoslovak Premier Vilam Siroky yesterday received in his Prague Palace the Moroccan government delegation led by Mohammed Douiri, Minister of National Economy and Finance. (Radio Prague.)

September 26 The governments of Czechoslovakia and of the Republic of Somalia have decided to establish diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level and to exchange diplomatic missions. (Radio Prague.)

September 27 A five-member delegation from Cuba headed by the Minister of Health Machado Ventura, arrived in Prague for a visit of several days at the invitation of the Minister of Health. (Radio Prague.)

September 28 The Kralovo Pole machine-building plant in Brno is producing an oil refinery plant for installation in Alexandria, UAR. Another center for refining Arab, Egyptian and Soviet crude oil is being constructed in Suez. (Radio Prague.)

NIKEX, Hungarian foreign trade enterprise, is going to build a factory manufacturing chemical industrial machines in Bombay, India. (Radio Budapest.)

A Bulgarian government trade delegation, led by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade L. Avramov, left for Cuba. The delegation will conduct talks to conclude a trade agreement between Bulgaria and Cuba. (Radio Sofia.)

September 29 A delegation of women from the Democratic Federation of Guinean Women is visiting nurseries and medical establishments in Prague and Bratislava.

A delegation from Oman arrived in Czechoslovakia on September 26. They "admired the advanced level of technology in the CSSR." (CTK, Prague.)

A Czechoslovak mission headed by Deputy Minister of the Interior has arrived in Conakry for a short stay. (Radio Dakar.)

October 1 A delegation led by Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz left Poland on September 14, 1960, to visit the following three Asiatic countries: Afghanistan, India and Ceylon. On September 19 an agreement was signed in Kabul, Afghanistan, covering the years 1961 through 1963 and concerning payments, as well as economic and scientific-technological exchange. On September 20 Cyrankiewicz arrived in Delhi where he visited Indian President Pasad and met with Guinea President Sekou Toure also visiting India. On September 30, during Cyrankiewicz's stay in Colombo, Ceylon, a joint official communique stated that the talks between the representatives of Poland and Ceylon were conducted in an atmosphere of true friendship and mutual understanding. (Radio Warsaw.)

October 2 A Czechoslovak government delegation arrived in Baghdad for preparatory talks for the conclusion of a technical and economic cooperation agreement. (Radio Baghdad.)

October 3 According to an agreement signed in Damascus recently, Czechoslovakia will send an electrical power plant to the Syrian region of the UAR. It will be the biggest of its kind in the area. (CTK, Prague.)

October 5 The Czechoslovak foreign trade enterprise Strojexport has concluded a contract for delivery of transformers and distributors to the UAR valued at about 20 million *koruny*. (CTK, Prague.)

October 10 An agreement including the exchange of goods, payment, and regular trade relations has been signed between Bulgaria and Cuba. (Radio Sofia.)

October 12 A Czechoslovak Trade Union delegation headed by Secretary of the Central Trade Union Council Gustav Hnilicka left for Havana. It will participate in the meeting of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the Asian People. (Radio Prague.)

Book Review

Background of Revolution

Rethinking Modern Hungarian History

IL PONTE (Florence), XV, 4-5 (April-May 1960), "Ungheria". (A special Double Issue on Hungary.)

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH

MAN, said Edmund Burke, is made up of his past, present and future. This is certainly true for the Hungarian Revolt, the fourth anniversary of which has just occurred. All eye-witness accounts and most subsequent studies stress its spontaneity and elemental fury. To many foreigners at the time it seemed like a sudden earthquake which tore great cracks in the Communist crust of the country, out of which poured the boiling lava of popular fury. There is much truth in this explanation; once the Security Police had fired on the crowd on the evening of October 23, 1956, the rage of the oppressed masses proved impossible to check or control. But even so, the sources and circumstances of the fury remain to be explained. The future of Hungary is difficult if not impossible to predict; the present is one of stagnation, presided over by cynical, corrupt and opportunistic collaborators whose knowledge of how much they are loathed by the population is only exceeded by their determination to hold on to their power and perquisites, and that of their Soviet masters to hold on to Hungary.

Hungary's past, however, can throw much light upon the Revolt and upon the Hungarian present and the future. Each generation must rewrite its history, and this 350-page collective vol-

ume is the latest attempt to do so by Hungarian refugee scholars and publicists. The editors of the distinguished Italian literary and political journal *Il Ponte* deserve much credit for offering their pages to this attempt at re-evaluating the recent Hungarian past, as do the Hungarian Writers Association Abroad and the editor of the volume, Mr. Istvan Meszaros, for its contents. The result, although naturally mixed in quality, is in general a stimulating and valuable contribution to Hungarian studies. (It is also, incidentally, another of the major works on contemporary Hungary available, unfortunately for most American readers, only in Italian.)¹

The volume is divided into three parts: articles by various pre- and post-1956 Hungarian refugees about various aspects of recent and contemporary Hungarian affairs, translations into Italian of a selection of modern Hungarian prose and poetry, and a symposium by various Italian and other political and intellectual figures about the prospects for Hungary. Of the latter, by far the most impressive is the contribution of Professor Hugh Seton-Watson. He begins by stressing what he considers the three main lessons of the Hungarian Revolt: (1) the

Communist regime had not gained the allegiance of the workers; (2) the new young intelligentsia of worker and peasant origin, although educated under the Communist system, were equally anti-Communist; and (3) a totalitarian regime can be destroyed from within. He points out that the difference between "Polish realism" and "Hungarian rashness" was actually that between Ochab's patriotism and Gerö's order to fire. He concludes with a brilliant refutation of the various disengagement proposals presented in recent years and with a plea to the West to remain strong and united and do what it can to aid the forces tending toward freedom, particularly the young intellectuals, within Hungary and the rest of the Soviet orbit.²

Without detracting from the significance of the latter two parts, this review will concentrate on the first, as being of the most interest for the student of Hungarian political, economic and cultural affairs. Wisely, it does not concentrate upon detailed studies of the Hungarian thaw and Revolt; many eye-witness accounts and at least one good analysis (Fejtő's "Ungheria") are already available, and this volume fulfills a definite need by the attempts of its contribu-

¹ The two others of significance are Francois Fejtő's *Ungheria* and Mr. Meszaros' *La rivolta degli intellettuali in Ungheria* (both Turin: Einaudi, 1957). For a comprehensive review of recent writing on post-1945 Hungary, cf. my "The Revolt Reconsidered," *East Europe*, July 1960, pp. 12-20.

² Cf., for Hungary, his "Hungary 1945-1956," introduction to Melvin J. Lasky, ed., *The Hungarian Revolution* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1957), *Neither War Nor Peace* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1960), pp. 341-344 and *From Lenin to Khrushchev* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1960), pp. 368-372; for disengagement, *Neither War Nor Peace*, pp. 346-350 and "Soviet Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Summit," *International Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 1960), pp. 287-298.

tors to put the post-1953 events into a reconsidered context of Hungarian nineteenth and twentieth century history. Of the articles, two, by Messrs. Istvan Meszaros and Imre Kovacs, are highly partisan; they will be considered more in detail below. First, however, the more objective surveys.

The volume begins with a cool and balanced examination of Hungarian history from 1867 to 1920 by Signor Leo Valiani, in which he puts emphasis upon its analogies with that of the last ten years. There is an excellent survey of post-1945 Hungarian economics by George Kemeny, the distinguished Hungarian economist now living in London, author of the standard "Economic Planning in Hungary" (London: R.I.I.A., 1952). Professor Bela Ivanyi-Grunwald makes a significant contribution to a neglected field through his comprehensive and objective article on Hungarian historiography, 1945-1959. Mr. Andrew Revai, a Hungarian publicist living in England, contributes an essay on the 1945-1959 period, correctly pointing out the similarities between the political developments during the Revolt and those which occurred in the immediate postwar period, in particular the formation of national committees at the local level. As to his thesis that the Soviets did not originally intend the full Sovietization of Eastern Europe, this reviewer is inclined to feel that the developments in postwar Poland tend to contradict it. There, in a country much more vital to Soviet interests than Hungary, the process of Sovietization set in at once;³ thereafter, the equivalent developments in the other Eastern European countries were probably only a matter of time. Mr. Endre Enczi, one of the editors of *Irodalmi Újság* during the 1955-56 period, contributes an important study of the organizational and operational aspects of this key

journal; it not only gives many new details but supersedes in some respects the accounts already available.⁴ The most important article in the volume is by Mr. Janos Erös on the 1867-1945 Hungarian democratic, non-Communist, anti-Horthyist opposition; it represents a major contribution to a previously neglected field of Hungarian historiography. Balanced, comprehensive and unprejudiced, it covers the pre-1914 opposition, the Karolyi-Jaszi 1918-1919 interlude, the interwar Fabian and *Szep Szó* groups, the populists (more objectively than Kovacs), and the Second War oppositional elements. Mr. Erös' admirable summary is an essential source for understanding the background and influence of the non-Communist elements during the Hungarian thaw and Revolt. The artificial predominance of revisionist writing during all but the final phases of the Hungarian thaw (the censorship still preventing publication of much material by non-Party members) and the Revolt's short duration and lack of success precluded the emergence of a total picture of what a democratic, independent Hungary would have become. It is probable, however, on what evidence is available, that it would have retained public ownership of heavy industry, restored private ownership in agriculture, and established a parliamentary regime and a neutral foreign policy roughly like that of present-day Austria. In this context, as in any future free Hungary, the liberal, populist and Democratic Socialist currents which Mr. Erös so well describes would have become very important; most likely, with the addition of some variety of Christian Democratic movement, they would have dominated the Hungarian political scene.

One may differ with some of the interpretations in the articles mentioned above without, however, questioning their seriousness and basic objectivity. The same cannot, regretably, be said for all aspects of the two articles first mentioned, those by Istvan Meszaros and Imre Kovacs; these belong more to the category of political polemic than to that of objective scholarship. As such, however, they are of genuine interest to the student of Hungarian affairs.

Each represents a definite, albeit highly biased, left-wing school of thought on Hungarian history, Mr. Meszaros that of revisionist, i.e., revitalized and "humanist," Communism (or, at the least, extreme left-wing Socialism) and Mr. Kovacs that of Hungarian populism. Each is implicitly a tract against the other. Taken together, they have one great advantage for the Western observer: they expose, radically and polemically, the often underestimated split between the two major historical forces in the contemporary Hungarian left: the Marxists and the agrarian radicals. They thus offer a convenient catalogue of the major points at issue, a service the more valuable because most studies yet published in Western languages of pre-1945 Hungary, in particular the great contributions of Professor Macartney,⁵ tend to concentrate more on the conservative (when not authoritarian) regime rather than on the radical opposition groups.

Mr. Meszaros is that *rara avis* in the current political scene, a revisionist. His kind is now practically extinct in Eastern Europe⁶ and only rarely still extant among Eastern European emigres. His intellectual comrades-in-arms are the extreme left in France, Italy and England.⁷ A disciple and former assistant of the great Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic Gyorgy Lukacs, his treatment of modern Hungarian history is that of a man who was never a Stalinist,⁸ has lost much (but perhaps not all) of his faith in Leninism, but remains a firm believer in the desirability and efficacy of Workers' Councils and a "genuine" Popular Front and of a political system which, whatever it is, is not that of parliamentary democracy in the Western sense; it is

³ Notably his *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1957), published in England as *October Fifteenth*.

⁴ Vd. my "What Happened to Revisionism?", *Problems of Communism*, IX, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1960), pp. 1-9.

⁵ Vd. *Soviet Survey*, No. 32 (Apr.-June 1960), especially Giorgio Galli, "The Choice for the Italian Left," pp. 32-39, Jean Duvignaul, "Neo-Marxism in France," pp. 40-45, and G. L. Arnold, "New Reasons in Britain," pp. 46-52.

⁶ I owe Mr. Meszaros an apology for having previously incorrectly (in my "The Revolt Reconsidered," *loc. cit.*, p. 14) included him among the Stalinists.

² For the crucial significance of Poland, vd. especially W. W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena* (N.Y.: Harper, 1960), pp. 177-188.

⁴ Notably Aczel and Meray's *Revolt of the Mind* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1959), whose accounts of the maneuvers around *Irodalmi Újság* must now be checked with Enczi's contribution; so, also, must be Miklos Molnar's "The History of *Irodalmi Újság*" (MS.), in the Columbia University Refugee Project—Hungary (CURPH).

perhaps closest to some of the theories of the Nenni Socialists in Italy. The reader will be confused and probably unfavorably impressed by some of Mr. Meszaros' terminology; he consistently uses "Socialism" when he means "Communism", and his violent antipathy to the Hungarian Social Democrats and the populists culminates in his statement (p. 487):

"Neither the Smallholders nor the National Peasant Party nor the Social Democrats had an economic plan covering the entire country; only the Communist Party had such a plan. . . ."

Mr. Meszaros begins his survey of Hungarian history from 1920 to 1956 with a violent attack on the Social Democrats for their "collaboration" with the Horthy regime. It is true that, so as not to be banned, the Social Democratic leadership in Horthyist Hungary agreed not to propagandize the landless agricultural workers but to confine its activity to the cities,⁹ and one may well, as Mr. Meszaros does, term this "collaboration"; but what, one may well ask, of the collaboration (i.e., remaining within the Communist Party) of those of his heroes like Rajk, Lukacs, or, for that matter, Imre Nagy, with the Stalinist Rakosi? Mr. Meszaros then proceeds to an even stronger attack on the populists, condemning their policy of "illusion" and their alleged lack of any definite political program (p. 475), of "slogans" (p. 477), and of the collaboration of some of them with the Horthy regime (p. 477), while according praise only to their extreme left-wing members, Erdei, Darvas and Veres, of whom the former two (particularly Darvas) became close collaborators with Rakosi after 1945. He then follows Lukacs in denouncing the urbanists for their lack of "links with the masses," and concludes that neither "bourgeois democracy" nor populism had any chance in 1945, but only Communism. Perhaps his most startling (and doubtful) thesis is that after 1945 the non-Communist political leaders preferred to deal with Rakosi rather than with the "anti-Stalinists" Rajk, Szanto, Nagy and Lukacs because they knew and feared the latter's popular support.

⁹ Macartney, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 66, 71.

Mr. Meszaros concludes his article with a survey of developments during the post-1953 period: the New Course, the thaw, and the Revolution. This is somewhat more objective than what precedes it, but it still suffers from an exclusive concentration on the Communist revisionists. Like them, he feels that Imre Nagy was too cautious during the 1953-1954 New Course period and not cautious enough during the Revolution (in withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact). However, in a curious although perhaps unconscious contradiction, he points out that the Workers' Council (which he elsewhere praises so highly) pressed Nagy to this step, one which inevitably brought Soviet intervention. Mr. Meszaros' prescription for Hungary today is a "Socialist" regime run by a combination of a parliamentary democracy (composed, however, only of "Socialist" parties) and of Workers' Councils, with a foreign policy of neutralism made possible by disengagement throughout Central Europe. (Professor Seton-Watson, later in this same volume (pp. 764-766) admirably exposes the lack of realism of disengagement proposals.)

Even to sketch what seems to this reviewer wrong with Mr. Meszaros' views on recent Hungarian history would go beyond the limits of this review; I have elsewhere¹⁰ indicated my general view of contemporary Hungarian affairs. Suffice it to say here that Mr. Meszaros neglects almost completely the force of Hungarian nationalism and the determination of the USSR to hold its grip on Hungary—surely the two major factors in contemporary Hungarian history. He does not discuss the agrarian problem, he does not even mention the Jewish problem, and, in my opinion, he greatly overestimates popular support for Communism in Hungary; had the Revolt succeeded such support would probably have been minute. Finally, he seems to me still bound up in the illusions of revisionism, a phase which is now, as it had to be, past history in Hungary and the rest of Eastern Europe.

Mr. Imre Kovacs' contribution can be discussed more briefly. Most of it

¹⁰ In my "The Revolt Reconsidered," *loc. cit.*

is a summary of the development of the populist movement in Hungary.¹¹ He himself was one of its leaders, both in literature and political action, and the Secretary-General of the National Peasant Party forced to flee the country in 1947. Mr. Kovacs' article is eloquent and highly partisan; its theme is briefly put by his statement (p. 601) that:

. . . the 23rd of October is due, in reality, to the Hungarian populist movement. . . ."

Now this reviewer, as he has written elsewhere,¹² is inclined to give considerable emphasis to the significance of the populist movement¹³ as perhaps the most widely-based and practical alternative to Communism in present-day Hungary, particularly as outlined in the articles of Istvan Bibó.¹⁴ Nevertheless, to say that the Revolt was in reality due to it is to exchange history for rhetoric. After having got this terrible simplification off his chest, however, Mr. Kovacs proceeds to an interesting, useful and (quite naturally) very favorable outline of the development of Hungarian populism, rightly stressing its two major factors: its nationalism and identification with Hungarian popular feelings, and its theory of the "third way"—an agrarian, non-Marxist Socialism with neutrality in foreign affairs. One might wish that Mr. Kovacs had also treated (as he does not) the more purely political aspects of the populist movement, and especially the disputed question of the collaboration of some of its members with the Horthy regime and the Arrow Cross and of others with the Communists. As to the relative role of the populists and the revisionists during the Revolt, again Mr. Kovacs unfortunately (p. 609) mixes fact with rhetoric:

"The Communist revisionists, after a week, found themselves short of arguments, while from the mouths of the populists the argu-

¹¹ And a condensation of a book-length manuscript by Mr. Kovacs, on the same subject, now awaiting publication.

¹² "The Revolt Reconsidered," *loc. cit.*

¹³ *Vd. ibid.*, fn. 23 for bibliography.

¹⁴ Cited in *ibid.*, fn. 24, and now available in a collected volume, *Harmadik, Ut, Politikai es torteneti Tanulmányok* (London: Magyar Könyves Cáh, 1960).

ments gushed out impetuously like the water of life from the fountain of popular fables. . . ."

Nevertheless, this has a kernel of truth; the Communist revisionists, although they played an essential role in getting the thaw under way, were in the process of losing any real political power during the Revolt.¹⁵

In sum, then, the volume under review contains some studies of considerable importance for any serious student of recent Hungarian developments, plus two polemical essays whose very prejudices and distortions at least throw into sharp relief many of the basic questions which historians of contemporary Hungary must work through and to which, one hopes,

they will offer some unprejudiced answers.

¹⁵ For Mr. Kovacs' very unfavorable judgment of some of them, notably Aczel and Meray, vd. his "The Literary Wardens of Hungary" (a review of their *Revolt of the Mind*) in *The New Leader*, XLIII, 17 (Apr. 25, 1960), pp. 23-24; for a moderately prorevisionist reply, vd. a letter by Francois Fejtö in *The New Leader*, XLIII, 33 (Aug. 29, 1960), pp. 30-31.

Book Notes

This section is reserved for brief descriptions of books of possible interest to our readers. The editors make no attempt at critical evaluation or analysis.

The Trial Begins, by Abram Tertz (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960, 128 pp., \$2.95). The identity of the author of this novel, smuggled out of Russia in manuscript, remains a secret. Obviously the work of a brilliant talent, this expressionistic satire is as far removed from official "Socialist realism" as caviar from black bread. It is an acrid study of the hypocrisy of the New Class, set in the last year of Stalin's life when a wave of anti-Semitism culminated in the arrest of a group of doctors accused of plotting to assassinate members of the government. The chief character is the Public Prosecutor. "In strict confidence he told [his mother-in-law] that spy centers had been uncovered in X-garia and X-akia. A group of criminals in the Z Regional Party Committee had been plotting to seize power. . . . The Prosecutor's ears were flushed with blood as thick and dark as oil. . . . It was time, my goodness, it was high time for a good blood-letting, for a sensational public trial to clear the air!"

The Future is Ours, Comrade, by Joseph Novak (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960, 286 pp., \$3.95). Of all the recent books which attempt to show how the Russian citizen lives today, this is certainly one of the most entertaining and readable. Joseph Novak (a pseudonym) records the many conversations he had with Russians during his long stay in the Soviet Union in the period following Stalin's death. Because he lived in many Russian homes, the details of life emerge with particular vividness and authentic-

ity: the overcrowded, shabby apartments; the Russian's relation to love, marriage and children; his awe of authority; his life in the city street which is his second home. The author also includes background material on the Red Army, the factory workers, and the political scene. Introduction by Irving R. Levine.

Who Wants Disarmament? by Richard J. Barnet (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, 141 pp., \$3.50). This is a study of the essential issues in the disarmament debate which has been going on since the first disarmament conference between the Soviet Union and the US in 1946. The author, a practicing lawyer and a staff member of the Harvard University Russian Research Center, examines such questions as America's real position on disarmament, the causes of the prolonged deadlock, the role that indecision plays in shaping our disarmament policy, Russia's propaganda gains on the disarmament issue, and finally, what kind of world is implied if disarmament is to be a reality. He also studies the problem of arms control. Chester Bowles contributes the introduction.

Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917, by Richard A. Pierce (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960, 359 pp., \$7.00). Russian Central Asia, an area half the size of the United States, proved difficult to assimilate and control after its conquest in the nineteenth century. This volume describes events under Imperial

Russian rule and shows the geographic, political and cultural factors that must be faced by any regime in Central Asia. The author gives a concise account of the Russian conquest and administration, the several rebellions and the revolutionary outbreak of 1905, and the Russian economic and cultural innovations. Russification remained the ultimate goal of the colonizers, and in consequence a movement began to take shape among the natives aimed at modernization and ultimate independence. The author concludes with the revolutionary year of 1917, which brought the much harsher rule of the Soviets. Bibliography, index, maps.

A Primer on Communism, by George W. Cronyn (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1960, 192 pp., \$2.95). First published in 1957, this book now appears in an edition that has been revised and brought up to date by the author. It contains over 200 questions and answers on international Communism, intended to provide basic facts on the subject. It briefly covers such topics as the nature of Communism and its system of government, Communism and labor, ownership of land and property, education, family life, religion, etc. The final chapter—How to Combat Communism—offers proposals for coping with the Communist challenge. George W. Cronyn has written numerous articles on Communist ideology and practice and is currently engaged in research on the subject for the US government. Index.

East Europe
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
2 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
Forwarding Postage Guaranteed

BULK RATE
**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**
New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

EDITORIAL DEPT
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
313 NO FIRST ST
ANN ARBOR MICH

7-57

Form 3547 Requested



Printed in U.S.A.

Y
C
S

11